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Paul Davidson on the US subprime-led financial crisis

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HOW TO SOLVE THE U.S. HOUSING PROBLEM AND AVOID
A RECESSION:a revived holc and rtc

Paul Davidson

Paul Davidson is a Visiting Scholar at the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA) and Editor of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.

Within the last few months, the so-called “subprime mortgage crisis” has developed from a small blip on the economic radar screen to a situation that has threatened financial markets and financial institutions worldwide. This financial instability induced the Federal Reserve to announce a historically large 75 basis point decline in the federal funds rate on January 22, 2008. Financial experts and economists are suddenly talking of a U.S. recession in 2008, and the only question is how deep the depressing effects will be. There is even the possibility of a global recession. This recessionary threat has led the White House and Congress to announce a fiscal stimulus package consisting primarily of a one-time tax rebate of between $300 to $1200 for families within defined income limits, plus a temporary tax reduction for business making certain investments in 2008. This stimulus plan is surely too little and too late.

Just a little over a month ago, many of the “best and the brightest” economic experts were not in favor of any fiscal stimulus package. The Wall Street Journal reported that former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan recommended that politicians do nothing to prevent a possible recession as a result of the subprime mortgage lending mess.1 Greenspan preferred to let the market solve the problem by “letting housing prices (and security pegged to mortgages) fall until investors see them as bargains and start buying, stabilizing the economy.” But if Congress does nothing, then a year from today we may be mired in the Greatest Recession since the Great Depression.

The proposed stimulus package will bring forth some additional household and business spending. Nevertheless, perhaps as much as 20 percent of each dollar of household tax rebate will go to buy cheap foreign imported goods, and therefore will not stimulate demand for American produced goods. Another 20 to 30 percent of household rebates may go into reducing household credit card or other debts, or directly into savings accounts. Accordingly, perhaps as little as fifty cents on the dollar will stimulate the economy. Not much stimulus bang for the buck!

The temporary tax cuts for businesses may not stimulate much additional investment as long as domestic market demand remains slack. Moreover, since the business tax relief is temporary, it encourages moving investments that may already be scheduled for next year into today’s tax reduction period, thus creating a potential further decline in demand after the tax relief expires. In sum, any temporary fiscal stimulus package is likely to have temporary, and small if any, positive effects to offset the forthcoming recession in 2008.

As I will discuss below, the original subprime mess has ultimately resulted in an insolvency problem for millions of U.S. households. The government’s fiscal “stimulus” plan does not directly address this insolvency problem. The Federal Reserve pumping in more liquidity will not end the housing insolvency problem. Instead, I suggest a tried and true comprehensive program to create a major federal facility to refinance mortgages at low rates and extended maturities, and to finance new investment in private sector housing.

The goal of this new lending facility will be to: 1) end the insolvency housing problem; 2) avoid a serious recession, and; 3) prevent similar financial bubbles due to securitization of loan-backed financial assets from developing in the future.

BANK SOLVENCY CRISES

A sage once said “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat its errors.” So let’s look at what history can teach us about what “caused” this housing bubble and how we can relieve the distress. After U.S. Stock Market Crash of October 1929, one out of every five banks in the U.S. failed.

Several years after the Crash and the beginning of The Great Depression of the 1930s, a U.S. Senate committee held hearings on the possible causes of the Crash. These hearings indicated that in the early part of the 20th century individual investors were seriously hurt by banks whose self-interest lay in promoting sales of securities that benefited only the banks. The hearings concluded that a major cause of the Crash was that banks, in the 1920s, significantly increased their underwriting activities of securities. Consequently, in 1933, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, which banned banks from underwriting securities. Financial institutions had to choose either to be a simple bank lender or an underwriter (investment banker or brokerage firm). The Act also gave the Federal Reserve more control over banking activities.

As a result, for several decades bank originated mortgage loans were not resalable. The originating bank lender knew that he or she would have to carry the mortgage loan debt security over its life. If the borrower defaulted, the lender would bear the costs of foreclosure. Thus, the originating bank lender thoroughly investigated the three C’s of each borrower—Collateral, Credit History, and Character—before making a mortgage loan.

In the 1970s, deregulation of U.S. banking activities began when brokerage firms began offering money market, high interest, check writing accounts that competed with traditional banking business. In the 1980s the Federal Reserve reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow banks to engage in securities underwriting activities to a small extent. In 1987 the Fed Board allowed banks to handle significant underwriting activities including those of mortgage-backed securities, despite objections of Fed Chairman Paul Volker. When Alan Greenspan became chair of the Fed in 1987, he favored further bank deregulation to help U.S. banks compete with foreign banks, where the latter are often universal banks which are permitted to act as investment banks, take equity stakes, and the like.

In 1996, the Federal Reserve permitted bank holding companies to own investment banking affiliates that could contribute up to 25 percent of total revenue of the holding company. In 1999, after 12 attempts in 25 years, Congress (with the support of President Clinton) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. In a 1999 article in The Wall Street Journal (a few days before Congress repealed the Act), Republican Senator Phil Gramm is quoted as telling a Citigroup lobbyist to “get [Citigroup Co-Chairman] Sandy Weill on the phone right now. Tell him to call the White House and get [them] moving.”2 Soon after Gramm’s warning, President Clinton supported the repeal of the Glass-Steagall. Shortly after Congress repealed the Act, Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin accepted a top job at Citigroup.

Housing market crises in history

Once Glass-Steagall was repealed, there were no legal constraints between loan origination and underwriting activities. Accordingly, there is a great profit incentive for a mortgage originator to search out any potential home buyers (including sub prime ones) and provide them with a mortgage. The originator can then profitably sell these mortgages, usually within 30 days, to an underwriter, or act as an underwriter to sell to the public exotic mortgage-backed securities. The originator therefore has no fear of default if the borrower can at least make his first monthly mortgage payment.

The underwriter typically packages these mortgages into collateral debt obligations (CDOs), Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), or other esoteric financial vehicles. He then sells tranches in these vehicles to unwary pension funds, local and state revenue funds, individual investors, or other banks domestically or overseas (e.g., Northern Rock in the UK) who, led on by the high ratings of these complex financial securities by rating agencies, believe these are safe investment vehicles. Thus, since the turn of the century, this process of packaging and selling mortgage-backed securities has helped finance the housing bubble that pushed housing prices to historic highs by 2005.

In a December 14, 2007 article, New York Times op-ed writer Paul Krugman defined the resulting housing bubble as where the price of housing exceeded a “normal ratio” relative to rents or incomes.3 Like Greenspan, Krugman does not suggest anything that politicians can do to relieve the distress caused by the deflating housing bubble. Krugman believes the market will solve the problem by deflating house prices. He estimates that housing prices will have to fall by 30 percent to restore a “normal ratio.” This implies that home values in the U.S. will decline by some six trillion dollars.

The result will be that many borrowers “will find themselves with negative equity” as their outstanding mortgage exceeds this “normal” market price of the borrower’s house—an insolvency problem. Krugman indicates that no one can provide a quick fix for this problem; he suggests that it will “take years” for the market to clean up the insolvency housing mess.

In many states mortgages are non-recourse loans (i.e., after default and foreclosure the borrower is not responsible for the difference between the outstanding mortgage balance and the lower sale price at foreclosure). If Krugman’s 30 percent house value decline is accurate, as many as 10 million
households will end up with negative equity and will have a strong incentive to default. Millions of homeowners
will lose their homes in foreclosure proceedings and investors in mortgage-backed securities will incur large losses.

The holc

But a study of history can give us clues as to how to solve the problem. The Roosevelt Administration’s handling of the housing insolvency crisis of the 1930s suggests a precedent for dealing with the U.S. housing bubble distress. In 1933, the Home Owners Refinancing Act created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) to refinance homes to prevent foreclosures, and also to bail out mortgage holding banks. The HOLC was a tremendous success, making one million low-interest loans which often extended the pay-off period of the original loan, thereby significantly reducing the monthly payments to amounts that homeowners could afford. In its years of operation, the HOLC not only paid all its bills, but it also made a small profit.

Other measures might include setting up a government agency to take non-performing mortgage loans off the books of private balance sheets and therefore remove the threat of insolvency for those who took positions in the mortgage-backed securities after being misled by rating agencies. The result will prevent further sell-offs causing financial distress in all financial markets. The Resolution Trust Corporation, set up by the government, did remove non-performing mortgage loans from Building Societies’ balance sheets after the 1980s Savings and Loan bank crisis, thereby preventing further financial damage to others. Also, Congress might consider a 21st Century version of the 1930s government-sponsored Reconstruction Finance Corporation to help finance investments and operations in the private sector housing and related industries during this insolvency crisis.
Congress should act promptly to create the necessary government agencies to help clean up this mess rather than wait out the “years” that Krugman suggests it would take if we leave the solution to the market. Moreover, the Greenspan-Krugman market solution will cause collateral damage to many innocent economic casualties (e.g., homeowners in neighborhoods where foreclosures are prevalent, and workers and business firms in construction and related industries).

While we wait for Congress to act on this proposed program, it may be desirable for the Federal government to start up an infrastructure rebuilding program to help stimulate the economy out of a potential forthcoming recession and increase productivity in the longer run. There is sufficient evidence that more than 50 percent of U.S. bridges and other public structures are in a weakened or failing condition. What better way to offset a possible recession in the construction industry and at the same time contribute to improvements in our nation’s transportation productivity? Every dollar spent on rebuilding and improving infrastructure will create jobs for U.S. workers and profits for domestic enterprises.

RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL NAY-SAYERS

There will be those who say that this proposed solution to the housing bubble problem will be too costly. Moreover, they will question why U.S. taxpayers should bail out banks, other financial institutions, individual investors, and individual subprime borrowers who made foolish decisions. To help these institutions and individuals will merely introduce the “moral hazard” problem: protecting individuals and institutions from economic losses they would otherwise suffer due to their previous foolish decisions will only encourage them (and other fools) to make more risky decisions in the future since, if their actions result in large economic losses, they believe the government will step in to bail them out. What is the proper response to nay-sayers who raise these arguments?

First, the real cost of a serious recession in 2008 is very large if we do nothing but hope that the Federal Reserve continues to lower the interest rate that they charge banks. The above proposal assures that, at worst, a mild slow down will occur in 2008, and more likely the U.S. economy will experience substantial economic growth while rebuilding productive infrastructure. Clearly these benefits exceed the potential real costs of a recession that could last several years.

Second, this proposal avoids the significant collateral economic damage to many innocent bystanders that will occur if we rely on the market to reduce home prices by 30 percent. These innocent bystanders include: 1) existing homeowners, especially in areas where there are large number of neighborhood foreclosures; 2) potential home buyers who have deposits on unfinished homes where builders file for bankruptcy (The New York Times recently featured a front-page article about this regarding Levitt Builders in the Carolinas4 ); 3) unemployed workers and businesses in the building and home furnishing industries; 4) local governments that put their revenues into CDOs thinking that their money was in a safe investment, and; 5) some pensioners who might find their annual pension income declining as the pension fund takes a loss on its investment in mortgage-backed assets.

If this proposal is adopted, which banks will be bailed out? Probably very few banks, except the large ones who have combined normal banking affiliates with investment banking underwriting subsidiaries under the banking holding company cloak (e.g., Citigroup). There are news reports that upon occasion these big institutions provided some “liquidity puts”( i.e., promised to buy back some tranches of their asset-backed packages), which means that if financial stress occurs, these banks’ off-balance sheet liabilities might have to be moved back to on-balance sheet of the bank and/or its underwriting affiliate. That partly explains the big write-offs of Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, etc. But these big bank institutions are “too big to fail” anyway, so some bailout must be arranged. Small regional banks often are not big enough to engage in significant underwriting activities. If, however, they did create mortgage-backed assets that they sold to the public, then the liability of default has probably already been passed off without any “liquidity put” guarantees.

The last refuge of those who argue against bailout is the “moral hazard” argument. But if Congress passes a 21st Century equivalent of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits making bank loans resalable, then we will have legally prevented those who have been bailed out from again originating risky loans that they can push off their balance sheets within a month or so.

History also tells us that the distress to U.S. taxpayers for extensive bail-out programs is not significant. Did most taxpayers notice any significant cost of resolving the S&L crisis, despite the media’s constant argument that taxpayers would suffer? Did individual and corporate income tax rates increase as a direct result of the S&L problem?

THE FALLACY OF THE TAXPAYER COST QUESTION

The question of taxpayer costs for bailouts of financial institutions is typically part of discussions by the mass media. The question “what is it going to cost the U.S. taxpayer?” reflects an unthinking bias against active government policies to prevent recession and depression. Asking how much an active government policy to prevent a financial market calamity is going to cost the taxpayer can only be based on an economic theory that assumes that the macroeconomic activity in the economy will be unchanged whether or not the government takes any positive action to remove distress in financial markets. In other words, underlying this question is the micro theory ceteris paribus assumption—where the ceteris paribus is that the nation’s GDP will, in the long run, follow an unchanging long-run permanent full employment trend line.

Accordingly, if there is a recession due to some financial distress, it is conceived as representing an X percent fall below this trend line for a period of time before some automatic market mechanism restores the economy to the predetermined full employment trend line. If, on the other hand, the government takes some positive policy action to resolve the housing insolvency finance problem, then, it is presumed, there must be a Y percent taxpayer cost deduction from the trend line. When the problem is framed in this rhetoric, then it appears obvious that one should compare the magnitudes of X percent vis-à-vis Y percent reduction from the trend line. If Y percent is greater than X percent, then no government action should be taken.

Since the cost of a forthcoming recession cannot be accurately predicted except after the fact, while one can always make some estimate of the cost of operating a government program, it should be obvious that the government plan can always be painted as larger than the cost of a mild recession. Consequently, the rhetoric of this cost to taxpayer question will almost always favor the “do nothing” argument, because it assumes that the economy has some automatic market mechanism that assures that the GDP will always quickly return to a full employment level of GDP.

In the real world, however, there is no predetermined, long-run GDP full employment trend line. The macroeconomic performance of the U.S. economy will be substantially improved in both the short- and long-run if the government takes direct action. If, on the other hand, the government leaves it to the market to solve the problem, the result will be an economic recession that might even collapse into a depression. Consequently, the income of American taxpayers will, on average, be significantly improved if government takes action than if we rely on the market to solve such problems. If the government does nothing, U.S. residents stand to experience a severe reduction to their income levels. Accordingly, a properly designed policy to avoid financial and economic depression provides only benefits—not costs—to the nation’s economy.

Let us look at a historical example where if this type of “what will cost to the tax payer and/or the economy?” question were asked, one of the most desirable government policies would never have been undertaken. At the Bretton Woods conference it was recognized that the European nations would need significant aid to help rebuild their economies after the war. Keynes estimated that the need would be between $12 and $15 billion. U.S. representative Harry Dexter White indicated that Congress could not ask the taxpayers to provide more than $3 billion. Accordingly, the Keynes Plan was defeated at Bretton Woods, and the Dexter White proposals were adopted

Suppose that in 1946 it was recommended that U.S. give a gift of $13 billion dollars over four years to various European countries to help them rebuild their war-ravaged economies (in 1940s current dollars, this sum would be well over $150 billion in 2007 dollars). Obviously if Dexter White was correct, the Congress would never have approved the Marshall Plan. Since the Marshall Plan did not reveal in advance that it would provide foreign governments $13 billion over a period of four years, Congress approved the Marshall Pan. The Marshall Plan gave foreign nations approximately two percent of the United States’ GDP each year for four years. Was the Marshall Plan costly to U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy?

The statistics indicate that, during the Marshall Plan years, for the first time in history the U.S. did not experience a serious economic slowdown immediately after a war. And this despite the fact that federal government expenditures on goods and services declined by approximately 57 percent between 1945 and 1946. Furthermore, four years after World War II, federal government expenditure was still approximately half of what it had been in 1945.

When the U.S. emerged from World War II, the federal debt was more than 100 percent of the GDP. Accordingly, there was great political pressure to reign in federal government spending to make sure that the federal debt did not grow substantially. Clearly, then, it was not “Keynesian” deficit spending that kept the U.S. out of recession in the immediate post-World War II years.

What was the cost of the Marshall Plan to the U.S. economy and the U.S. taxpayer? In 1946, the GDP per capita was 25 percent higher than it had been in the last peace years before the War. GDP per capita continued to grow during the Marshall Plan years. Despite giving away two percent of U.S. GDP, American residents (and taxpayers) experienced a higher standard of living each year.

Clearly The Marshall Plan did not make American taxpayers feel they were bearing a great cost in terms of real income. The Marshall Plan was good for the European nations since the Europeans used the funds to buy U.S. exports needed to feed its population and rebuild it war damaged capital stock. In the United States, unemployment was not a problem despite nine million men and women being released from the Armed Services into the civilian population and labor force. The Marshall Plan financed a significant growth in U.S. exports that help offset, in part, the fall in aggregate demand due to a reduction in government spending. U.S. export growth was not the only offset as pent up consumer demand also expanded in the post-war period. Without the Marshall Plan, however, the U.S. export industries would not have expanded, and probably would have declined, as European nations exhausted whatever foreign reserves they possessed.

