사이드바 영역으로 건너뛰기

'2007/01/11'에 해당되는 글 2건

  1. 2007/01/11 Economic Frameworks for the Progressives
  2. 2007/01/11 Don't Blame China

Newer Entries Older Entries

Economic Frameworks for the Progressives

View Comments

Economics for the Progressives in the US
 
TO: Progressive Presidential Candidates:
RE: Framing a Winning Economic Policy
FROM: Thomas I. Palley
 
The unbalanced U.S. boom that has followed the 2001 recession provides a real window of opportunity for progressive Democrats to reverse the laissez-faire extremism of the last 30 years. This window may open still wider if the economy suffers a recession in the next two years (The Next Recession ). If progressives are to take full advantage of this opportunity, they will need a new economic policy frame. Here’s a suggested road map.
 
(1) The roots of past failure. As a rule, progressive economic policies have played well in slumps, but their traction has tended to weaken with recovery as it becomes more difficult to argue for change of direction. This pattern has been a recurrent problem over the last 25 years, especially since the so-called good times have often not been that good for many working families. Once recessions have ended, policy has quickly reverted to the laissez-faire model. The result has been globalization without standards, persistent erosion of worker bargaining power, and expansion of the economic power of corporate and financial elites.
 
Behind this political failure lies a progressive economic policy framed in terms of unemployment, fairness, and, more recently, budget deficits. This triptych—unemployment, fairness, and budget deficits—is deeply flawed as it lacks staying power, rests on an essentially negative message that clashes with America’s economic optimism, and is prone to economic confusions.
 
Though unemployment resonates deeply in recessions, it loses traction once the economy moves into recovery stage. That means progressive critique can sound off-key for the greater part of the business cycle.
 
Economic fairness has more lasting appeal. However, it seems to be a secondary economic value for many Americans and is usually trumped by concerns with efficiency, enterprise, and growth. This public attitude is reinforced by laissez-faire economists who regard a trade-off between equity and economic efficiency as unavoidable
 
Finally, focusing on budget deficits makes it look as if government itself and lack of saving—conservative positions— are the problems. That, in turn, pushes tax policies that privilege saving and profits and increases both the deficit and inequality. Additionally, focusing on the deficit produces message confusion since budget deficits can be desirable to counter recessions or finance public investment. That adds the further complication of distinguishing “good” deficits from “bad” deficits due to tax cuts for the wealthy and wasteful spending.
 
(2) A winning economic policy frame. Despite their failings of framing, progressives have considerable traction on economic issues because of deep-seated public anxiety about the economy.
 
These anxieties have only deepened during the unbalanced boom of the last four years—a boom marked by slow job growth, hidden chronic unemployment, wage stagnation, stagnant poverty rates, and further increased wealth and income inequality. The only upside has been robust consumption spending, but even that is superficial since its source was a housing price bubble.
 
These unhealthy features provide the key to a winning progressive economic policy frame. That frame must restore the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with full employment. In addition, the budget and trade deficits should be discussed in terms of long-haul sustainability.
 
Linking wages and productivity growth focuses on the entire business cycle, rather than just recession. That fills the gap afflicting existing policy messaging in booms, and booms that fail to deliver rising wages can be rightly criticized. Moreover, emphasizing productivity growth makes it an explicitly pro-growth message. Lastly, the message is anchored in economic history, the “golden age” of the American economy being 1945—‘73 when wages and productivity rose together and the rising economic tide lifted all boats.
 
A winning strategy substitutes full employment for unemployment.. Words matter. Full employment is an affirmative concept, whereas unemployment is a negative one. Full employment also resonates with self-help, whereas unemployment can suggest welfare. And spotlighting full employment also fits with tying wages to productivity since tight labor markets help workers win a share of their productivity. Of course, what constitutes full employment is open to debate, but that is a debate worth having and one that conservatives have shuttered since the late 1960s.
 
Finally, the budget and trade deficit should be reframed in terms of sustainability. That escapes the prison of the lock-box and balanced budgets by recognizing that deficits can be both good and bad. As with full employment, sustainability is also open to debate, but once again that’s a debate worth having.
 
A productivity based wages, full employment, sustainable deficits frame embodies a powerful affirmative logic. Moreover, it provides an easy funnel for showcasing the “hot-button” discontents of today’s economy. Rising inequality and the CEO pay explosion are simply the flipside of today’s wage-productivity disconnect. The trade deficit drains demand from the U.S. economy, undermining full employment and manufacturing, which is key to future productivity-wage growth. And George Bush’s tax cuts have promoted bad unsustainable deficits.
 