In sum, were there any real costs of the Marshall Plan as compared to doing nothing? A response that Americans were forced to reduce their living standards by approximately two percent would only be correct if one assumed that the GDP would have been the same in those early post-war years without the Marshall Plan. Can anyone really believe this?

THE ACCOUNTING COSTS OF INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS HOLC AND RTC

It has already been indicated that the HOLC actually earned a small profit over its life. From 1933 to 1935, the HOLC provided almost $3 billion in bonds to banks in exchange for mortgages, thereby reducing the pressure of potential economic failure for many banks. Moreover, if it were not for the HOLC more houses would have been foreclosed. The economic misery of the depression would have been worse. More Americans would have been living in the street (or Hoovervilles), while the U.S. housing stock would have depreciated much more rapidly due to the neglect of vacant foreclosed homes.

The HOLC financed all of its operations through either earnings or borrowing. Congress never appropriated any funds for the HOLC. [Notice this made the operations of HOLC an off-balance sheet operation.] The original act called for the HOLC to issue its own bonds with the interest guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury and with a maturity not to exceed 18 years. A year later the guarantee by the Treasury was extended to the principal as well. Although HOLC initially issued its bonds to the public, eventually the HOLC received its funds by borrowing directly from the Treasury rather than from the money markets. From 1936 to 1940, HOLC borrowed $875 million directly from the U.S. Treasury.

The RTC was a corporation formed by Congress in 1989 to replace the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and to respond to the insolvency of about 750 savings and loan associations. As receiver, it sold assets of failed S&Ls and paid insured depositors. In 1995 its duties, including insurance of deposit in thrift institutions, were transferred to the Savings Association Insurance Fund.

The S&L crisis in 1989 occurred under a Republican Administration that had pledged “no new taxes.” Nevertheless, the Administration recognized the difficulty of the problem involving the large number of S&L insolvencies, and it supported the formation of the RTC. The first Bush administration recognized, apparently, that the RTC would not require new taxes to burden the U.S. taxpayer with the cost of the program.

After much wrangling by Congress, the initial funding of the RTC included $18.8 billion from the Treasury and $31.2 billion from bonds issued by the RTC (and therefore an-off budget liability). In 1995, the RTC was folded into another larger government agency, and there has been no public accounting records provided to show whether the RTC operations ultimately made a profit or not.

In sum, although there are some accounting costs of setting up any institution similar to the HOLC and the RTC, these bookkeeping entries are unlikely to hurt U.S. taxpayers. The benefits from having such institutions alleviating economic distress far outweigh the costs of allowing deflationary market forces solve the problem of our bursting housing and financial bubble.

notes
1. Wessel, David. (2007). “Don’t Count On A Stimulus Plan.” The Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2007.
2. Schroeder, Michael. (1999). “Glass-Steagall Accord Reached After Last Minute Deal Making.” The Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1999.
3. Krugman, Paul. (2007). “After The Money’s Gone.” The New York Times, December 14, 2007.
4. Streitfeld, David. (2008). “With Builder in Bankruptcy, Buyers Are Left Out.” The New York Times, January 3, 2008.
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Robert Wade on current US credit turmoil

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Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)

The financial crisis: burst bubble, frayed model

Created 2007-10-01 16:00

As everyone now knows, the current financial market turmoil spreading across the Atlantic economy and beyond started with rising defaults in the United States mortgage market. How did the US come to experience a gigantic house-price bubble?


The explanation starts with US trade deficits and their financing. The US has been running an increasing trade (or more accurately, current-account) deficit since the early 1980s, with only one short interruption. The excess of imports over exports is paid for by newly printed dollars or Treasury [1] bonds.


In countries running trade surpluses (like China and Japan [2]), exporters to the US sell their dollars to their banks in return for domestic currency. This increases the demand for domestic currency, which - if the central bank does not intervene - tends to appreciate in value. As the currency appreciates, so too does the wage level, which impairs the economy's competitiveness. So to maintain export competitiveness and to boost employment, the central banks buy the dollars from exporters in return for newly created domestic currency; this functions as high-powered money - increasing domestic demand, raising the ratio of "financial" to "real" transactions, and encouraging speculation in domestic and foreign assets.


At the same time, the central banks use their increasing stock of dollars to invest [3] in US assets in order to earn a return. The return flow pushes up asset values in the US, including property and Treasury bonds. Higher bond prices go with lower yields, and therefore lower interest rates. Lower interest rates push up US consumption, US domestic debt and US imports, and cause the US deficit [4] to grow even bigger. 

But when the central banks invest in US assets like Treasury bonds (using the dollars they have bought from exporters), their action puts downward pressure on the dollar, which, other things being equal, tends to reduce the deficit. Lower bond yields (due to higher price of bonds) mean that other investors are less inclined to buy dollars with which to invest in Treasury bonds, so the lower yields produce a lower dollar.  In fact, lower yields may cause some foreign investors to sell the Treasury bonds they already hold and then sell the dollars they receive to buy some other currency with higher yields, adding to downward pressure on the dollar.

Robert Wade is professor of political economy at the London School of Economics. He worked as a World Bank economist in the 1980s. He is the author of Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization [5] (Princeton University Press, 1990) and of "Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?", in John Ravenhill, ed., Global Political Economy [6] (Oxford University Press, 2005).

The banks' choice

This mechanism has generated impressive economic growth in both deficit and surplus countries; but it is inherently unstable. Large trade imbalances [7] generate larger increases in financial transactions and rising financial fragility, as rapidly increasing central-bank reserves (due to the US current-account deficit) provide the fuel for inflationary pressures and for mushrooming growth of the financial sector relative to other sectors. Banking crises, foreign-exchange crises, housing crises and the like become more likely (see Richard Duncan's book, The Dollar Crisis [8] [Wiley, 2005], and his "Blame the dollar standard", FinanceAsia, September 2007 [9]) [subscription only]).


More specifically, central banks, faced with rising reserves denominated mostly in dollars, have a choice of three types of dollar assets:


(a) the bonds of the US government, in the form of Treasury bonds


(b) the bonds of "quasi-government" agencies, or government-sponsored enterprises [10] (GSEs), like the mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac


(c) asset-backed securities issued by the private sector.


The banks' preference is for government bonds, the safest. But the supply and therefore the price of Treasury bonds depend on the state of the US budget deficit. When it is in or near surplus the supply is low and the price relatively high - therefore the returns are relatively low; and so the central banks switch their purchases to (b) or (c).


The turbo-charger effect


In the late 1990s, with both the US current-account deficit and foreign central-bank reserves continuing to increase, the US budget went into surplus thanks to the internet bubble and fast overall growth. The supply of government (Treasury) bonds therefore fell. Foreign central banks switched their demand to the next safest US asset, quasi-government bonds, in particular those of the mortgage lenders. So Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac [11] enormously expanded their bond-issuance and mortgage-lending in the next several years, initiating the housing-market bubble.


But then the US budget went into deficit after the collapse of the stock-market bubble and the George W Bush administration's tax cuts [12], and the Treasury needed to sell more bonds. To cut a long story short, it engineered a halt to the issue of any more quasi-government bonds (to curb competition with government bonds), and foreign central-banks' demand switched back to government bonds.


By 2004 the property boom initiated earlier was generating rapid and broad-based economic growth in the US (enough [13] to get Bush re-elected). So tax revenues increased and the US budget again went into surplus. The supply of new Treasury bonds fell.


Foreign central banks, with still fast-rising dollar reserves meeting a smaller supply of US government and quasi-government bonds, therefore switched to the third category of US assets, so-called asset-backed securities [14] (ABSs). Between 2003 and 2004 the issuance of ABSs in the US more than doubled, and then almost doubled again in 2005. A large part of these ABSs was backed by mortgages - mortgages issued not so much by the quasi-government mortgage lenders as by private banks and other financial organisations.


To generate new demand, the latter developed new kinds of mortgages [15] aimed at people previously not able to obtain mortgages on conventional terms: the so-called "sub-prime" mortgages, or "liar" loans, or Ninja loans (no income, no job). The mortgagees were told that continuously rising house prices would allow them to "extract equity" from the rising value of the house and in this way meet the higher repayments when the repayment terms toughened in a year or two. The private banks developed techniques [16] of "securitising" the mortgages, techniques known by the impressive-sounding term "structured finance", by which combinations of highly risky mortgages could be packaged and sold - and given AAA ratings by the rating agencies on the pretext that the risk was widely dispersed (hence the ironic appellation, Ninja AAA loans).

This mechanism constituted a turbo-charger [17] on the US house market. House prices escalated, the bubble intensified.


It was not only foreign central banks which accumulated dollars and sought to buy US dollar assets; so too did commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds and the like. And they were not only non-US investors; US investors were also seeking to buy the same "risk-free" assets.


Meanwhile, US consumption soared, spurred on by equity extraction from rising house values, and so therefore did the US trade deficit. The jump in US imports helped to fuel a global economic boom in 2004-06; to which China's fast growth [18], itself fuelled by exports to the US, contributed via improved terms of trade for commodity producers in developing countries. The world economy grew at its fastest rate in decades in 2004-06.


Globalisation was cheered [19] to the rooftops; the views of "anti-globalisation" activists were being confounded (so the argument went), as free-market capitalism was evidently working to bring widely disbursed economic growth and associated benefits, even in parts of Africa.


The cost of collapse


The bursting of the property bubble in the US in 2006 triggered a sequence in which, slowly, banking and financial operators became aware that the foundation of the debt pyramid was quicksand [21]. The US house buyer/consumer (below the top 20% of households) was increasingly insolvent, or nearly so. The large international banks, hoping for the best, waited until the summer of 2007 before they began to acknowledge that many of their complex debt instruments (ABSs) were non-performing [22]: the debts could not be repaid, yet the banks were counting them as revenue-yielding assets. But in August 2007 they jammed on the brakes and cut lending, including to each other - and in many other parts of the Atlantic economy (not just the US) as well.

The knock-on effect of the falls in house prices and the rise in repossessions in the US mean that all other mortgage markets are in trouble - including cars and credit-cards [23]. Unemployment is growing, consumption is stagnant.


The figure to watch is the ratio of total US debt to GDP [24]. The ratio of rising debt to GDP has fuelled US growth in the past several decades (it went from 240% in 1990 to 340% in 2006). If total debt/GDP suddenly flattens, the US will experience a recession. If US debt/GDP falls, the world will experience a recession, because its fall will go with a fall in US consumption, which accounts for at least 20% of world consumption. The crisis has already spread to housing markets and mortgage lenders in the US, Germany, France, Spain, and South Korea. It will soon affect China and Japan, which are the two biggest holders [25] by far of US national debt and stand to lose the most from a steep dollar devaluation. They are also large net exporters to the US, and will suffer from a fall in their US exports as the US contracts.


Meanwhile, oil has hit a record $84 a barrel, up from $24 in 2003; this generates a strong inflationary dynamic because of the effect on transport costs (equivalent to a general tariff increase). The price of uranium [26] has jumped more than ten times since 2000, from $3.18 per kilogram to $38.6 per kilogram in 2007. The existing 440 nuclear reactors in the world require 82 million kilograms of uranium per year; but mines supply only 45.5m (the balance comes from national stockpiles and decommissioned nuclear weapons). Production from existing mines is falling; yet another ninety nuclear plants [27] are either under construction or in planning. As though this was not enough, the price of wheat is at record levels and world wheat stocks at their lowest for decades; which adds to the other sources of inflationary pressure, in the form of higher food costs.


Saudi Arabia looks set to greatly reduce [28] the weight of dollars in its reserves, accelerating the fall of the dollar. Its action would probably trigger a stampede out of depreciating [29] dollar assets by other Gulf oil exporters (which currently have the fourth largest holdings of US national debt, after China, Japan and Britain).

The turmoil might even induce a shift in the neo-liberal consensus about the role of government in governing the market. Even the industrial and financial sectors might become more sympathetic to the idea of more limits on some kinds of markets (including for executive remuneration) - limits decided through a political process, in line with a social-democratic vision. After all, the Nordic countries achieve [30] astounding prosperity with a denser regulatory regime and substantially less inequality of income and wealth than in the more neo-liberally-oriented countries.


The Guardian's Larry Elliott [31] issues a useful caution here: "The sad fact is that only a deep recession is likely to generate enough national self-disgust at the destructive get-rich-quick value system oozing out of the City [of London] to create the political pressure for reform" (see "When money lenders cry for hand-outs [32]", Guardian, 10 September 2007).


The consequences of waiting for a deep recession will be greater than anything seen so far.



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2007/11/01 12:28 2007/11/01 12:28

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Perry Anderson LRB

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Depicting Europe by Perry Anderson (London Review of Books).
 
An epiphany is beguiling Europe. Far from dwindling in historical significance, the Old World is about to assume an importance for humanity it has never, in all its days of dubious past glory, before possessed. At the end of Postwar, his 800-page account of the continent since 1945, the historian Tony Judt exclaims at ‘Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the 21st century as a paragon of the international virtues: a community of values . . . held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate’.1 The reputation, he assures us, is ‘well-earned’. The same vision grips the seers of New Labour. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century declaims the title of a manifesto by Mark Leonard, the party’s foreign policy wunderkind.2 ‘Imagine a world of peace, prosperity and democracy,’ he enjoins the reader. ‘What I am asking you to imagine is the “New European Century”.’ How will this entrancing prospect come about? ‘Europe represents a synthesis of the energy and freedom that come from liberalism with the stability and welfare that come from social democracy. As the world becomes richer and moves beyond satisfying basic needs such as hunger and health, the European way of life will become irresistible.’ Really? Absolutely. ‘As India, Brazil, South Africa and even China develop economically and express themselves politically, the European model will represent an irresistibly attractive way of enhancing their prosperity whilst protecting their security. They will join with the EU in building “a New European Century”.’
 
Not to be outdone, the futurologist Jeremy Rifkin – American by birth, but by any standards an honorary European: indeed a personal adviser to Romano Prodi when he was president of the European Commission – has offered his guide to The European Dream.3 Seeking ‘harmony, not hegemony’, he tells us, the EU ‘has all the right markings to claim the moral high ground on the journey towards a third stage of human consciousness. Europeans have laid out a visionary road map to a new promised land, one dedicated to reaffirming the life instinct and the Earth’s indivisibility.’ After a lyrical survey of this route – typical staging-posts: ‘Government without a Centre’, ‘Romancing the Civil Society’, ‘A Second Enlightenment’ – Rifkin, warning us against cynicism, concludes: ‘These are tumultuous times. Much of the world is going dark, leaving many human beings without clear direction. The European Dream is a beacon of light in a troubled world. It beckons us to a new age of inclusivity, diversity, quality of life, deep play, sustainability, universal human rights, the rights of nature, and peace on Earth.’
 
These transports may seem peculiarly Anglo-Saxon, but there is no shortage of more prosaic equivalents on the Continent. For Germany’s leading philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, Europe has found ‘exemplary solutions’ for two great issues of the age: ‘governance beyond the nation-state’ and systems of welfare that ‘serve as a model’ to the world. So why not triumph in a third? ‘If Europe has solved two problems of this magnitude, shouldn’t it issue a further challenge: to defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law’ – or, as his compatriot the sociologist Ulrich Beck puts it, ‘Europeanisation means creating a new politics. It means entering as a player into the meta-power game, into the struggle to form the rules of a new global order. The catchphrase for the future might be: Move over America – Europe is back!’ In France, Marcel Gauchet, theorist of democracy and an editor of Le Débat, the country’s central journal of ideas, explains, more demurely, that ‘we may be allowed to think that the formula the Europeans have pioneered is destined eventually to serve as a model for the nations of the world. That lies in its genetic programme.’
 
Self-satisfaction is scarcely unfamiliar in Europe. But the contemporary mood is something different: an apparently illimitable narcissism, in which the reflection in the water transfigures the future of the planet into the image of the beholder. What explains this degree of political vanity? Obviously, the landscape of the continent has altered in recent years, and its role in the world has grown. Real changes can give rise to surreal dreams, but they need to be calibrated properly, to see what the connections or lack of them might be. A decade ago, three great imponderables lay ahead: the advent of monetary union, as designed at Maastricht; the return of Germany to regional preponderance, with reunification; and the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe. The outcome of each remained ex ante indeterminate. How far have they been clarified since?
 
Of its nature, the introduction of a single currency, adopted simultaneously by 11 out of 15 member states of the EU on the first day of 1999, was the most punctual and systematic transformation of the three. It was always reasonable to suppose its effects would be the soonest visible, and most clear-cut. Yet this has proved so only in the most limited technical sense, that the substitution of a dozen monies by one (Greece joined in 2002) was handled extremely smoothly, without glitch or mishap: an administrative tour de force. Otherwise, contrary to general expectations, the net upshot of the monetary union that came into force in the Eurozone eight years ago remains undecidable. The stated purpose of the single currency was to lower transaction costs and increase predictability of returns for business, so unleashing higher investment and faster growth of productivity and output.
 
But to date the causes have failed to generate the results. The dynamic effects of the Single European Act of 1986, held by most orthodox economists to be an initiative of greater significance than EMU, had already been wildly oversold: the official Cecchini Report estimated it would add between 4.3 and 6.4 per cent to the GDP of the Community where in reality it yielded gains of little over 1 per cent. So far, the pay-off for EMU has been even more disappointing. Far from picking up, growth in the Eurozone initially slowed down, from an average of 2.4 per cent in the five years before monetary union, to 2.1 in the first five years after it. Even with the modest acceleration of the last three years, it remains below the level of the 1980s. In 2000, on the heels of the single currency, the Lisbon summit promised to create within ten years ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’. In the event, the EU has so far recorded a growth rate well below that of the US, and has lagged far behind China. Caught between the scientific and technological magnetism of America, where two-fifths of all scientists – some 400,000 – are now EU-born, and the cheap labour of the PRC, where average wages are well over twenty times lower, Europe has not had much to show for its bombast.
 
Not only has the performance of the single-currency bloc been well below America’s. More pointedly, the Eurozone has been outstripped by those countries within the EU which declined to scrap their own currencies, Sweden, Britain and Denmark all posting higher rates of growth over the same period. Casting a further shadow over the legacy of Maastricht, the Stability Pact which was supposed to ensure that fiscal indiscipline at national level would not undermine monetary rigour at supranational level has been breached repeatedly and with impunity by both Germany and France, the two leading economies of the Eurozone. Had its deflationary impact been enforced, as it was on Portugal, which was in less of a position to resist, overall growth would have been yet lower.
 
Still, it would be premature to think that any unequivocal verdict on monetary union had been reached. The advocates of EMU point to Ireland and Spain as success stories within the Eurozone, and look to the general economic upturn of the past year, led by Germany, as a sign that monetary union may at last be coming into its own. Above all, they can vaunt the strength of the euro itself. Not only are long-term interest rates in the Eurozone below those in the US. More strikingly, the euro has overtaken the dollar as the world’s premier currency in the international bond market. One result has been to power a wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Euroland itself, evidence of the kind of capital deepening the architects of monetary union envisaged. Given the volatility of relative regional or national standings in the world economy – Japan’s is only the most spectacular reversal of fortune since the 1980s – might not the Eurozone, after somewhat over seven lean years, now be poised for their biblical opposite?
 
Here, clearly, much depends on the degree of European interconnection with, or insulation from, the US economy, which dominates global demand. The mediocrity of Eurozone performance since 1999, attributable in the eyes of economic liberals to statist inertias and labour-market rigidities that it has taken time to overcome, but that are now giving way, has unfolded against the background of a global conjuncture, driven principally by American consumption, which for the last five years has been highly favourable – world economic growth averaging over 4.5 per cent, a rate not seen since the 1960s. A large part of this boom has come from rocketing house prices. That holds above all for the US, but also for much of the OECD: not least such once peripheral economies as Spain and Ireland, where construction has been the linchpin of recent growth. In the major Eurozone economies, on the other hand, where mortgages are not so central to financial markets, such effects have been more subdued. But, as the exposure of European banks to the collapse of sub-prime markets in the US is currently showing, the lines of repackaged credit are now so diffused and entangled across financial markets that the Eurozone is unlikely to be sheltered from a transatlantic recession.
 
The role of Germany in the new Europe remains no less ambiguous. Absorption of the DDR has restored the country to its standing at the beginning of the 20th century as the strategically central land of the continent, the most populous nation and the largest economy. But the longer-term consequences of reunification have still to unfold. Internationally, the Berlin republic has unquestionably become more assertive, shedding a range of postwar inhibitions. In the past decade the Luftwaffe has returned to the Balkans, Einsatztruppen are fighting in West Asia, the Deutsche Marine patrols the Eastern Mediterranean. But these have been subcontracted enterprises, in Nato or UN operations governed by the United States, not independent initiatives. Diplomatic postures have been more significant than military. Under Schröder, close ties were developed with Russia, in an entente that became the most distinctive feature of his foreign policy. But this was not a second Rapallo Pact, at the expense of western neighbours. Under Chirac and Berlusconi, France and Italy courted Putin scarcely less, but with fewer economic trumps in hand. Within Europe itself, the Red-Green government in Berlin, for all its well-advertised generational lack of complexes, never rocked the boat in the way its Christian Democrat predecessor in Bonn had done. Since 1991, in fact, there has been no action to compare with Kohl’s unilateral recognition of Slovenia, precipitating the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Merkel has moved successfully to circumvent the will of French and Dutch voters, but was in no position to accomplish this on her own: for that, governments in Paris and the Hague were necessary. The prospects of any informal German hegemony in Europe, classically considered, seem at present remote.
 
Part of the reason for the relatively subdued profile of the new Germany has been the cost of reunification itself, for which the bill to date has come to more than a trillion dollars, saddling the country for years with stagnation, high unemployment and mounting public debt. France, though no greyhound itself, consistently outpaced Germany, posting faster rates of growth for a full decade from 1994 to 2004, with more than double its increase in GDP in the first five years of the new century. In 2006, substantial German recovery finally arrived, and the tables have been turned. Currently the world’s leading exporter, Germany now looks as if it might be about to exercise once again something like the economic dominance of Europe it enjoyed in the days of Schmidt and the early Kohl. Then it was the tight money policies of the Bundesbank that held its neighbours by the throat. With the euro, that form of pressure has gone. What threatens to replace it is the remarkable wage repression on which German recovery has been based. Between 1998 and 2006, unit labour costs in Germany actually fell – a staggering feat: real wages declined for seven straight years – while they rose some 15 per cent in France and Britain, and between 25 and 35 per cent in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. With devaluation now barred, the Mediterranean countries are suffering a drastic loss of competitiveness that augurs ill for the whole southern tier of the EU. Harsher forms of German power, pulsing through the market rather than issuing from the high command or central bank, may lie in store. It is too soon to write off a regional Grossmacht.
 
Germany has now been reunited for 16 years. A single currency has circulated for eight years. The enlargement of the EU is just over three years old: it would be strange if its outcomes were already clearer. In practice the expansion of the EU to the East was set in motion in 1993, and completed – for the moment – only this year, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. At one level it is plain why it should be perhaps the principal source of satisfaction in today’s chorus of European self-congratulation. All nine former ‘captive nations’ of the Soviet bloc have been integrated without a hitch into the Union. Only the lands of a once independent Communism, in the time of Tito and Hoxha, wait to join the fold, and even there a start has been made with Slovenia. Capitalism has been restored smoothly and speedily, without vexing delays or derogations. Indeed, as the director-general of the EU Commission for Enlargement recently observed, ‘Nowadays the level of privatisation and liberalisation of the market is often higher in new member states than old ones.’ In this newly freed zone, rates of growth have also been considerably higher than in the larger economies to the west.
 
No less impressive has been the virtually frictionless implantation of political systems matching liberal norms – representative democracies complete with civil rights, elected parliaments, separation of powers, alternation of governments. Under the benevolent but watchful eye of the Commission, seeing to it that criteria laid down at the Copenhagen Summit of 1993 were properly met, Eastern Europe has been shepherded into the comity of free nations. There was no backsliding. The elites of the region were in most cases only too anxious to oblige. For their populations, constitutional niceties were less important than higher standards of living once the late Communist yoke was thrown off, although few if any citizens were indifferent to the humbler liberties of speech, occupation or travel. When the time for accession came, there was assent, but little enthusiasm. Only in two countries out of ten – Lithuania and Slovenia – did a majority of the electorate turn out to vote for it, in referenda which most of the population elsewhere ignored, no doubt in part because they regarded it as a fait accompli by their leaders.
 
Still, however technocratic or top-down the mechanics of enlargement may have been, the formal unification of the two halves of Europe is a historical achievement of the first order. This is not because it has restored the countries of the East to an age-long common home, from which only a malign fate – the totalitarian grip of Russia – wrested them after the Second World War, as the ideologues of Central Europe, Kundera and others, have argued. The division of the continent has deeper roots, and goes back much further, than the pact at Yalta. In a well-received book, the American historian Larry Wolff charged travellers and thinkers of the Enlightenment with ‘the invention of Eastern Europe’ as a supercilious myth of the 18th century.4 The reality is that from the time of the Roman Empire onwards, the lands now covered by the new member states of the Union were nearly always poorer, less literate and less urbanised than most of their counterparts to the west: prey to nomadic invasions from Asia; subjected to a second serfdom that spared neither the German lands beyond the Elbe nor even relatively advanced Bohemia; annexed by Habsburg, Romanov, Hohenzollern or Ottoman conquerors. Their fate in the Second World War and its aftermath was not an unhappy exception in their history, but – catastrophically speaking – par for the course.
 
It is this millennial record, of repeated humiliation and oppression, that entry into the Union offers a chance, finally, to leave behind. Who, with any sense of the history of the continent, could fail to be moved by the prospect of a cancellation in the inequality of its nations’ destinies? The original design for EU expansion to the East, a joint product of German strategy under Kohl and interested local elites, seconded by assorted Anglo-American publicists, was to fast-track Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the Union, as the most congenial states of the region, with the staunchest records of resistance to Communism and the most Westernised political classes, leaving less favoured societies to kick their heels in the rear. Happily, this invidious redivision of the East was avoided. Credit for preventing it must go in the first instance to France, which from the beginning advocated a ‘regatta’ approach, insisting on the inclusion of Romania, which made it difficult to exclude Bulgaria; to Sweden, which championed Estonia, with the same effect on Latvia and Lithuania; and to the Prodi Commission, which eventually rallied to comprehensive rather than selective enlargement. The result was a far more generous settlement than originally envisaged.
 
What of the economic upshot of expansion for the Union itself? Thanks to the modesty of the regional funds allocated to the East, the financial cost of enlargement has been significantly less than once estimated, and the balance of trade has favoured the more powerful economies of the West. This, however, is small change. The real takings – or bill, depending on who is looking at it – lie elsewhere. Core European capital now has a major pool of cheap labour at its disposal, conveniently located on its doorstep, not only dramatically lowering its production costs in plants to the East, but capable of exercising pressure on wages and conditions in the West. The archetypal case is Slovakia, where wages in the auto industry are one eighth of those in Germany, and more cars per capita are shortly going to be produced – Volkswagen and Peugeot in the lead – than in any other country in the world. It is the fear of such relocation, with the closure of factories at home, that has cowed so many German workers into accepting longer hours and less pay. Race-to-the bottom pressures are not confined to wages. The ex-Communist states have pioneered flat taxes to woo investment, and now compete with each other for the lowest possible rate: Estonia started with 26 per cent, Slovakia offers 19 per cent, Romania advertises 16 per cent, while Poland is now mooting a best-buy of 15 per cent.
 
The role configured by the new East in the EU, in other words, promises to be something like that played by the new South in the American economy since the 1970s: a zone of business-friendly fiscal regimes, weak or non-existent labour movements, low wages and – therefore – high investment, registering faster growth than in the older core regions of continent-wide capital. Like the US South, too, the region seems likely to fall somewhat short of the standards of political respectability expected in the rest of the Union. Already, now that they are safely inside the EU and there is no longer the same need to be on their best behaviour, the elites of the region show signs of kicking over the traces. In Poland, the ruling twins defy every norm of ideological correctness as understood in Strasbourg or Brussels. In Hungary, riot police stand on guard around a ruler unabashed at vaunting his lies to voters. In the Czech Republic, months pass without parliament being able to form a government. In Romania, the president insults the prime minister in a phone-in call to a television talk-show. But, as in Kentucky or Alabama, such provincial quirks add a touch of folkloric colour to the drab metropolitan scene more than they disturb it.
 
All analogies have their limits. The distinctive role of the new South in the political economy of the US has depended in part on immigration attracted by the region’s climate, which has given it rates of demographic growth well above the national average. Eastern Europe is much more likely to suffer out-migration, as the recent tide of Poles arriving in Britain, and similar numbers from the Baltics and elsewhere in Ireland and Sweden, suggest. But labour mobility in any direction is – and, for obvious linguistic and cultural reasons, will remain – far lower in the EU than in the US. Local welfare systems, inherited from the Communist past, and not yet greatly dismantled, are also potential constraints on a Southern path. Nor does the East, with less than a quarter of the population of the Union, have anything like the relative weight of the South in the United States, not to speak of the political leverage of the region at federal level. For the moment, the effect of enlargement has essentially been much what the Foreign Office and the employers’ lobbies in Brussels always hoped it would be: the distension of the EU into a vast free-trade zone, with a newly acquired periphery of cheap labour.
 
The integration of the East into the Union is the major achievement to which admirers of the new Europe can legitimately point. Of course, as with the standard encomia of the record of EU as a whole, there is a gap between ideology and reality in the claims made for it. The Community that became a Union was never responsible for the ‘fifty years of peace’ conventionally ascribed to it, a piety attributing to Brussels what in any strict sense belonged to Washington. When actual wars threatened in Yugoslavia, far from preventing their outbreak, the Union if anything helped to trigger them. In not dissimilar fashion, publicists for the EU often imply that without enlargement Eastern Europe would never have reached the safe harbour of democracy, foundering in new forms of totalitarianism or barbarism. There is somewhat more substance to this argument, since the EU has supervised stabilisation of the political systems of the region. But this claim too exaggerates dangers in the service of vanities. The EU played no role in the overthrow of the regimes installed by Stalin, and there is little sign that any of the countries in which they fell were at risk of lapsing into new dictatorships, were it not for the saving hand of the Commission. Enlargement has been a sufficient historical annealment, and so far economic success, not to require claims that it has also been, counter-factually, a political deliverance. The standard hype demeans rather than elevates what has been achieved.
 
There remains the largest question of all. What has been the impact of expansion to the East on the institutional framework of the EU itself? Here the glass darkens. For if enlargement has been the principal achievement of the recent period, the constitution that was supposed to renovate the Union has been its most signal failure, and the potential interactions between the two remain a matter of obscurity. The Convention on the Future of Europe met in early 2002, and in mid-2003 delivered a draft European Constitution that was agreed by the European Council in the summer of 2004. Delegates from candidate countries were nominally included in the Convention, but since the Convention itself amounted to little more than window-dressing for the labours of its president, Giscard d’Estaing, assisted by a British factotum, John Kerr, the two real authors of the draft, their presence was of no consequence. The future charter of Europe was written for the establishments of the West, the governments of the existing 15 member states who had to approve it, relegating the countries of the East to onlookers. In effect, the logic of a constituent will was inverted: instead of enlargement becoming the common basis of a new framework, the framework was erected before enlargement.
 
The ensuing debacle came as a brief thunderclap to the Western elites. The Constitution – more than 500 pages long, comprising 446 articles and 36 supplementary protocols, a bureaucratic elephantiasis without precedent – increased the power of the four largest states in the Union, Germany, France, Britain and Italy; topped the inter-governmental complex in which they would have greater sway with a five-year presidency, unelected by the European Parliament, let alone the citizens of the Union; and inscribed the imperatives of a ‘highly competitive’ market, ‘free of distortions’, as a foundational principle of political law, beyond the reach of popular choice. The founders of the American Republic would have rubbed their eyes in disbelief at such a ponderous and rickety construction. But so overwhelming was the consensus of the continent’s media and political class behind it, that few doubted it would come into force. To the astonishment of their rulers, however, voters made short work of it. In France, where the government was unwise enough to dispatch copies of the document to every voter (Giscard complained of this folly with his handiwork), little was left of it at the end of a referendum campaign in which a spirited popular opposition – without the support of a single mainstream party, newspaper, magazine, let alone radio or television programme – routed an establishment united in endorsing it. Rarely, even in recent French history, was a pensée quite so unique upended so spectacularly.
 
In the last days of the campaign, as polls showed increasing rejection of the Constitution among voters, panic gripped the French media. But no local hysterics, though there were many, rivalled those in Germany. ‘Europe Demands Courage,’ admonished Günter Grass, Jürgen Habermas and a cohort of like-minded German intellectuals, in an open letter dispatched to Le Monde. Warning their neighbours that ‘France . . . would isolate itself fatally if it were to vote “No”,’ they went on: ‘The consequences of a rejection would be catastrophic,’ indeed ‘an invitation to suicide’, for ‘without courage there is no survival.’ In member states new and old ‘the Constitution fulfils a dream of centuries,’ and to vote for it was not just a duty to the living, but to the dead: ‘we owe this to the millions upon millions of victims of our lunatic wars and criminal dictatorships.’ This from a country where no risk was taken of any democratic consultation of the elector -ate, and pro forma ratification of the Constitution was stage-managed in the Bundesrat to impress French voters a few days before their referendum, with Giscard as guest of honour at the podium. As for French isolation, three days later the Dutch – told, still more bluntly, that Auschwitz awaited Europe if they failed to vote yes – threw out the Constitution by an even wider margin.
 