Most importantly, such a frame invites questions of what caused the disconnection between wages and productivity, and what can be done to remedy that disconnect, That opens the way for deeper discussion about the economy, and in particular the role of economic power. Once that door is open, it’s easy to understand the role of unions in tying wages to productivity and limiting CEO excess. It is also easy to see why globalization will not work unless accompanied by global labor standards.
 
By way of example, consider the debate over the minimum wage. The existing progressive policy frame emphasizes fairness, with the minimum wage helping low-paid workers make a living. Compare that with a wage-productivity frame in which the minimum wage is part of the system for tying wages to productivity growth. That suggests not only should the minimum wage be increased, it should also be indexed to the median wage (say at 50 to 60 percent). Whereas the former approach relies on charitable sentiments, the latter approach gives everyone a vested interest in the minimum wage. That’s a winning political strategy.
 
(3) Lessons from history. History contains some encouraging parallels with the current moment, but it also shows that winning will require more than just a wish list of progressive policies. In the 1940s, Keynesian economics swept through the halls of academe and policymaking, transforming the way that people thought about the economy. Absent the Great Depression, it is unlikely this revolution in thought would ever have happened.
 
Likewise, in the 1970s, the stagflation induced by the OPEC oil price increases created a window of opportunity for Milton Friedman’s laissez-faire idea of a natural rate of unemployment that returned economics to pre-Depression modes of thought. George Bush’s sick and unbalanced boom provides progressives with a similar opportunity.
 
However, history also illustrates that crisis alone is not enough to change thinking. Ideas must also be ready to fill the vacuum that opens. That has important strategic implications for progressive presidential candidates.
 
Put bluntly, a laundry list of policy proposals is not enough to transform thinking about the economy. That is a deeper task requiring policy be connected to a convincing vision of how the economy works
 
진보블로그 공감 버튼트위터로 리트윗하기페이스북에 공유하기딜리셔스에 북마크
2007/01/11 04:47 2007/01/11 04:47

댓글0 Comments (+add yours?)

트랙백0 Tracbacks (+view to the desc.)

Don't Blame China

View Comments

Comment

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Low wage competition isn't to blame for western job losses and inequality

 

US and British business culture is creating our widening pay gap, not the impact of sub-contractor economies like China

 

Will Hutton

Tuesday January 9, 2007 The Guardian

 

Mention globalisation and a curious mist descends that prevents straight thinking. It is now a given on left and right that billions of low-paid workers are going to take away western jobs and make European welfare and taxation levels unaffordable luxuries. The only options are trade protection or a Darwinian low-tax, low-welfare fight to the finish - equipped with whatever education and training we can get. We must all accept our fate.

 

The problem is this nexus of givens is wrong. Globalisation and trade have greatly enlarged the world's economic cake and our economic options, rather than narrowing them. The problem is that too much of the world is an excluded onlooker, because the rules of the game are massively tilted in the west's favour. It is alarmist, intellectually mistaken and plain counterproductive to blame foreigners for our problems.

Even China, portrayed as the Big New Threatening Thing, has not managed to change the rules. Close to 60% of its exports, nearly all its hi-tech exports and more than half its patents come from foreign companies. In essence it is a subcontractor to the west, boosting the profits of our multinationals and the real incomes of our consumers.

 

China has not a single brand in the world's top hundred, despite the projection that it will become the world's largest exporter in 2008. Buying Rover, and shipping some of the plant back to China, was viewed as an act of strength; in fact it was an act of economic desperation. By lending $200bn a year to finance the US trade deficit, China underpins the international dominance of the dollar. In the upper echelons of the Communist party and the state council there is anguished debate about why so many goods are made "in China" and not "by China", and why indigenous innovation is so disastrous. In 1995 China set a target of having 50 companies in the world's top 500 multinationals by 2010. It will be lucky to have any.

 

Subcontractors tend to have a limited impact on contractors' employment. So it proves with China. The most hawkish, protectionist thinktank in the US is the Economic Policy Institute. It believes Chinese imports have cost the US 2.24 million jobs between 1989 and 2005 - but the overall job churn over the same period exceeded 400m. The impact of offshoring, which attracts so much venom from the American left, is even smaller. The US bureau of labour's survey of mass layoffs identified 884,000 job losses in 2005, of which 12,030 went overseas - two-thirds of this to China and Mexico. In Britain it is a similar story. From April 2003 to July 2006 we lost 390,000 jobs - only 19,000 went abroad. A TUC unit set up to monitor offshoring four years ago has closed because there is so little to monitor.