Such popular repudiation of the charter for a new Europe, not because it was too federalist, but because it seemed to be little more than an impenetrable scheme for the redistribution of oligarchic power, embodying everything most distrusted in the arrogant, opaque system the EU appeared to have become, was not in reality a bolt from the blue. Virtually every time – there have not been many – that voters have been allowed to express an opinion about the direction the Union was taking, they have rejected it. The Norwegians refused the EC tout court; the Danes declined Maastricht; the Irish, the Treaty of Nice; the Swedes, the euro. Each time, the political class promptly sent them back to the polls to correct their mistake, or waited for the occasion to reverse the verdict. The operative maxim of the EU has become Brecht’s dictum: in case of setback, the government should dissolve the people and elect a new one.
 
Predictably, amid the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome that gave birth to the EEC, European heads of state were soon discussing how to cashier the popular will once again, and reimpose the Constitution with cosmetic alterations but without exposing it this time to the risks of a democratic decision. At the Brussels summit this June, the requisite adjustment – now renamed a simple treaty – was agreed. To let it disavow a referendum, Britain was exempted from the Charter of Fundamental Rights to which all other member states subscribed. To throw a sop to French opinion, references to unfettered competition were tucked away in a protocol, rather than appearing in the main document. To square the conscience of the Dutch, ‘promotion of European values’ was made a test of membership. To save the face of Poland’s rulers, the demotion of their country to second rank in the Council was deferred for a decade, leaving their successors to come to terms with it.
 
The principal novelty at this gathering to resuscitate what French and Dutch voters had buried was the determination of Germany to ensure its primacy in the electoral structure of the Council. Polish objections to a formula doubling Germany’s weight, and drastically reducing Poland’s, had – for reasons that voting theory in international organisations has long made clear, as experts in such matters pointed out – every technical consideration of fairness on their side. But issues of equity were of no more relevance to the outcome than issues of democracy. After blustering that demographic losses in the Second World War entitled Poland to proportionate compensation in the design of the Union, the Kaczynski twins crumpled as quickly as the country’s prewar colonels before the German blitz. Brave talk forgotten, it was all over in a phone call. For the region where Poland accounts for nearly half the population and GDP, the episode is a lesson in the tacit hierarchy of states it has entered. The East is welcome, but should not get above itself.
 
Not that crumbs are unavailable. As the British, Dutch and French rulers, so the Polish too received, with their postponed demotion, the fig-leaf needed to dispense them from submitting the reanimated Constitution to the opinion of their voters. It was left to Ireland’s Premier Ahern – along with Blair, another of the conference’s recent escapees from a cloud of corruption – to exclaim, in a moment of unguarded delight: ‘90 per cent of it is still there!’ Even loyal commentators have found it difficult to suppress all disgust at the cynicism of this latest exercise in the ‘Community method’. The contrast between such realities and the placards of the touts for the new Europe could scarcely be starker. The truth is that the light of the world, role model for humanity at large, cannot even count on the consent of its populations at home.
 
What kind of political order, then, is taking shape in Europe, 15 years after Maastricht? The pioneers of European integration – Monnet and his fellow spirits – envisaged the eventual creation of a federal union that would one day be the supranational equivalent of the nation-states out of which it emerged, anchored in an expanded popular sovereignty, based on universal suffrage, its executive answerable to an elected legislature, and its economy subject to requirements of social responsibility. In short, a democracy magnified to semi-continental scale (they had only Western Europe in mind). But there was always another way of looking at European unification, which saw it more as a limited pooling of powers by member governments for certain – principally economic – ends, that did not imply any fundamental derogation of national sovereignty as traditionally understood, but rather the creation of a novel institutional framework for a specified range of transactions. De Gaulle famously represented one version of this outlook; Thatcher another. Between these federalist and inter-governmentalist visions of Europe, there has been a continual tension down to the present.
 
What has come into being, however, corresponds to neither. Constitutionally, the EU is a caricature of a democratic federation, since its Parliament lacks powers of initiative, contains no parties with any existence at European level, and wants even a modicum of popular credibility. Modest increments in its rights have not only failed to increase public interest in this body, but have been accompanied by a further decline in it. Participation in European elections has sunk steadily, to below 50 per cent, and the newest voters are the most indifferent of all. In the East, the regional figure in 2004 was scarcely more than 30 per cent; in Slovakia less than 17 per cent of voters cast a ballot for their delegates to Strasbourg. Such ennui is not irrational. The European Parliament is a Merovingian legislature. The mayor in the palace is the Council of Ministers, where real law-making decisions are taken, topped by the European Council of the heads of state, meeting every three months. Yet this complex in turn fails the opposite logic of an inter-governmental authority, since it is the Commission – the EU’s unelected executive – alone that can propose the laws on which the Council and (more notionally) the Parliament deliberate. The violation of a constitutional separation of powers in this dual authority – a bureaucracy vested with a monopoly of legislative initiative – is flagrant. Alongside this hybrid executive, moreover, is an independent judiciary, the European Court, capable of rulings discomfiting any national government.
 
At the centre of this maze lies the impenetrable zone in which the rival law-making instances of the Council and the Commission interlock, more obscure than any other feature of the Union: the nexus of ‘Coreper’ committees in Brussels,5 where emissaries of the former confer behind closed doors with functionaries of the latter, to generate the avalanche of legally binding directives that form the main output of the EU – close on 100,000 pages to date. Here is the effective point of concentration of everything summed up in the phrase – smacking, characteristically, of the counting-house rather than the forum – ‘democratic deficit’, one ritually deplored by EU officials themselves. In fact, what the trinity of Council, Coreper and Commission figures is not just an absence of democracy – it is certainly also that – but an attenuation of politics of any kind, as ordinarily understood. The effect of this axis is to short-circuit – above all at the critical Coreper level – national legislatures that are continually confronted with a mass of decisions over which they lack any oversight, without affording any supranational accountability in compensation, given the shadow-play of the Parliament. The farce of popular consultations that are regularly ignored is only the most dramatic expression of this oligarchic structure, which sums up the rest.
 
Alongside their negation of democratic principles, two further and less familiar features of these arrangements stand out. The vast majority of the decisions of the Council, Commission and Coreper concern domestic issues that were traditionally debated in national legislatures. But in the conclaves at Brussels these become the object of diplomatic negotiations: that is, of the kind of treatment classically reserved for foreign or military affairs, where parliamentary controls are usually weak to non-existent, and executive discretion more or less untrammelled. Since the Renaissance, secrecy has always been the other name of diplomacy. What the core structures of the EU effectively do is convert the open agenda of parliaments into the closed world of chancelleries. But even this is not all of it. Traditional diplomacy typically required stealth and surprise for success. But it did not preclude discord or rupture. Classically, it involved a war of manoeuvre between parties capable of breaking as well as making alliances; sudden shifts in the terrain of negotiations; alterations of means and objectives: in short, politics conducted between states, as distinct from within them, but politics nonetheless. In the disinfected universe of the EU, this all but disappears, as unanimity becomes virtually de rigueur on all significant occasions, any public disagreement, let alone refusal to accept a prefabricated consensus, increasingly being treated as if it were an unthinkable breach of etiquette. The deadly conformism of EU summits, smugly celebrated by theorists of ‘consociational democracy’, as if this were anything other than a cartel of self-protective elites, closes the coffin of even real diplomacy, covering it with wreaths of bureaucratic piety. Nothing is left to move the popular will, as democratic participation and political imagination are each snuffed out.
 
These structures have been some time in the making. Unreformed, they could not but be reinforced by enlargement. The distance between rulers and ruled, already wide enough in a Community of nine or 12 countries, can only widen much further in a Union of 27 or more, where economic and social circumstances differ so vastly that the Gini coefficient in the EU is now higher than in the US, the fabled land of inequality itself. It was always the calculation of adversaries of European federalism, successive British governments at their head, that the more extended the Community became, the less chance there was of any deepening of its institutions in a democratic direction, for the more impractical any conception of popular sovereignty in a supranational union would become. Their intentions have come to pass. Stretched to nearly 500 million citizens, the EU of today is in no position to recall the dreams of Monnet.
 
So what? There is no shortage of apologists prepared to explain that it is not just wrong to complain of a lack of democracy in the Union, conventionally understood, but that this is actually its greatest virtue. The standard argument, to be found in journals such as Prospect, goes like this. The EU deals essentially with the technical and administrative issues – market competition, product specification, consumer protection and the like – posed by the aim of the Treaty of Rome to assure the free movement of goods, persons and capital within its borders. These are matters in which voters have little interest, rightly taking the view that they are best handled by appropriate experts, rather than incompetent parliamentarians. Just as the police, fire brigade or officer corps are not elected, but enjoy the widest public trust, so it is – at any rate tacitly – with the functionaries in Brussels. The democratic deficit is a myth, because matters which voters do care strongly about – pre-eminently taxes and social services, the real stuff of politics – continue to be decided, not at Union but at national level, by traditional electoral mechanisms. So long as the separation between the two arenas and their respective types of decision is respected, and we are spared demagogic exercises in populism – putting issues that the masses cannot understand, and that should never be on a ballot in the first place, to referenda – democracy remains intact, indeed enhanced. Considered soberly, all is for the best in the best of all possible Europes.
 
In an unreflective sense, this case might seem to appeal to a common immediate experience of the Union. If asked in what ways they have personally been affected by the EU, most of its citizens – at least those who live in the Eurozone and Schengen belt – would certainly not mention its technical directives; they would probably answer that travel has been simplified by the disappearance of border controls and the need to change currencies. Beyond such conveniences, a narrow stratum of professionals and executives, and a somewhat broader flow of migrant workers and craftsmen, have benefited from occupational mobility across borders, though this is still quite limited: less than 2 per cent of the population of the Union lives outside its country of origin. In some ways more significant may be the programmes that take growing numbers of students to courses in other societies of the EU. Journeys, studies, a scattering of jobs: agreeable changes all, not vital issues. It is this expanse of mild amenities that no doubt explains the passivity of voters towards rulers who ignore their expressions of opinion. For nearly as striking as the repeated popular rejection of official schemes for the Union is the lack of reaction to subsequent flouting of the popular decision. The elites do not persuade the masses; but, to all appearances, they have little to fear from them.
 
Why then is there such persistent distrust of Brussels, if so little of what it does impinges on ordinary life, and that quite pleasantly? Subjectively, the answer is clear. There are few citizens who are not banally alienated from the way they are governed at home – virtually every poll shows how little they believe in what their rulers say, and how powerless they feel to alter what they do. Yet these are still societies in which elections are regularly held, and governments that become too disliked can be evicted. No one doubts that democracy, in this minimal sense, obtains. At European level, however, there is all too obviously not even this vestige of accountability: the grounds for alienation are cubed. If the EU really had zero impact on what voters care about, their distrust could be dismissed as a mere abstract prejudice. But in fact the intuition behind it is accurate. Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the Union has not by any means been confined to regulatory issues of scant interest to the population at large. It now has a Central Bank, without even the commitment of the Federal Reserve to sustain employment, let alone its duties to report to Congress, that sets interest rates for the whole Eurozone, backed by a Stability Pact that requires national governments to meet hard budgetary targets. In other words, determination of macroeconomic policy at the highest level has shifted upwards from national capitals to Frankfurt and Brussels. What this means is that just those issues that voters usually feel most strongly about – jobs, taxes and social services – fall squarely under the guillotines of the Bank and the Commission. The history of the past years has shown that this is not an academic matter. It was pressure from Brussels to cut public spending which led Juppé’s government to introduce the fiscal package that detonated the great French strike-wave of the winter of 1995, and brought him down. It was the corset of the Stability Pact that forced Portugal into slashing social benefits and plunging the country into a steep recession in 2003. The government in Lisbon did not survive either. The notion that today’s EU comprises little more than a set of innocuous technical rules, as value-neutral as traffic lights, is a fatuity.
 
There was from the beginning a third vision of what European integration should mean, distinct from either federalist or inter-governmentalist conceptions of the Community. Its far-sighted theorist was Hayek, who even before the Second World War had envisaged a constitutional structure raised sufficiently high above the nations composing it to exclude the danger of any popular sovereignty below impinging on it. In the nation-state, electorates were perpetually subject to dirigiste and redistributive temptations, encroaching on the rights of property in the name of democracy. But once heterogeneous populations were assembled in an inter-state federation, as he called it, they would not be able to re-create the united will that was prone to such ruinous interventions. Under an impartial authority, beyond the reach of political ignorance or envy, the spontaneous order of a market economy could finally unfold without interference.
 
By 1950, when Monnet was devising the Schuman Plan that yielded the initial European Coal and Steel Community, Hayek himself was in America, and played little part in shaping arguments for integration. Later, rejecting the idea of a single currency as statist (he favoured competing private issues), he would come to the conclusion that the Community itself remained all too dirigiste. But in Germany there was a school of theorists that saw the possibilities of European unity in much the same terms as he had originally envisaged, the Ordo-liberals of Freiburg, whose leading thinkers were Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke and Alfred Müller-Armack. Lacking Hayek’s intransigent radicalism, they were close to Ludwig Erhard, the reputed architect of the postwar German miracle, and thereby had more real influence in the early days of the Common Market. But for thirty years, this was still a recessive strain in the make-up of the Community, latent but never the most salient in its development.
 
With the abrupt deterioration in the global economic climate in the 1970s, and the general neo-liberal turn that followed in the 1980s, Hayekian doctrine was rediscovered throughout the West. The leading edge of the change came in the UK and US, with the arrival of Thatcher and Reagan. Continental Europe never produced comparably radical regimes, but the ideological atmosphere shifted steadily in the same direction. The collapse of the Soviet bloc sealed the transformation of working assumptions. By the 1990s, the Commission was openly committed to privatisation as a principle, pressed without embarrassment on candidate countries along with other democratic niceties. Its most powerful arm had become the Competition Directorate, striking out at public sector monopolies in Western and Eastern Europe alike. In Frankfurt the Central Bank conformed perfectly with Hayek’s prewar prescriptions. What was originally the least prominent strand in the weave of European integration had become the dominant pattern. Federalism stymied, inter-governmentalism corroded, what had emerged was neither the rudiments of a European democracy controlled by its citizens, nor the formation of a European directory guided by its powers, but a vast zone of increasingly unbound market exchange, much closer to a European ‘catallaxy’ as Hayek had conceived it.
 
The mutation is by no means complete. The European Parliament is still there, as a memento of federal hopes foregone. Agricultural and regional subsidies, legacies of a cameralist past, continue to absorb most of the EU budget. Services, over two-thirds of Union GDP, have yet to be fully liberalised. But of a ‘social Europe’, in the sense intended by either Monnet or Delors, there is as little left as a democratic Europe. At national level, welfare regimes that distinguish the Old World from the New persist. With the exception of Ireland, the share of state expenditure in GDP remains higher in Western Europe than in the United States, and the larger part of an academic industry – the ‘varieties of capitalism literature’ – is dedicated to showing how much more caring ours, above all the Scandinavian versions, are than theirs. The claim is valid enough; the self-satisfaction less so. For as the numbers of long-term jobless and pensioners have risen, the drift of the age has been away from earlier norms of provision, not beyond them. The very term ‘reform’ now means, virtually always, the opposite of what it denoted fifty years ago: not the creation but the contraction of welfare arrangements once prized by their recipients. The only two structural advances beyond the postwar gains of social democracy – the Meidner plan for pension funds in Sweden, and the 35-hour week in France – have both been rolled back. The tide is moving in the other direction.
 
Today’s EU, with its pinched spending (just over 1 per cent of Union GDP), minuscule bureaucracy (around 16,000 officials, excluding translators), absence of independent taxation, and lack of any means of administrative enforcement, could in many ways be regarded as a ne plus ultra of the minimal state, beyond the most drastic imaginings of classical liberalism: less even than the dream of a nightwatchman. Its structure not only rules out a transfer, of the sort once envisaged by Delors, of social functions from national to supranational level, to counterbalance the strain these have come under from high rates of unemployment and growing numbers of pensioners. Its effect is to increase, rather than compensate for, pressure on national systems of social provision, as so many impediments to the free movement of factors of production. As a leading authority, Andrew Moravcsik, explains, ‘the neo-liberal bias of the EU, if it exists, is justified by the social welfare bias of current national policies,’ which ‘no responsible analyst believes can be maintained’ – ‘European social policy exists only in the dreams of disgruntled socialists.’ The salutary truth is that ‘the EU is overwhelmingly about the promotion of free markets. Its primary interest group support comes from multinational firms, not least US ones.’ In short: regnant in this Union is not democracy, and not welfare, but capital. ‘The EU is basically about business.’
 
That may be so, enthusiasts might reply, but why should it detract from the larger good that the EU represents in the world, a political community that stands alone in its respect for human rights, international law, aid to the poor of the earth, and protection of the environment? Could the Union not be described as the realisation of the Enlightenment vision of the virtues of le doux commerce, that ‘cure for the most destructive prejudices’, as Montesquieu described it, pacifying relations between states in a spirit of mutual benefit and the rule of law?
 
In the current repertoire of tributes to Europe, it is this claim – the unique role and prestige of the EU on the world’s stage – that now has pride of place. What it rests on, ubiquitously, is a contrast with the United States. America figures as the increasingly ominous, violent, swaggering Other of a humane continent of peace and progress: a society that is a law to itself, where Europe strives for a legal order binding on all. The values of the two, Habermas and many fellow thinkers explain, have diverged: widespread gun culture, extreme economic inequality, fundamentalist religion and capital punishment, not to speak of national bravado, divide the US from the EU and foster a more regressive conception of international relations. Reversing Goethe’s dictum, we have it better here.
 
The crystallisation of these images came with the invasion of Iraq. The mass demonstrations against the war of 15 February 2003, Habermas thought, might go down in history as ‘a signal for the birth of a European public’. Even such an unlikely figure as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the probable incoming director of the IMF, announced that they marked the birth of a European nation. But if this was a Declaration of Independence, was the term ‘nation’ appropriate for what was being born? While divergence with America over the Middle East could serve as a negative definition of the emergent Europe, there was a positive side that pointed in another conceptual direction. Enlargement was the great new achievement of the Union. How should it be theorised? In late 1991, a few months after the collapse of the Soviet Union and a few days after the summit at Maastricht, J.G.A. Pocock published a prophetic essay in these pages.6 A trenchant critic of the EU, which he has always seen as involving a surrender of sovereignty and identity – and with them the conditions also of democracy – to the market, though a surrender never yet completed, Pocock observed that Europe now faced the problem of determining its frontiers, as ‘once again an empire in the sense of a civilised and stabilised zone which must decide whether to extend or refuse its political power over violent and unstable cultures along its borders’.
 
At the time, this was not a formulation welcome in official discourse on Europe. A decade later, the term it loosed with irony has become a common coin of complacency. As the countdown to Iraq proceeded, the British diplomat Robert Cooper, special adviser on security to Blair, and later to Prodi as head of the Commission, explained the merits of empire to readers of Prospect. ‘A system in which the strong protect the weak, in which the efficient and well-governed export stability and liberty, in which the world is open for investment and growth – all of these seem eminently desirable.’ Of course, ‘in a world of human rights and bourgeois values, a new imperialism will . . . have to be very different from the old.’ It would be a ‘voluntary imperialism’, of the sort admirably displayed by the EU in the Balkans. Enlargement ahead, he concluded, the Union was en route to the ‘noble dream’ of a ‘co-operative empire’. Enlargement in the bag, the Polish theorist Jan Zielonka, now at Oxford, exults in his book Europe as Empire that its ‘design was truly imperialist’: ‘power politics at its best, even though the term “power” was never mentioned in the official enlargement discourse’ – this was a ‘benign empire in action’.7
 
In more tough-minded style, the German strategist Herfried Münkler, holder of the chair of political theory at Humboldt University in Berlin, has expounded the world-historical logic of empires in an ambitious comparative work, Imperien, whose ideas were first presented as an aide-mémoire to a conference of ambassadors called by his country’s Foreign Ministry.8 Its theme is that, from ancient to modern times, imperial power has been required to stabilise adjacent power vacuums or turbulent border zones, holding barbarians or terrorists at bay. While naturally loyal to the West, Münkler disavows normative considerations. Human rights messianism is a moral luxury even the American empire can ill-afford. Europe, for its part, should take the measure of its emergent role as a ‘sub-imperial system’, with its own marches to control, matching its tasks to its capabilities without excessive professions of uplifting intent.
 
The prefix poses the question that is the crux of the new identity Europe has awarded itself. How independent of the United States is it? The answer is cruel, as even a cursory glance at the record shows. Perhaps at no time since 1950 has it been less so. The history of enlargement, the Union’s major achievement – extending the frontiers of freedom, or ascending to the rank of empire, or both at once, as the claim may be – is an index. Expansion to the East was piloted by Washington: in every case, the former Soviet satellites were incorporated into Nato, under US command, before they were admitted to the EU. Poland and the Czech Republic had joined Nato in 1999, five years before entry into the Union; Bulgaria and Romania in 2004, three years before entry; even Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltics, a gratuitous month – just to rub in the symbolic point? – before entry (planning for the Baltics started in 1998). Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are next in line.
 
The expansion of Nato to former Soviet borders, casting aside undertakings given to Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War, was the work of the Clinton administration. Twelve days after the first levy of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had joined the Alliance, the Balkan War was launched – the first full-scale military offensive in Nato’s history. The successful blitz was an American operation, with token auxiliaries from Europe, and virtually no dissent in public opinion. These were harmonious days in Euro-American relations. There was no race between the EU and Nato in the East. Brussels deferred to the priority of Washington, which encouraged and prompted the advance of Brussels. So natural has this asymmetrical symbiosis now become that the United States can openly specify what further states should join the Union. When Bush told European leaders in Ankara, at a gathering of Nato, that Turkey must be admitted into the EU, Chirac was heard to grumble that the US would not like being instructed by Europeans to welcome Mexico into the federation; but when the European Council met to decide whether to open accession negotiations with Turkey, Rice telephoned the assembled leaders from Washington to ensure the right outcome, without hearing any inappropriate complaints from them about sovereignty. At this level, friction between Europe and America remains minimal.
 
Why then has there been that sense of a general crisis in transatlantic relations, which has given rise to such an extensive literature? In the EU, media and public opinion are at one in holding the conduct of the Republican administration outside Nato to be essentially responsible. Scanting the Kyoto protocols and the International Criminal Court, sidelining the UN, trampling on the Geneva Conventions, and stampeding into the Middle East, the Bush regime has on this view exposed a darker side of the United States, that has understandably been met with near universal abhorrence in Europe, even if etiquette has restrained expressions of it at diplomatic level. Above all, revulsion at the war in Iraq has, more than any other single episode since 1945, led to the rift recorded in the painful title of Habermas’s latest work, The Divided West.9
 
In this vision, there is a sharp contrast between the Clinton and Bush presidencies, and it is the break in the continuity of American foreign policy – the jettisoning of consensual leadership for an arrogant unilateralism – that has alienated Europeans. There is no question of the intensity of this perception. But in the orchestrations of America’s Weltpolitik, style is easily mistaken for substance. The brusque manners of the Bush administration, its impatience with the euphemisms of the ‘international community’ and blunt rejection of Kyoto and the ICC, offended European sensibilities from the start. Clinton’s emollient gestures were more tactful, if in practice their upshot – neither Kyoto nor the ICC ever risked passage into law while he was in office – was often much the same. More fundamentally, as political operations, a straight line led from the war in the Balkans to the war in Mesopotamia. In both, a casus belli – imminent genocide, imminent nuclear weapons – was trumped up; the Security Council ignored; international law set aside; and an assault unleashed.
 
United over Yugoslavia, Europe split over Iraq, where the strategic risks were higher. But the extent of European opposition to the march on Baghdad was always something of an illusion. On the streets, in Italy, Spain, Germany, Britain, huge numbers of people demonstrated against the invasion. Opinion polls showed majorities against it everywhere. But once it had occurred, there was little protest against the occupation, let alone support for the resistance to it. Most European governments – Britain, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal in the West; all in the East – backed the invasion, and sent troops to bulk up the US forces holding the country down. Out of the 12 member states of the EU in 2003, just three – France, Germany and Belgium – came out against the prospect of war before the event. None condemned the attack when it was launched. But the declared opposition of Paris and Berlin to the plans of Washington and London gave popular sentiment across Europe a point of concentration, confirming and amplifying its sense of distance from power and opinion in America. The notion of an incipient Declaration of Independence by the Old World was born here.
 
Realities were rather different. Chirac and Schröder had a domestic interest in countering the invasion. Each judged his electorate well, and gained substantially – Schröder securing re-election – from his stance. On the other hand, American will was not to be trifled with. So each compensated in deeds for what he proclaimed in words, opposing the war in public, while colluding with it sub rosa. Behind closed doors in Washington, France’s ambassador Jean-David Levitte – currently Sarkozy’s diplomatic adviser – gave the White House a green light for the war, provided it was on the basis of the first generic UN Resolution 1441, as Cheney wanted, without returning to the Security Council for the second explicit authorisation to attack that Blair wanted, which would force France to veto it. In ciphers from Baghdad, German intelligence agents provided the Pentagon with targets and co-ordinates for the first US missiles to hit the city, in the downpour of Shock and Awe. Once the ground war began, France provided airspace for USAF missions to Iraq (which Chirac had denied Reagan’s bombing of Libya), and Germany a key transport hub for the campaign. Both countries voted for the UN resolution ratifying the US occupation of Iraq, and lost no time recognising the client regime patched together by Washington.
 
As for the EU, its choice of a new president of the Commission in 2004 could not have been more symbolic: the Portuguese ruler who hosted Bush, Blair and Aznar at the summit in the Azores on 16 March 2003 that issued the ultimatum for the assault on Iraq. Barroso is in good company. France now has a foreign minister, Bernard Kuchner, who had no time for even the modest duplicities of his country about America’s war, welcoming it as another example of the droit d’ingérence he had always championed. Sweden, where once a prime minister could take a sharper distance from the war in Vietnam than De Gaulle himself, has a new minister for foreign affairs to match his colleague in Paris: Carl Bildt, a founder member of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, along with Richard Perle, William Kristol, Newt Gingrich and others. In the UK, the local counterpart has proudly restated his support for the war, though here, no doubt, the corpses were stepped over in pursuit of preferment rather than principle. Spaniards and Italians may have withdrawn their troops from Iraq, but no European government has any policy towards a society America has destroyed that is distinct from the outlook in Washington.
 
For the rest, Europe remains engaged to the hilt in the war in Afghanistan, where a contemporary version of the expeditionary force dispatched to crush the Boxer Rebellion has killed more civilians this year than the guerrillas it seeks to root out. The Pentagon did not require the services of Nato for its lightning overthrow of the Taliban, though British and French jets put in a nominal appearance. Occupation of the country, which has a larger population and more forbidding terrain than Iraq, was another matter, and a Nato force of five thousand was assembled to hold the fort around Kabul, while US forces finished off Mullah Omar and Bin Laden. Five years later, Omar and Osama remain at large; the West’s puppet ruler, Karzai, cannot move without a squad of mercenaries from DynCorp International to protect him; production of opium has increased tenfold; the Afghan resistance has become steadily more effective; and Nato-led forces – now comprising contingents from 37 nations, from Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Poland down to such minnows as Iceland – have swollen to 35,000, alongside 25,000 US troops. Indiscriminate bombing, random shooting and ‘human rights abuses’, in the polite phrase, have become commonplaces of the counter-insurgency.
 
In the wider Middle East, the scene is the same. Europe is joined at the hip with the US, wherever the legacies of imperial control or settler zeal are at stake. Britain and France, original suppliers of heavy water and uranium for the large Israeli nuclear arsenal, which they pretend does not exist, demand along with America that Iran abandon programmes it is allowed even by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under menace of sanctions and war. In Lebanon, the EU and the US prop up a cabinet that would not last a day if a census were called, while German, French and Italian troops provide border guards for Israel. As for Palestine, the EU showed no more hesitation than the US in plunging the population into misery, cutting off all aid when voters elected the wrong government, on the pretext that it must first recognise the Israeli state, as if Israel had ever recognised a Palestinian state, and renounce terrorism (read: any armed resistance to a military occupation that has lasted forty years without Europe lifting a finger against it). Funds now flow again, to protect a remnant valet in the West Bank.
 
Lovers of Europe might reply that some of this record may be questionable, but these are external issues that can scarcely be said to affect the example Europe sets the world of respect for human rights and the rule of law within its own borders. The performance of the EU or its member states may not be irreproachable in the Middle East, but isn’t the moral leadership represented by its standards at home what really counts, internationally? So good a conscience comes too easily. The war on terror knows no frontiers and the crimes committed in its name have stalked freely across the continent, in the full cognisance of its rulers. Originally, the subcontracting of torture – ‘rendition’, or the handing over of a victim to the attentions of the secret police in client states – was, like so much else, an invention of the Clinton administration, which introduced the practice in the mid-1990s. Asked about it a decade later, the CIA official in charge of the programme, Michael Scheuer, simply said: ‘I check my moral qualms at the door.’ As one would expect, it was Britain that collaborated with the first renditions, in the company of Croatia and Albania.
 
Under the Bush administration, the programme expanded. Three weeks after 9/11, Nato declared that Article V of its charter, mandating collective defence in the event of an attack on one of its members, was activated. By then American plans for the descent on Afghanistan were well advanced, but they did not include European participation in Operation Enduring Freedom; the US high command had found the need for consultation in a joint campaign cumbersome in the Balkan War, and did not want to repeat the experience. Instead, at a meeting in Brussels on 4 October 2001, the allies were called on for other services. The specification of these remains secret, but as the second report to the Council of Europe – released in June this year – by the courageous Swiss investigator Dick Marty, has shown, a stepped-up programme of renditions must have been high on the list. Once Afghanistan was taken, Baghram airbase outside Kabul became both interrogation centre for the CIA and loading-bay for prisoners to Guantánamo. The traffic was soon two-way, and its pivot was Europe. In one direction, captives were transported from Afghan or Pakistani dungeons to Europe, either to be held there in secret CIA jails, or shipped onwards to Cuba. In the other direction, captives were flown from secret locations in Europe for requisite treatment in Afghanistan.
 
Though Nato initiated this system, the abductions it involved were not confined to members of the North Atlantic Council. Europe was eager to help America, whether or not fine print obliged it to do so. North, south, east and west: no part of the continent failed to join in. New Labour’s contribution occasions no surprise: with up to 650,000 civilians dead from the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, it would have been unreasonable for the Straws, Becketts, Milibands to lose any sleep over the torture of the living. More striking is the role of the neutrals. Under Ahern, Ireland furnished Shannon to the CIA for so many westbound flights that locals dubbed it Guantánamo Express. Social-democratic Sweden, under its portly boss Göran Persson, now a corporate lobbyist, handed over two Egyptians seeking asylum to the CIA, who took them straight to torturers in Cairo. Under Berlusconi, Italy helped a large CIA team to kidnap another Egyptian in Milan, who was flown from the US airbase in Aviano, via Ramstein in Germany, for the same treatment in Cairo.10 Under Prodi, a government of Catholics and ex-Communists has sought to frustrate the judicial investigation of this kidnapping, while presiding over the expansion of Aviano. Switzerland proffered the overflight that took the victim to Ramstein, and protected the head of the CIA gang that seized him from arrest by the Italian judicial authorities – he now basks in Florida.
 
Further east, Poland did not transmit captives to their fate in the Middle East, but incarcerated them for treatment on the spot, in torture chambers constructed for ‘high-value detainees’ by the CIA at the Stare Kiejkuty intelligence base, Europe’s own Baghram – facilities unknown in the time of Jaruzelski’s martial law. In Romania, a military base north of Constanza performed the same services, under the superintendence of the country’s current president, the staunchly pro-Western Traian Basescu. In Bosnia, six Algerians were illegally seized at American behest, and flown from Tuzla – beatings in the aircraft en route – to the US base at Incirlik in Turkey, and thence to Guantánamo, where they still crouch in their cages. In Macedonia, scene of Blair’s moving encounters with refugees from Kosovo, there was a combination of the two procedures, as a German of Lebanese descent was kidnapped at the border; held, interrogated and beaten by the CIA in Skopje; then drugged and shipped to Kabul for more extended treatment. Eventually, when it became clear, after he went on hunger-strike, that his identity had been mistaken, he was flown blindfold to a Nato-upgraded airbase in Albania, and deposited back in Germany.
 
There the Red-Green government had been well aware of what happened to him, one of its agents interrogating him in his oubliette in Kabul – Otto Schily, the minister of the interior, was in the Afghan capital at the time – and accompanying his flight back to Albania. But it was no more concerned about his fate than about that of another of its residents, a Turk born in Germany, seized by the CIA in Pakistan and dispatched to the gulag in Guantánamo, where he too was interrogated by German agents. Both operations were under the control of today’s Social Democratic foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, then in charge of the secret services, who not only covered for the torturing of the victim in Cuba, but even declined an American offer to release him. In a letter to the man’s mother, Joschka Fischer, Green foreign minister at the time, explained that the government could do nothing for him. In ‘such a good land’, as a leading admirer has recently described it, Fischer and Steinmeier remain the most popular of politicians. The new interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, is more robust, publicly calling for assassination rather than rendition in dealing with deadly enemies of the state, in the Israeli manner.
 