 

The reason is simple. Manufacturing represents only a small proportion of the value in any good - there is invention, design, financing, marketing, transporting, warehousing, advertising - and even then wage costs are not decisive. A Chinese worker may earn 4% of the wage of an American or British worker, but is only 4% as productive. The consultants McKinsey, for example, estimated that only a quarter of Indian engineers and a tenth of Chinese engineers are equipped to work in multinationals. In a McKinsey survey of California, the savings from offshoring to China ranged from 13% in textiles to a tiny 0.6% for hi-tech companies. Cheap labour is not everything.

 

Western companies can still compete against low-wage Asian businesses, as a study of 500 multinationals by Susan Berger, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has confirmed. They tend to be better organised and embedded in better institutional networks. Nor, finds Peter Lindert, of the University of California, has globalisation hit the industrialised world's capacity to sustain its welfare states; on the contrary well- targeted high social spending is good for growth. Affluence begets affluence, as new forms of economic activity emerge driven by a combination of more discriminating, better educated and affluent consumers wanting new sophisticated services that western companies are more capable of delivering via new technologies- although they need to be physically close to their markets. This is the knowledge economy. Both the network of institutions that support it and the need for market proximity make western economies less vulnerable to globalisation. The US is world leader in technology, brands, universities and patents. In Britain the knowledge- economy programme of the Work Foundation (of which I am chief executive) has found that exports of knowledge-based services trebled from 1995 to 2005, while knowledge-based employment has risen from 30% of employment in 1990 to 41% today.

 

For the less developed countries it seems a magic circle that is ever harder to break into; if even China is no more than a subcontractor to the west's knowledge economy, what chance has it to break the western armlock in the process? And yet the west is hysterically convinced it is the loser - the reason for both the collapse of the Doha round of trade talks and no less than 20 anti-China trade bills in the US Congress.

 

The argument is false everywhere you look. Higher inequality is not caused by low-wage competition driving wages to the bottom or ever higher rewards for the skilled. What has changed is the new super-rich. Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon, of Northwestern University, show that in the US, incomes of the 99.99th percentile have grown outlandishly, rising 497% between 1979 and 2002. This is the principal cause of American inequality. It is the same in Britain; 20 years ago the average CEO of a FTSE 100 company earned 25 times the average worker's wage; today the multiple is close to 120 times.

 

China is not to blame. In Britain and America a business culture has developed where the share price is the be-all and end-all. Under desperately weak and unreformed corporate governance arrangements, CEOs have in effect written their own pay deals.

 

To deliver higher share prices, they have embarked on the world's biggest takeover boom. In hard cash, the cumulative value of deals in the US between 1995 and 2005 was over $9 trillion. In Britain over the past three years there has been a no less astonishing £500bn worth of deals. These are the chief driver of job losses and downsizing - and typically for negligible productivity gains. The "enlightenment" obstacles to this - regulation, a sense of long-term ownership, media scrutiny, competition rules, strong trade unions and a belief in equality - have been progressively weakened. Western capitalism is losing its embedded checks and balances, its morality and, ultimately, its legitimacy.

 

Instead of demonising China as a threat, we should see it for what it is - both an opportunity and a country in trouble that we need to help make the transition to a more viable economic structure, in its interests and in ours. It needs to develop a soft "enlightenment" infrastructure; and we need to nurture and protect our own rather than throw it to the wolves because, allegedly, globalisation makes it too expensive. In fact, it has never been more important. We need to recapture the argument about globalisation from those who use it to serve their own interests - and fast.

 

· Will Hutton's The Writing on the Wall is published next week at £20; to pre-order a copy for £18 with free UK p&p go to guardian.co.uk/bookshop or call 0870 836 0875 will.hutton@observer.co.uk

 

진보블로그 공감 버튼트위터로 리트윗하기페이스북에 공유하기딜리셔스에 북마크
2007/01/11 04:40 2007/01/11 04:40

댓글0 Comments (+add yours?)

트랙백0 Tracbacks (+view to the desc.)

Newer Entries Older Entries