Such is the record set out in the two detailed reports by Marty to the Council of Europe (nothing to do with the EU), each an exemplary document of meticulous detective work and moral passion. If this Swiss prosecutor from Ticino were representative of the continent, rather than a voice crying in the wilderness, there would be reason to be proud of it. He ends his second report by expressing the hope that his work will bring home ‘the legal and moral quagmire into which we have collectively sunk as a result of the US-led “war on terror”. Almost six years in, we seem no closer to pulling ourselves out of this quagmire.’ Indeed. Not a single European government has conceded any guilt, while all continue imperturbably to hold forth on human rights. We are in the world of Ibsen – Consul Bernick, Judge Brack and their like – updated for postmoderns. Pillars of society, pimping for torture.
 
What has been delivered in these practices are not just the hooded or chained bodies, but the deliverers themselves: Europe surrendered to the United States. This rendition is the most taboo of all to mention. A rough approximation to it can be found in what remains in many ways the best account of the relationship between the two, Robert Kagan’s Paradise and Power, the benevolent contempt of whose imagery of Mars and Venus – the Old World, relieved of military duties by the New, cultivating the arts and pleasures of a borrowed peace – predictably riled Europeans.11 But even Kagan grants them too much, as if they really lived according to the precepts of Kant, while Americans were obliged to act on the truths of Hobbes. If a philosophical reference were wanted, more appropriate would have been La Boétie, whose Discours de la servitude volontaire could furnish a motto for the Union. But these are arcana. The one contemporary text to have captured the full flavour of the transatlantic relationship is, perhaps inevitably, a satire, Régis Debray’s plea for a United States of the West that would absorb Europe completely into the American imperium.12
 
Did it have to come to this? The paradox is that when Europe was less united, it was in many ways more independent. The leaders who ruled in the early stages of integration had all been formed in a world before the global hegemony of the United States, when the major European states were themselves imperial powers, whose foreign policies were self-determined. These were people who had lived through the disasters of the Second World War, but were not crushed by them. This was true not just of a figure like De Gaulle, but of Adenauer and Mollet, of Eden and Heath, all of whom were quite prepared to ignore or defy America if their ambitions demanded it. Monnet, who did not accept their national assumptions, and never clashed with the US, still shared their sense of a future in which Europeans could settle their own affairs, in another fashion. Down into the 1970s, something of this spirit lived on even in Giscard and Schmidt, as Carter discovered. But with the neo-liberal turn of the 1980s, and the arrival in power in the 1990s of a postwar generation, it faded. The new economic doctrines cast doubt on the state as a political agent, and the new leaders had never known anything except the Pax Americana. The traditional springs of autonomy were gone.
 
By this time, on the other hand, the Community had doubled in size, acquired an international currency, and boasted a GDP exceeding that of the United States itself. Statistically, the conditions for an independent Europe existed as never before. But politically, they had been reversed. With the decay of federalism and the deflation of inter-governmentalism, the Union had weakened national, without creating a supranational, sovereignty, leaving rulers adrift in an ill-defined limbo between the two. With the eclipse of significant distinctions between left and right, other motives of an earlier independence have also waned. In the syrup of la pensée unique, little separates the market-friendly wisdom of one side of the Atlantic from the other, though as befits the derivative, the recipe is still blander in Europe than America, where political differences are less extinct. In such conditions, an enthusiast can find no higher praise for the Union than to compare it to ‘one of the most successful companies in global history’. Which firm confers this honour on Brussels? Why, the one in your wallet. The EU ‘is already closer to Visa than it is to a state’, declares New Labour’s Mark Leonard, exalting Europe to the rank of a credit card.
 
Transcendence of the nation-state, Marx believed, would be a task not for capital but for labour. A century later, as the Cold War set in, Kojève held that whichever camp achieved it would emerge the victor from the conflict. The foundation of the European Community settled the issue for him. The West would win, and its triumph would bring history, understood categorically – not chronologically – as the realisation of human freedom, to an end. Kojève’s prediction was accurate. His extrapolation, and its irony, remain in the balance. They have certainly not been disproved: he would have smiled at the image of a chit of plastic. The emergence of the Union may be regarded as the last great world-historical achievement of the bourgeoisie, proof that its creative powers were not exhausted by the fratricide of two world wars, and what has happened to it as a strange declension from what was hoped from it. Yet the long-run outcome of integration remains unforeseeable to all parties. Even without shocks, many a zigzag has marked its path. With them, who knows what further mutations might occur.
 
Notes
 
[1] Neal Ascherson discussed Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 in the LRB of 17 November 2005.
[2] Fourth Estate, 170 pp., £8.99, February 2005, 978 0 00 719531 2.
[3] The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (Polity, 400 pp., £50 and £15.99, September 2004, 978 0 7456 3425 8).
[4] Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment (1996).
[5] Committees of Permanent Representatives.
[6] LRB, 19 December 1991.
[7] Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford, 304 pp., £18.99, September, 978 0 19 923186 7).
[8] Rowohlt, 331 pp., £13.66, August 2005, 978 3 8713 4509 8.
[9] Polity, 200 pp., £15.99, September 2006, 987 0 7456 3519 4.
[10] John Foot wrote about this case in the LRB of 2 August.
[11] Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Atlantic, 112 pp., £7.99, March 2004, 978 1 8435 4178 3).
[12] ‘Letter from America’ by Xavier de C* * * (NLR, January-February 2003).
 
Perry Anderson teaches history at UCLA.
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2007/09/17 04:42 2007/09/17 04:42

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Review of Schmpeter (The Nation)

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Perishable Goods
by ROBIN BLACKBURN
 
[from the September 24, 2007 issue]
 
Books on the lives of the great economists might not, at first blush, set the blood coursing. Yet Robert Skidelsky's masterly three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes proved how engrossing such a life could be. It is high praise to say that Thomas McCraw's biography of Joseph Schumpeter, Prophet of Innovation, has some of the same quality and appeal. But is Schumpeter really a figure who deserves to be numbered among the great economists?
 
Leading economists are a bit like academic royalty: They are counselors to our rulers, they have Nobel Prizes to themselves and in Britain the most influential sit in the House of Lords. Keynes and Schumpeter died before either could win a Nobel, but they made up for this by having a far larger impact than most who win the prize. While Keynes's approach shaped the global postwar economy, Schumpeter's explained why capitalism could never be tamed by Keynesian regulation. Keynes rarely spoke of capitalism. Schumpeter believed the concept to be essential to true economic understanding. His two most important books were The Theory of Economic Development (1911) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). Schumpeter's claim to greatness is that he had great insight into capitalism. Despite living and working in Depression-era America, he was utterly convinced that the great crisis was simply a ground-clearing interlude that would usher in the most prodigious wave of growth in human history.
 
For much of the twentieth century, mainstream social scientists believed the term "capitalism" was unduly loaded and ideological. They spoke instead of "industrial society" and the "mixed economy"--or they saw no need for any label at all. I can still remember the frisson I felt in the late 1970s when I saw a neon sign turning in the Boston night sky reading Capitalism Works. In Europe at this time only the radical left talked about capitalism. Though far from a leftist, Schumpeter shared with the Marxists and the laissez-faire right an interest in capitalism--and a refreshing candor about naming the system. Indeed, influential exponents of these opposed philosophies learned from Schumpeter, with his focus on the importance of the entrepreneur and on a restless, ruthless accumulation process fostering insatiable appetites and limitless capacities. Like those who erected that sign in Boston, Schumpeter believed that capitalism works, or would work if only politicians gave it a chance.
 
Schumpeter was born in 1883--the same year as Keynes--and lived only four years longer, dying in 1950. He had a Czech mother and German-speaking father but was raised by his mother in Graz and Vienna. Among the latter city's galaxy of intellectual stars, several--Ludwig von Mises, who would become the co-founder of the free-market school, and the "Austro-Marxists," headed by Otto Bauer, leader of the Social Democratic Party--were preoccupied by the workings of the market, seen as either a rival or a complement to state bureaucracy. Fear of German power, and of the growing strength of a Marxist labor movement, prompted this Austrian interest in capitalism. A sequence of photographs reproduced in McCraw's book show the members of the famous Marx seminar at the University of Vienna led by professor Eugen Böhm-Bawerk, a former imperial finance minister and author of Karl Marx and the Close of His System (1899). Schumpeter is flanked by Mises, Bauer and Rudolf Hilferding, the Marxist economist and future German finance minister.
 
Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development conveyed his conviction that entrepreneurship and competition were constant sources of growth and disruption in capitalist economies. While other economists saw competition as focusing on price, Schumpeter argued that the process also embraced the development of new products and processes, with often devastating effects on established producers. This was the germ of what he was later to call "creative destruction," the wavelike process in which yesterday's leaders are replaced by those with something radically new to offer, be it the railway, the automobile, the PC or the iPod. Others were so mesmerized by the great trusts, and their apparent power to control the market, that they did not see how vulnerable even the greatest could be if challenged by a new product.
 
McCraw argues that Schumpeter gives us a keen insight into the world of globalized capitalism, a world built on the ruins of Keynesian-style national economic regulation. Schumpeter sought to explain the behavior of real-life corporations like International Harvester, Bell and Ford. Keynes's General Theory does not mention a single firm. While others write patronizingly of "widgets" and the "better mouse trap," Schumpeter sought to chart the dynamics of product innovation.
 
But if Schumpeter's work looked forward to the twenty-first century, his early life has an aura of the nineteenth-century fin de siècle and ancien régime. While still in his 20s he won an appointment to a chair in Czernowitz, an eastern outpost of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where he found that his students were denied proper access to the library. Challenged to a duel by the school's librarian, he fought to help his students and, not least, to demonstrate his honor--satisfaktionsfähig--as an Austrian gentleman. By virtue of his swordsmanship, Schumpeter drew first blood, and the library's collection was made fully available to his students. When he moved from Czernowitz to a chair in Graz, Francis Joseph, the 81-year-old emperor, presided over the ceremony. As a servant of the crown, Schumpeter, like all university professors, wore a civil service uniform during his lectures.
 
Schumpeter spent time in Britain, Cairo and the United States before the outbreak of war in Europe but returned to Austria in 1914 to pursue his academic career. At the war's close, he was invited by Karl Kautsky to join the "socialisation commission" established by the new Social Democratic German government. Hilferding was also a member and claimed that Schumpeter was far more radical in his proposals than his Marxist colleagues. Later Schumpeter explained that he was curious to see if there really was an alternative to capitalism.
 
Before long Schumpeter moved back to Vienna, where the Social Democrats offered him the post of finance minister. But he did not last more than four months in the job, stepping down in October 1919. As minister he sought to introduce a swingeing "capital levy"--a steeply progressive tax on capital. His aim was to stabilize the economy, not to expropriate the bourgeoisie. But he arrived too late to avert a crash. McCraw paints a vivid account of the ups and downs of Schumpeter's early career, but extra tidbits can be gleaned from Wolfgang Stolper's 1994 biography of Schumpeter. For example, while still finance minister, he offered to raise the funds needed for a "Counter Revolution" in neighboring Hungary, where Béla Kun's Communists had seized power.
 
In the early 1920s Schumpeter led a Gatsbyesque existence as Viennese financier and man about town, but he nearly went bankrupt in the second general collapse of 1924. While he comported himself as an aristocrat at the opera and races (as well as on horseback), he married Annie Reisinger, the daughter of the concierge of his swanky apartment on the Ringstrasse. Skillfully drawing on diaries and letters, McCraw gives a poignant account of Schumpeter's devastation following his wife's death in childbirth and of his subsequent lengthy affair with his beautiful young housekeeper and secretary, Mia Stöckel.
 
Following the ruin of his bank, Schumpeter retreated to academia once again, securing chairs first at Bonn and then at Harvard. After a succession of visiting appointments, he eventually moved to Harvard on a full-time basis in 1932. Schumpeter disliked the Nazis and was soon seeking to arrange appointments in the United States for his Jewish and anti-Nazi German friends. But as he later admitted, he gravely underestimated Hitler. He failed to appreciate both the virulence of the Nazi leader's racial hatreds and the effectiveness of his policies for reviving the German economy by means of rearmament and public works.
 
During the 1930s Schumpeter worked on a massive study of business cycles but altogether failed to match the timeliness of Keynes's great campaigns of advocacy. Schumpeter agreed with Keynes that a great injection of demand was required, but he was intensely irritated by the English economist's apparent belief that capitalism needed some semipermanent "oxygen tent" if it was to flourish. Schumpeter's study of American economic history convinced him that capitalism's success depended on mass demand. Capitalism had already transformed the lives of ordinary people and, given the right conditions, it could lift the whole globe into a new cycle of prosperity. However, he believed FDR's policies did not help. The US obsession with monopoly and animus against "economic royalism" were misplaced, in his view, because the large companies should be encouraged to engage in nonprice competition and devote large R&D budgets to product innovation.
 
Schumpeter's work on business cycles was too compendious and complex to have much impact on his colleagues, let alone the general public. But his lively 1942 polemic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy became a bestseller and brought him renown and respect far outside the ranks of economics departments. It was in this book that he gave definitive expression to "creative destruction" as the animating principle of capitalist competition. While admitting that such competition brings ruin to whole industries and regions, he stressed that the accompanying rise of innovating industries will bring new goods within the reach of working men and women. In a revealing example, he argued that capitalism meant that "factory girls" could now wear "silk stockings," garments that only queens could afford in previous centuries. (My mother tells me that nylon was replacing silk by this time, a detail that only confirms the argument of the "prophet of innovation.")
 
McCraw shows that Schumpeter was, in many ways, a deeply conservative thinker: probusiness, anti-New Deal and anti-welfare. However, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he at least half-conceals this by appearing to defer to the radical and socialist ideas then thriving in the English-speaking world. Schumpeter starts by declaring that capitalism cannot possibly survive. He claims to be equally convinced that a socialist economic system--despite what its critics say--might be workable and compatible with democracy, though only if it adopts many market mechanisms. McCraw sees an Olympian irony at work as Schumpeter patiently proves to the reader that capitalist collapse will come not from another terrible downswing but rather from an overflowing prosperity that will sap business motivation and encourage irresponsible attempts to tamper with capitalism. Schumpeter predicted--with a prescience matched by no other thinker--that the period 1940-2000 would see US per capita incomes rise by 2 percent a year, just as they had done in the sixty years before 1928.
 
In Schumpeter's view this surge of capitalist prosperity would allow for the solution of all social problems but would also undermine the conditions that made it possible. The motivation of the great business families would be eroded, capitalist growth taken for granted and the anticapitalist moralizing of intellectuals indulged. A drift toward socialism would ensue as governments intervened ever more intimately in the capitalist mechanism. Like Friedrich August von Hayek and Mises, Schumpeter believed in the power of capitalism, but he rejected what he saw as their absurd prejudice against the state, capitalism's necessary handmaiden.
 
In response to the argument that socialist economies have no reliable mechanism for setting rational prices--the refrain of Hayek and Mises--Schumpeter suggests that the socialists could devise a collectivist economy that makes full use of markets, price signals and even "profit" yet delivers egalitarian and welfare goals. While some of Schumpeter's arguments are mischievous--socialism, he suggests, would be a good way of controlling the unions--there is no denying that he had a lifelong curiosity about different economic arrangements.
 
One sign of Schumpeter's open-mindedness is to be found in the circle of the brilliant young economists he gathered around him. In 1947 the Socialist Club of Boston invited Schumpeter to debate the future of capitalism with one of his former students, Marxist economist Paul Sweezy (later editor of Monthly Review). The chair was taken by Wassily Leontief, and the event was written up by Paul Samuelson (both men later received Nobel Prizes). The Schumpeter circle also included James Tobin, another Nobelist. And notwithstanding his own conservatism, Schumpeter sought to secure appointments for such radical younger economists as Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. Schumpeter corresponded amiably with Keynes, though each man doubted the achievement of the other.
 
During and after the war Schumpeter's work acquired growing prestige. He had produced a new and much revised edition of The Theory of Economic Development in 1931 and a stream of influential articles. He was an enthralling lecturer and a man of wide culture. In 1948 he was elected president of the American Economic Association. Outwardly jovial and ebullient, he was susceptible to despair and depression, only conquering them by throwing himself into his work. In his American exile he offered up prayers of devotion to his dead wife, Annie, and wrote many letters to Mia Stöckel. Although he knew his letters to Stöckel were opened by the German censors, he did not suppress his criticism of the Nazis. Stöckel pleaded with him to bring her to the States, but according to McCraw, Schumpeter didn't think she would fit in at Harvard. She eventually married a young Serbian political scientist, and in 1942 she and her husband were shot by the Nazis. Schumpeter probably blamed himself for not forestalling this tragic end.
 
In 1937 Schumpeter married an American economic historian, Elizabeth Boody Firuski, who helped him overcome his continuing private terrors and complete his intellectual projects, especially a massive History of Economic Analysis (edited by her and eventually published in 1954). Though highly respectable and admired by colleagues, Elizabeth and Joseph became, following Pearl Harbor, the targets of a lengthy inquisition at the hands of J. Edgar Hoover. They and their friends and associates were repeatedly interviewed by FBI agents, and their activities were watched. Hoover was, of course, prone to suspect European intellectuals, but what fed his paranoia in this case were the couple's Japanese connections.
 
The Schumpeters had made several trips to Japan. Japanese economists greatly esteemed Joseph's work, translating his books and articles and inviting him to lecture. Elizabeth researched the Japanese economy and argued that Japan's economic achievements were being greatly underestimated. None of this meant that the Schumpeters backed Japanese imperialism, but they did downplay the strength and ambitions of the Japanese militarists and failed to denounce the Nanking massacre. Joseph also looked with great foreboding on the implications of the US wartime alliance with the Soviet Union. In his view this would give dire scope to a primitive and backward Russian imperialism.
 
Racial categories appear in Schumpeter's writings, as they do in those of many other thinkers of the time--his argument in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy that socialist ideas will lead to admirable results in Sweden but to misery in Russia is premised on the "racial" inheritance of the two peoples. Schumpeter, though striving to express a logic of cultural evolution, stumbles into a Borat-like ethnic contempt for crude yokels and semicriminal "sub-normals."
 
The private reflections recorded by the Schumpeters in letters and diaries were very distant from the patriotism and progressivism of the time. McCraw tells us that Joseph's bêtes noires were "Harvard, Roosevelt and the Soviet Union." Hoover's belief that the Schumpeters were agents of Japan or Germany was ludicrous. But as the allies pressed to a triumphant conclusion, Joseph did express sympathy for the German and Japanese peoples and horror at the mass slaughter of civilians in Dresden and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Joseph still had a house outside Bonn, and his German papers were destroyed in a fire-bomb assault on a residential district in November 1944.
 
Without doubt Schumpeter is a great economic historian and an essential writer for anyone who wishes to understand capitalism. McCraw, who has written the definitive biography of his subject, supplies many testimonials to Schumpeter's genius and influence from both his day and our own. (In my view he could have added the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism initiated by Paul Sweezy, which drew memorable contributions from Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton and Eric Hobsbawm.)
 
Unlike Keynes, Schumpeter was not good at framing policies to tackle specific situations. His strength lay in working out the implications of a policy over time. He thought that Keynesian-style deficit-spending by itself would eventually lead to inflation and stagnation and that it needed to be accompanied by policies to foster and generalize innovation.
 
Schumpeter's ideas were enthusiastically adopted by Japanese economic planners and informed Japan's extraordinarily successful postwar growth strategy. The capital levy he had vainly sought to apply as finance minister in Austria was successfully used to choke off inflation and cut war profits in occupied Japan. The Japanese strategy of creating markets for new products, with industrial groups investing in R&D and the Ministry of Foreign Trade supplying coordination, echoed and confirmed Schumpeter's thinking.
 
Another country whose development path had a Schumpeterian flavor was Sweden. The so-called Rehn-Meidner model put the accent on industrial innovation and full employment as well as generous social provision. Rudolf Meidner, a Social Democrat refugee from Germany who became chief economist of the LO, the main trade union federation, was certainly familiar with the work of Hilferding and Schumpeter. In Sweden large corporations were allowed to build up tax-free reserves so long as they spent them on R&D. Meidner eventually sought to complete the "Swedish home" with social funds raised by means of a share levy, a gentler version of the capital levy. These "wage-earner" funds were terminated in the early 1990s, thwarting Meidner's aim to promote economic democracy; still, they were used to establish a string of research institutes that have kept Sweden at the forefront of the information economy.
 
Schumpeter never worked out a rigorous model of his own, and several of the ideas he tossed out were no more than brilliant jeux d'esprit. Among twentieth-century economists, Keynes and Hayek made more considerable contributions. But in the twenty-first century, with the disappearance of command economies and of most restraints on capital, the process of creative destruction has taken on planetary dimensions that would surely have shaken Schumpeter, and that now give added interest to his work. Indeed, the very considerable interest of McCraw's book derives not only from the story it tells of a life navigating what Eric Hobsbawm has called the "age of extremes" but from the case it makes for seeing Schumpeter as the most farsighted of twentieth-century economists. His focus on capitalism and creative destruction made him the prophet of globalization.
 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy remains well worth reading, although it's best read against the grain of the underlying argument. The book insures Schumpeter a place alongside two other Austrians who understood the market and its limits--Karl Polanyi, author of The Great Transformation (1944), which insisted on the social embedding of market forces; and Otto Neurath, the Viennese philosopher who, as financial commissioner in the short-lived Bavarian workers' republic of 1919, became the first public official to insist on the need for carbon rationing. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy serves as a useful foil for the sort of global prospectus that has been attempted, with such disappointing results, by the likes of Thomas Friedman and Niall Ferguson. Seventy-five years on, Schumpeter's work is still a better guide to the world we live in than the shallow quips and complacent jingoism they offer.
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2007/09/08 08:14 2007/09/08 08:14

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Market Bondage (T. Palley)

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With Wall Street beset by a crisis of confidence and the mortgage-backed securities market seizing up, there is urgent need for an immediate emergency Federal Reserve interest rate cut. This sudden need has also revealed how today’s financial system places monetary policy in bondage to markets. That system has evolved over the past twenty-five years with the Fed’s approval, and the current crisis starkly reveals need for reform.

An emergency rate cut is needed to prevent the sub-prime mortgage meltdown from spiraling into a full-blown recession. By immediately lowering the base cost of credit, a rate cut can make existing mortgage securities more attractive to investors and also encourage continued flows of mortgage finance for the housing market.

Such continued financing is critical. In its absence mortgage availability will shrink and mortgage rates rise, thereby deepening the housing market slump. That is likely to trigger additional mortgage defaults and reductions in construction activity, thereby perhaps even causing a recession. In this event, the spiral of credit deterioration stands to deepen, jumping from the sub-prime mortgage market to the entire housing sector and the economy more broadly.

In response to this threat the Fed has already moved to inject significant temporary additional liquidity into money markets, effectively lending billions of dollars to banks to prevent their having to make further asset sales under current distressed conditions. Central banks in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere have done the same. However, because the costs of recession promise to be so large, the Fed must also move to cut rates.

As recently as ten days ago Fed policy was focused on containing inflation. Now, within the blink of an eye, the evaporation of confidence among Wall Street lenders has created conditions warranting an emergency rate cut to save the economy. This power of financial markets is rooted in a new business cycle that emerged in the 1980s and which has made the economy increasingly dependent on debt to fuel expansions. The creation of debt in turn relies on highly leveraged financial intermediaries that package and re-package loans while promising liquidity they are unable to deliver. As a result, the system has become fragile.

Increased financial fragility is one feature of the new system. A second and worse feature is that increased debt is part of a complex for shifting value from the real sector to the financial sector - a phenomenon known as “financialization”. This increases profits in the financial sector at the expense of the real economy. Meanwhile, the new structure also implicitly compels monetary policy to rescue the financial sector if it gets into trouble. This amounts to a policy stick-up whereby the Fed is forced to provide the get away car for fear that not doing so will result in even greater economic damage.

Today’s system places monetary policy in a double bind. In good times the Fed is forced to raise interest rates to maintain lender beliefs that inflation will remain low. Those beliefs ensure investors are willing to make the loans needed to fuel the system. However, the result is higher interest rates and curtailed expansions that hold down wages and employment, thereby limiting the share of productivity growth going to working families.

In bad times, such as we are now experiencing, the Fed is obliged to come to the rescue of lenders for fear that if they stop lending the economy will tank. Moreover, this fear deepens the greater the level and burden of debts. Worse yet, such intervention creates a problem known as “moral hazard” that can aggravate the need for rescues. Having the Fed intervene to prevent financial meltdowns tacitly puts a floor under financial markets. That floor acts as a form of insurance for investors and speculators, who knowing that they are protected against large losses then channel more funds into even higher risk investments and loans.

The Fed has actively promoted the new system through deregulation. Its claim has been the risks of the financial system imploding are less because risk is spread. That claim is now being shown to be false.

For two decades working families have felt the effects of the policy head-lock imposed by financial market demands for ultra-low inflation. Now, financial markets are exercising their other demand for interest rate cuts to preserve asset values in order to prevent recession.

 

The threat posed by the current crisis is such that the Fed should meet this demand. That means immediately cutting rates and continuing to judiciously provide emergency liquidity. However, once the storm passes Congress and the Fed must address the systemic problems and policy distortions that have been exposed by the current crisis.

Copyright Thomas I. Palley

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2007/08/22 06:30 2007/08/22 06:30

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Money markets hit reverse (FT)

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Money markets hit reverse on hopes for rate cut

By Krishna Guha in Washington and Saskia Scholtes n New York

Published: August 21 2007 15:39 | Last updated: August 21 2007 21:09

Money markets on Tuesday staged a dramatic reversal of Monday’s flight to safety, after an influential US senator fuelled expectations that the US Federal Reserve would soon cut interest rates.

Christopher Dodd, the chairman of the Senate banking committee, told reporters after a meeting with Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, and Hank Paulson, US Treasury secretary, that Mr Bernanke had told him he would use “all the tools” at his disposal to contain market turmoil and prevent it from damaging the economy.

The revelation helped turn around investor sentiment after an earlier warning by Mr Paulson that there was no quick solution to the problems in credit markets.

Mr Dodd said Mr Bernanke also indicated that he was not satisfied with the market’s response to the Fed’s decision on Friday to make direct loans available to banks on attractive terms through its discount window.

The meeting of the three men on Capitol Hill highlights the increasing political pressure on the Fed.

Fed insiders played down the significance of Mr Dodd’s remarks, indicating that there was no change in policy since Friday, when it put out a statement saying it was “prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets”.

The Fed was not expecting market conditions to improve dramatically following Friday’s move, so it will not be too disheartened by the mixed developments since then.

Nonetheless, Mr Dodd’s comments helped sustain a pull-back in the short-term government debt market, where investors had pushed yields down to remarkable lows amid a desperate scramble for safe government paper.

The yield on the one-month Treasury bill showed the sharpest move, rising by 87 basis points to 2.98 per cent by late afternoon in New York, while the three-month bill yield was 43bp higher on the day at 3.61 per cent. Investors had initially poured into short-term government debt yesterday, extending a flight to quality as they shunned the commercial paper market.

The move had pushed yields in the market for Treasury bills around 30 basis points lower, driving the yield on one-month bills below 2 per cent and the three-month bill yield below 3 per cent. The flight to safety had also extended to the two-year Treasury note, which saw its yield fall below the psychologically significant level of 4 per cent yesterday.

In a further sign of investor risk aversion, the pricing differential between higher and lower-rated commercial paper issued by non-financial companies ex­panded to the widest levels since the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001.

“Credit is being repriced, reassessed across our capital markets,” Mr Paulson told CNBC television. “As the Fed addresses liquidity this makes it possible, this makes it easier, for the market to focus on risk and pricing risk. This will play out over time.”

Conditions in equity markets remained tense as convulsions swept through the money and credit markets. By midday in New York, the S&P 500 index was up 0.4 per cent at 1,451.59 while in Europe, leading shares ended the day flat after a late rally.

European shares were weighed down by fresh concerns about the exposure of the German banking sector to turmoil in the US subprime mortgage market.

Underlining the severity of US subprime woes on German banks following the near-collapse of lender IKB this month, Alexander Stuhlmann, chief executive of lender WestLB, said the sector was in a “not uncritical situation” overall.

But shares in Asia continued to rally from last week’s rout. The Morgan Stanley Capital International Asia-Pacific index was up 1.2 per cent in the early evening in Tokyo. This took its rise over the past two days to 5.3 per cent.

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2007/08/22 06:24 2007/08/22 06:24

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FT Bridging poverty gap should be IMF priority

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Bridging poverty gap should be IMF priority

By Chrystia Freeland and Edward Luce in Washington

Published: July 27 2007 23:24 | Last updated: July 27 2007 23:24

Bridging the gap between rich and poor countries should be as high a priority for the International Monetary Fund as helping to solve the world’s financial imbalances, Dominique Strauss Kahn, the probable next managing director of the IMF told the Financial Times.

The former French finance minister, who is on a world tour to win support for his candidacy to head the IMF, said that “going south of the Equator” would matter just as much as going “east to the Pacific” – a reference to deep concerns about the growing trade gap between China and the developed world. Mr Strauss Kahn will fly to Mozambique on Sunday to meet African finance ministers and then over the following two weeks to Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, South Korea, Japan, India and Russia in what he freely described as a “campaign” among the largest developing countries to get the job.

The position opened up unexpectedly last month following the resignation of Rodrigo de Rato, the former Spanish finance minister, for personal reasons.

Asked whether Europe should continue to maintain its stranglehold on the top IMF job as the US does with the World Bank, Mr Strauss Kahn said he supported an open process and would welcome candidates from other parts of the world if they threw their hats into the ring before the closing date at the end of August.

“It is entirely legitimate for any country that is a member of the IMF to promote one of their nationals as a candidate,” he told the FT in his first interview since being proposed for the job.

“But of course that does not mean that a European cannot also be a candidate,” he added.

On Friday the Bush administration formally endorsed Mr Strauss Kahn’s candidacy following his meeting with Hank Paulson, the US treasury secretary.

Mr Strauss Kahn on Friday also met Bob Zoellick, the new president of the World Bank, who moved into the job following the unexpected resignation of Paul Wolfowitz last month.

He said his top priorities would be to address both financial and equity imbalances in the world economy and to improve the governance structure and quota system of the IMF to better reflect the growing weight of developing countries in the world economy.

He said he believed the IMF could “adapt” to make itself more relevant to the challenges of globalisation.

“I believe strongly in multilateralism,” he said.

“I think that at this time of globalisation we need more multilaleralism – not less,” adding that he believed the US had recently become “more committed to “multilateralism”.

He said that the “integration” of poor countries into the global economy would be a top priority if he got the job.

 

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2007/07/29 14:04 2007/07/29 14:04

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FT Brazil claims WTO cotton victory

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Brazil claims WTO cotton victory

By John Rumsey in São Paulo, Frances Williams in Geneva and Eoin Callan in Washington

Published: July 27 2007 23:19 | Last updated: July 27 2007 23:19

Brazil on Friday claimed victory in its latest assault on US cotton subsidies at the World Trade Organisation, underscoring warnings by the Bush administration that the subsidy-laden farm bill under consideration by Congress risks triggering a wave of trade disputes.

Brazil said a confidential interim ruling by a WTO panel had gone in its favour.

The panel, due to issue its final decision in September, was set up last year to judge whether the US had fully complied with a 2005 WTO appeal verdict condemning several subsidy programmes for cotton farmers.

In response to that verdict, the US scrapped or amended programmes considered to be illegal export subsidies. However, Brazil says this left untouched some of the most trade-distorting subsidies, such as marketing loans and counter-cyclical payments that compensate farmers for low prices.

The US House of Representatives was set to vote late on Friday on a controversial $256bn, five-year farm bill that eliminates subsidies for farmers with more than $1m in adjusted gross income but continues to give generous subsidies in key areas including corn, cotton, soya beans and rice.

The bill was approved by the House agricultural committee on July 19.

The Bush administration has threatened to veto the legislation, saying it leaves the US vulnerable to WTO challenges similar to the case brought by Brazil over support for cotton farmers.

Pedro Camargo Neto, ex-secretary of production and trade at the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, dismissed the likelihood of Brazil bringing further cases, such as against soy, sugar and rice, where it would be more difficult to prove damages.

The Brazil ruling should embolden other countries, such as Mexico and Uruguay, to seek redress over rice subsidies.

A US trade official confirmed on Friday that the WTO panel had found that the changes made by the US “were insufficient to bring the challenged measures into conformity with US WTO obligations . . . we are very disappointed with these results”.

Brazil and its allies have pressed for big reductions in US and European Union farm support in the Doha global trade round.

The latest draft text by the chair of the Doha round’s agricultural negotiations calls specifically for deeper and faster-than-average cuts in cotton subsidies in developed countries.

Critics say such subsidies hurt not only Brazil but also millions of poor West African cotton farmers.

Still, with a successful conclusion to the round uncertain, the WTO’s dispute mechanism is increasingly seen as an alternative if ponderous route to the same end.

 

In 2005, Brazil, Thailand and Australia won another landmark case against EU sugar subsidies and this year Canada and Brazil have each filed new complaints alleging US overspending on trade-distorting farm aid.

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2007/07/29 14:02 2007/07/29 14:02

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The Growth of Nations

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The growth of nations

Review by Martin Wolf

Published: July 21 2007 01:24 | Last updated: July 21 2007 01:24

In the summer of 1972, as a “young professional” at the World Bank, I went on a mission to South Korea. It was my first experience of something extraordinary: a country that was developing at a breathtaking rate. The country had already enjoyed a decade of economic growth at close to 10 per cent a year. It continued to grow at close to that rate for another quarter of a century.

What struck me about Korea was the determination of its policy-makers to sustain rapid industrialisation. I saw the construction from scratch of the vast Hyundai shipyard at Ulsan that was soon to join the first rank of ship-builders. That bet itself demonstrated something even more remarkable: Koreans’ belief in their country’s ability to achieve global competitiveness.

For the Koreans, exports were both a tool of development and a test of its success. How different this was from east Africa and India, on which I was to work for the following five years. India was almost as sealed from the world economy as it was possible to be. Its annual growth in income per head had fallen in the 1970s to about 1 per cent a year, while industrial productivity seemed to be declining, despite its desperately low level.

The contrast between South Korea’s success and India’s failure was striking. Both used protection and other tools of industrial policy. Yet the orientation of India’s policies was inward-looking and anti-competitive, while that of South Korea was the opposite. In the literature on development and trade, the Korean strategy came to be called “export promotion”, because its economy did not have an overall bias towards the home market.

The contrast between South Korea and India raised the biggest questions in economics: why have some countries succeeded with development and others failed? Why has Korea jumped from poverty to prosperity in a lifetime? Why did India do badly then, but much better recently?

The broad question is the one Erik Reinert states in his title: How Rich Countries Got Rich... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor. Reinert is a Norwegian professor who now teaches at Tallinn, Estonia. Ha-Joon Chang, a well-known Korean development economist, teaches at Cambridge. But both give strikingly similar answers to this question.

Both state that the priority in development is rapid and sustained growth. Only industrialisation can deliver such growth, because industry is the only sector in which rapid and sustained rises in productivity are feasible. Furthermore, to industrialise, countries must upgrade their technological and managerial capabilities, which can be achieved only if they are able to nurture infant sectors. That requires protection, they both argue, as has been the case in every successful economy of the past half-millennium.

Tragically, they argue, the “neo-liberal hegemony” - the broad consensus on liberal trade and freer markets of the past quarter century - has deprived countries of these valuable tools. The result has been a development disaster, particularly in Latin America and Africa, where the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have run amuck. The World Trade Organisation and a host of one-sided so-called free trade agreements further constrain the ability of developing countries to adopt sensible policies. This, they agree, is a huge contrast to the era of the Marshall Plan in postwar Europe and the more permissive attitudes towards development policy taken by the US between the 1950s and early 1980s.

While the two books are rooted in a similar world view, their style and tone are different. Reinert’s book, while no less enraged, is more academic. He is fighting an intellectual war with neo-classical economics, the academic orthodoxy since the 19th century. He considers himself “heterodox” and presents an alternative “other canon”.

In place of a priori reasoning, this emphasises practical experience; instead of the theory of comparative advantage in trade invented by the 19th-century theorist David Ricardo, it points to the success of protection against imports since the Renaissance. Reinert argues that, for poor countries, specialisation in line with comparative advantage means specialising in poverty. As Friedrich List, the 19th-century German economist, argued, what a country makes matters. Protection is the solution; free trade is suitable only for countries at the same level of development.

So, in respect of Africa - surely the most important and urgent case for treatment - Reinert recommends internal free trade and external barriers to trade, in place of what he condemns as the mere “palliative economics” of millennium development goals, bed-nets and ever more aid.

Chang’s book Bad Samaritans is shorter and more punchily written. He considers how people who want to help developing countries but instead are hurting them, constrain policy options for developing countries. Among these constraints are limits on their ability to regulate inward direct investment, an undue obsession with privatisation, restrictions on access to intellectual property, exaggerated attention to financial stability, excessive emphasis on corruption and lack of democracy and, last but not least, undue stress on the importance of culture.

Unlike much of the writing produced by opponents of contemporary globalisation, these are serious books by serious people. They deserve to be read.

Moreover, I agree with both authors that the goal has to be faster economic growth. I sympathise with the view that the assumptions of conventional economics ignore the evolutionary character of a dynamic economy. I agree, too, that industrialisation is the principal route to growth. I agree, finally, that some policies that now affect developing countries are dangerous: restrictions on easy access to intellectual property are perhaps the most important.

Yet I also have some important disagreements. Reinert, for example, argues that contemporary neo-liberals believe in “factor-price equalisation” - the theory that free trade would make wages and returns to capital the same everywhere. In fact, those taught the theory always understood that the implication is the opposite: it shows how many unlikely conditions need to hold before these results hold true.

What neo-liberals - if I may use that ugly term - did believe is that new opportunities were at last opening up for developing countries to export manufactures and a range of relatively sophisticated services competitively. Indeed, about 80 per cent of exports from developing countries are now manufactures.

Admittedly, this success has recently been dominated by China. But China is as populous as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America combined. The exports of manufactures would, it was hoped, build up the virtuous circle of growth and industrialisation in which Reinert believes, operating on a world scale from the start. That is, of course, what China is now achieving.

This brings me to my most fundamental disagreement: the lessons of history. Reinert argues: “US industrial policy from 1820 to 1900 is probably the best example for Third World countries to follow today until these countries are ready to benefit from international trade.” From the emphasis Chang puts on 19th-century examples, he agrees.

Yet this example makes no sense for most, if not all, contemporary developing countries. The technological gap between the UK and the US in the 19th century was trivial by comparison with that between, say, the US and Ethiopia today. Even so it took more than half a century for the US to close it.

The US was also a vast continental country, capable of attracting a huge immigrant workforce, much of it educated, and so generate a domestic market large enough to exhaust the economies of scale offered by the technology of the time, while still permitting strong domestic competition. That proved not to be the case even for India, a giant among developing countries. This is, to put it mildly, hardly a model for Ethiopia, let alone Chad.

Few (I would argue, no) contemporary developing countries are big or technologically sophisticated enough to make a decent job of the 19th-century protectionist model. The big successes of recent decades - from Hong Kong to China, South Korea to Ireland, Singapore to Taiwan, Japan to Finland - were not all free traders (though some were). Some also relied heavily on foreign direct investment (China, Ireland and Singapore), while others resisted it (Japan and South Korea).

Yet all used the world economy - and therefore trade - as a central part of their development success. These were, then, cases of outward-looking, infant-industry promotion far more than protection. Indeed, this was precisely what most observant economists learnt from the contrast between the performance of South Korea and India. Apparently similar tools can be used in various ways, with very different results. Both the overall aim and the details of policy make a huge difference.

Moreover, both these books lack a serious discussion of what very late catch-up countries ought to do. Reinert recommends free trade inside Africa or Latin America, with high barriers to trade against outsiders. But this sort of preferential trading agreement among developing countries is a way to transfer income from the most backward to the least backward economies in the region.

Worse, the higher the protection the larger (and so more politically objectionable) is the transfer of income. This is why only those preferential agreements with low external barriers tend to survive. But these do not deliver the greater protection Reinert wants. Higher barriers, even if desirable, would be politically possible only if members also moved towards a single labour market, which is impossible.

What then is left is protection by individual countries. But, to use just one example, Ghana’s national income is about the same as that of a London borough. A policy of import substitution there would be as rational as for Southwark.

Across-the-board import substitution in a country such as Ghana is a recipe for creating a host of small-scale, uncompetitive, rent-extracting monopolies. Obviously, an industrial policy with any hope of success must be both selective and build towards world markets, to obtain scale. What, then, are the chances that often malignantly corrupt, incompetent and ill-informed governments will make sensible choices? Little, I would argue.

South Korea and Taiwan were exceptional cases. The argument that success will follow the overthrow of the neo-liberal consensus and the return of protection is nonsense. But the authors are right that those who argued that free trade alone is the answer were wrong. There are no magic potions for development. Developmental states can work. Many fail. But some may succeed.

Above all, developing countries should be allowed to try, and so learn from their own mistakes. Countries should be warned of the difficulties of following South Korea’s example, but allowed to do so if they wish.

Big and relatively successful developing countries, such as China and India, must participate in and be bound by global rules. They cannot be free riders. But the bulk of developing countries should be allowed to choose their own policies. Almost all will need to attract inward foreign direct investment. A few might still manage without it.

Chang is right that some of the constraints imposed upon developing countries, notably on intellectual property, are unconscionable. Most should enjoy the benefit of open markets from the rich, but be allowed to pursue their own paths, from laissez-faire to its opposite. They will make many mistakes. So be it. That is what sovereignty means.

Martin Wolf is the FT’s chief economics commentator.

How Rich Countries Got Rich...and Why Poor Countries Stay Poorby Erik S. Reinert
Constable & Robinson £25, 320 pages
FT bookshop price: £20

Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the Threat to the Developing World
by Ha-Joon Chang
Random House £18.99, 288 pages
FT bookshop price: £15.19

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2007/07/25 02:40 2007/07/25 02:40

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Jagdish Bhagwati - US Senate Finance Committee Testimony

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Senate Finance Committee Testimony on US TRADE POLICY: THE CHINA QUESTON Jagdish Bhagwati University Professor, Economics and Law

 

Let me begin by saying how honored I am to have been invited to appear before your Committee, Senator Baucus. I have long been familiar with the leadership you have provided on trade issues in the Senate over many years, enabling the United States to be the major player in the liberalization of world trade that has brought so many indisputable benefits to us and to many nations around the world.

You have asked me to address the question of China and what it implies for US trade policy. China, of course, has long been an important source of controversy for US trade policymakers. The debates over whether to grant it MFN status were followed by whether, and on what conditions, it should be admitted to the WTO (World Trade Organization). I recall how USTR Charlene Barshefsky arrived from Beijing with an agreement on the terms of Chinese entry into the

WTO just in time in Seattle in November 1999 for the WTO meeting which blew up in the face of President Clinton and the rest of us, postponing by two years to 2001 the start of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Many were certain that the focus on China had detracted from the US preparations and preparedness over the Seattle meeting, illustrating tangentially how multilateral trade liberalization is often handicapped, not advanced, by distractions over bilateral and plurilateral (i.e. with members exceeding two but less than all nations) trade negotiations.

Today, the issue of China is even more prominently at the center of a major debate over US trade policy. But the stakes in this debate are higher as the China question now is part of a substantive debate, especially after the last election, over the question whether further freeing of trade or a retreat (however slow) into de facto protectionism makes sense for the United States. More precisely, the China question is one of two issues today that must be addressed regarding our trade policy. So, let me say a few words about the other issue, and then turn more bodily to the China question which you are addressing today.

I: Inclusion of Labor and (Domestic) Environmental Standards in Trade Treaties: Case of “Export Protectionism”

The first relates to the fact that the New Democrats have been elected, with a Democratic majority, in the last Congressional election with promises to require labor and (domestic) environmental standards as central features of trade treaties. While there are groups that want to spread higher standards because of altruism and sympathy, the motivation that prompts the demands for inclusion of labour standards elsewhere as preconditions for trade liberalization by the United States --- these demands come from AFL-CIO and the new Democrats are reflecting for political convenience these demands while some share the AFL-CIO viewpoints independently of voting considerations, for sure --- is quite simply self-interest and fear.

The demands that labor and environmental standards, for example, must be demanded from others with low standards because otherwise free trade would be “unfair” have long been exposed as unpersuasive. Let me state here just a few of the counter-arguments against such demands: systematic analysis of the different rationales proposed for them is available in many other places and needs to be consulted for a fuller understanding of the protectionist dangers we currently

face.

First, if these demands take the common form that others must have similar “burdens” as our producers do, it is easy to see that standards, theirs and ours, are generally speaking different for perfectly legitimate reasons and that our objecting to others’ standards is as right or wrong as their objecting to ours.

Would we then let others exclude our exports simply because our standards are lower than those of Europe, even Canada’s, in many areas? In case one doubts that US standards are lower, just think of the obvious examples. Almost alone in the world, we allow capital punishment, including the capital punishment of juveniles. Or take the several international reports on the state of our prisons, and our widespread use of prison labour to produce goods for sale by firms who are not required to pay minimum wage payments and offer labour protections. Then again, on the right to unionize, the Human Rights Watch (with whom I work on 1 I, among many others, have written extensively on why the attempts to include labor and domestic environmental standards in trade treaties are misguided. Especially, exactly ten years ago, I and the late Professor Robert Hudec produced two substantial volumes on the subject; see Bhagwati and Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1996. I have also written extensively on the subject in the American Journal of International Law, in my Testimony to this Committee on the FTA with Jordan, and in many op ed articles in The Financial Times etc. I have not seen any persuasive response to my criticisms. My sense is that the AFL-CIO is no longer interested in arguments (where they cannot win) and have decided to go exclusively to the political route. Given their substantial resources, evidently, it is a smart strategy for them to substitute financial for human capital!

 

the Academic Advisory Committee on Asia) has produced a detailed analysis which concludes that this right is effectively denied to “millions” in the US, largely (but not exclusively) because the right to strike has been crippled by the Taft-Hartley provisions. Indeed, many abroad find it very hard to believe that, with little more than 10% of our labor force unionized, and with wide appreciation of the legislated difficulties faced by unions in organizing labor, we can claim that we have the higher moral ground in these matters. At a time when the Bush administration’s unilateralism has provoked serious anti- Americanism, the self-righteous tone of our labor and environmental lobbies and the dissonance between our postures and our own practice are also not likely to make the United States any more likeable to the world.

Second, and equally important, our attempts at imposing such standards on the developing countries will not succeed with the larger and economically more important developing countries such as India and Brazil. These countries are fully democratic; they are neither more dictatorships nor violators of human rights than we are. In fact, India is a splendid democracy which has managed to manage multi-religiosity, multi-ethnicity and diversity within a democratic framework. Its unions are also free; and its environmental movement is strong. As for Brazil, President Lula has risen from the ranks of the trade union movement and has better credentials as a trade unionist than even John Sweeney! Yet, both India and Brazil strongly reject the inclusion of labor and environmental standards in trade treaties. In fact, India just recently told the EU that they could not have an FTA with it unless if non-trade issues were mixed up with it, causing EU to go back to the bargaining table; and the same can be confidently expected to be the case with the US. It is also noteworthy that no trade treaty purely among developing countries has these extraneous non-trade issues within it: it is a characteristic of bilateral trade treaties that hegemonic powers, with their lobbies, impose on lesser countries in one-on-one, unevenly-matched bargains. If the new Democrats want to go down this route, they face the prospect of confining their trade liberalization to weak, ineffectual nations which will roll over when faced with such demands.

Some liberalization indeed!

Third, key political leaders in the US, until recently, were cognizant of the fact that it was more efficient to pursue labor agendas in the ILO and trade issues in the WTO and in other trade treaties and institutions. Senator Patrick Daniel Moynihan frequently wrote to me agreeing with this position, including sending me for my files a memo to this effect, based on an op ed of mine, signed by POUTS as “seen”.

It has become fashionable for some commentators such as the political science Professor Mac Destler and the journalist Mr. Bruce Stokes to say that the US has become less protectionist in recent years. This is seriously wrong. Yes, we probably have less sectoral, import protection. But the protectionism we now face is across-the-board, export protectionism. The attempts at raising labor and domestic environmental standards as preconditions for trade liberalization are transparent attempts by a terrified labor movement, and sympathetic media personalities like Lou Dobbs, to raise the cost of production of rivals in the poor countries so that the force of competition is moderated. Imagine a beast charging at you: you can either catch it by the horn (i.e. conventional import protectionism) or reach behind it, catch it by the tail and break the charge (i.e. export protectionism). The forced raising of standards in the poor countries desirous of trading with us is “export protectionism”: It is insidious because it is not transparent to the general public as such and partly because it can be successfully disguised as altruism and empathy for the people in the poor countries. It is also invidious because it is not confined to specific sectors but cuts across many sectors, indeed wherever the imposition of such standards by de facto exercise of political power manages to raise the cost of production of rival firms abroad.

It is a dangerous protectionist beast that the new Democrats, and several compliant Republicans who would rather advance business deals than stand for any principles, are therefore turning loose on the trade arena. But the other major threat comes form China today. Part of it is from China’s low standards on human, and hence labor, rights and so what I have argued above holds. Since such diametrically opposed recommendations are not uncommon in macroeconomics, and even the proponents of Chinese Renminbi revaluation divide into many camps on the extent of the desirable revaluation.

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2007/07/13 13:49 2007/07/13 13:49

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