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본문

머리띠 (투쟁!)

 

 

ㄱ

가이 포크스

간디

 

ㄷ

다스 베이더 https://www.google.co.kr/search?newwindow=1&biw=1746&bih=905&tbm=isch&q=darth%20vader%20vector&revid=112156160&ei=ebmeU5DPH4nn8AWEmIHoDA&ved=0CCEQsyU

 

 

ㄹ

레닌

 

ㅁ

마르크스

 

ㅂ

반핵

 

ㅅ

사파티스타

섀우깡 

 

ㅇ

아옌데

엥겔스

 

본문

08:48 AM

세월호, 급변침

 

 

08:55 AM

“지금 배 넘어갑니다” 세월호, 제주 VTS와 교신

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGnFoyUhKKU

주체: 해수부, 중앙대책본부, 청와대

 

09:07 AM

세월호, 진도 VTS와 교신

진도 VTS는 다른 경로를 통해 세월호의 긴급상황을 인지하고 세월호와 교신을 시도해 9시 7분에 처음으로 교신한다.

 

09:10 AM

세월호, 문자로 국정원에 사고 보고

세월호 운항관리규정상 ‘해양사고 보고 계통도’에 따르면 사고 시 세월호는 국정원에 1차적으로 보고해야 한다. 실제로 청해진해운은 사고 초반인 9시 10분에 국정원에 문자메시지로 사고 소식을 알렸으나, 국정원은 국회 답변에서 9시 44분에 언론을 통해 사고 소식을 접했다며 거짓말로 일관했다.

4월 운항중이던 1천톤급 이상의 17개 여객선 중 해양사고 발생시 국정원에 보고하는 체계를 갖춘 여객선은 세월호가 유일하다.

 

 

• 9시10분에 첫 보고 받은 국정원, 국회엔 “9시44분에 알아” 답변 http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201405152149135&code=940202
• 국회의원 정진후 보도자료 (7.10) - 공유해도 되나?? 안 됨 말규..;

주체: 국정원

 

09:32 AM

해경 123 함정 도착, 처음으로 구조 시작

첫번째로 도착한 해경인 123정은 해경본청에 경비전화로 “갑판과 바다에 사람이 하나도 없다”고 보고했으나 해경은 즉각적인 선실진입과 승객퇴선 지시를 내리지 않았다.

해경은 '해양 수색구조 매뉴얼'을 제대로 지키지 않으며 골든 타임을 허비했고, 이는 매뉴얼만 지켰어도 구조됐을 이들까지 죽음으로 몰아갔다. (<--- 너무 표현이 센가?? =ㅅ=)

• <세월호참사> 해경 수색 매뉴얼 현장서 무시돼 http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/society/2014/04/29/0701000000AKR20140429195100065.HTM

주체: 해경

 

12:44

해군3함대 잠수사 5명 현장 도착

전남도청 119 상황실로부터 지원요청을 받은 해군은 9시 9분에 함문식함 등 소속함정을 출동시켜 비교적 일찍 현장에 도착했으나 해경은 이들을 활용하지 않았다. 개정된 수난구호법에 따르면 해경이 요청하지 않는 한 해군이나 민간은 구조에 나설수 없다.

주체: 해경

 

15:00경

해경본청, 청해진해운에 언딘과 구난 계약 체결 종용

수색·구조작업이 한창 진행되고 있어 선박 인양이 이른 시점임에도 해경은 청해진해운에 구난계약 체결을 종용하며 직원이 3차례 통화하기도 했다.

청해진 해운에 따르면 담당 해경이 ‘제 입으로 말하기는 그렇지만 언딘이라는 업체가 있는데 벌써 구난 작업을 하고 있다. 그쪽과 계약하라’고 해서 사전에 존재도 몰랐던 언딘과 계약했다고 한다.

*** 언딘-해양구조협회 등은 규만이 써주삼

수난구호법은 수색구조·구난에 관한 기술·제도·문화 등의 연구·개발·홍보 및 교육훈련, 행정기관이 위탁하는 업무의 수행과 해양 구조·구난 업계의 건전한 발전 및 해양 구조·구난 관계 종사자의 기술향상을 위해 한국해양구조협회를 둔다. 수난예방과 대응에 대한 광범위한 업무를 민간에 위탁해 둔 양상. 해양구조협회의 인적구성을 보면 협회의 실제적인 기능은 정치권, 해경, 해양수산부, 해운업계의 이해관계자들의 인적 네트워크로 보임.

• [단독] 청해진, “해경이 ‘언딘과 계약하라’ 했다” http://www.sisainlive.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=20180
• 수난구호법(2013년 3월 23일 시행) 링크? 아니면 위 해군 얘기에 링크?

주체: 해경, 한국해양구조협회, 언딘

 

19:50
해경, 급파된 인양선 씨뮤즈호 방치

문화재청 소속 수중발굴 인양선 씨뮤즈호가 세월호 침몰 현장에 도착(또다른 인양선 누리안호는 다음날 오전 8시 10분 도착)했지만 해양경찰이 수일간 방치하다 돌려보냈다. 해경은 심지어 인양선들 철수 후 문화재청에 재지원을 요청하며 6일이나 시간을 낭비했다.

• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cATlV7Vzfd4

주체: 해양경찰

 

 

**

민간 잠수사 배제한 거 어떻게 넣어야 할지 모르겠긔... ㅠㅠ

http://news.jtbc.joins.com/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB10496586

본문

Dr. As'ad Ghanem, teaches comparative politics at the school of political science, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel

Email: ghanemasad@yahoo.com

and

Mohanad Mustafa

PhD student at the school of political science, University of Haifa

Address: School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel

 

Abstract

This article aims to present a comprehensive explanation of the development of Islamic political movements among the Palestinians. It focuses specifically on analyses of three public Islamic movements: Two that are active among the Palestinians in Israel proper, the Southern Islamic movement and the Northern Islamic movement, and the Hamas movement that is active among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Much can be learned about the nature of the political Islam, in general, and among the Palestinians in particular, from these three movements that differ substantially in their platforms, orientations, methods of political involvement, and attitudes toward the future of the Palestinian problem, Israel and the Jews. Through the analysis of these movements, the authors have built a broad explanatory set of factors that go beyond the Islamic movement itself to address the human and political environment in which supporters and leaders of political Islam operate. In this article a pyramid of four factors constitute together the multi-layered explanation that helps to understand the different approaches in political Islam: the context, the public orientation, the leaders' movements preferences, and the interpretation of the religious text.

 

Key words: Political Islam; Islamic Movements; Palestinians; Israel; Hamas;

 

Theoretical Background

Explaining the development of Islamic political movements, in general, and Palestinian political Islam in particular, has attracted great interest in the last few decades. The theoretical explanations of 'political Islam' among the Palestinians have been similar to the explanations provided for the general phenomena of political Islam and Islamic political revival.i. We contend to the contrary, however, that different and alternative explanations apply to political Islam observed among Palestinians.

Islamic revival, in essence, usually seen as a reflection of the desire to implement the religious text in daily life: politics, culture, economy, social domains, etc. According to the "fundamentalist approach", Islam in modern times is a political phenomenon that aims to implement the commands that appear in the text of the Islamic Shari'a (laws). These commands are based on (a) the Quran, Islam's holy book; (b) the Sunnah (the Prophet Muhammad's trodden path, custom, or tradition; (c) the Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings); or (d) any later religious regulations that were created or developed by the top religious figures (Ulama) in Muslim communities. In other words, the mission of political Islam is to implement the commands of the religious text (the shari’a) in the modern life of Muslims.ii

Literature on the subject refers to Islamic "fundamentalism" as a reflection of rigid beliefs and a specific way of life. Fundamentalists are described as idealistic, highly devoted, ready to live an austere lifestyle filled with struggle and sacrifice, and pledging absolute obedience to Allah and to the leader of the fundamentalist movementiii. Radical fundamentalists are portrayed as extremist and fanatic persons (muta'assibun), who suffer from an inferiority complex that is reflected in their aggressiveness, authoritarianism, intolerance, paranoia, and conspiratorial tendencies. In accordance with this view, Lewis has noted that the Islamic movements active during the second half of the twentieth century, were rooted in a universal belief in the unity of 'church and state;' Islam formed the central element in Muslim identity. Likewise, more modern Islamic movements (e.g., pan-Islamism of Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz in the 1870s; the rise of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1930s; and the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979), were also manifestations of this universality and centrality.iv

Many researchers, failing to distinguish different groups and orientations among political Islam, have used this model to explain Palestinian Islamic movements. Raphael Israeli, for example, maintains that all Islamic movements are identical in their goals and political targets and that any differences between movements are minor or superficial. For example, Israeli claims that no substantive difference exists between the goals of Israel’s two Islamic movements. Further, he maintains that these goals are identical to those of other Islamic fundamentalist movements. According to Israel, although they use different tactics to realize the goals,v all aim to destroy Israel, and to establish an Islamic entity in Palestine. Similarly, Bukay argues that there is only one Islamic culture and that there is no difference among Islamic streams, including in their interpretations of religious text. Like Israeli, Bukay believes that all Islamic movements aim to destroy the state of Israel and establish an Islamic state.vi Rekhess also denies any distinction among followers of Islam. He claims that strong ties exist among different Islamic movements, including between Palestinians in Israel and their brothers in the occupied Palestinian territories. Political Islam in Israel, he maintains, is merely a branch of general Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism - meaning that characteristics of the Islamic communities in Israel and in the Palestinian authority are identical.vii

An alternative explanation of political Islam is one that understands it as part of the political phenomena that exist within the context of ongoing political, social and economic development of a modern state and society. According to this approach, Islamic rivival movements are first and foremost "social and political movements engaged in mobilization, organization, and possibly the seizure of the political authority."viii. Therefore, these movements are directed, first and foremost, to political cost-benefit calculus, at least in the short run. In addition, similar to other socio-political forces, these movements are characterized by factional politics, personal conflicts, and controversies over strategies and tactics to achieve their common goals. According to this alternative perspective, political Islamic movements are populist movements. Their populist nature is expressed symbolically in their self-perception and presentation to the public as "fronts" (jabahat) open to all Muslims, rather than as regular political parties representing particular interests. The populist nature of these political Islamic movements is also reflected in their heterogeneous social base which includes the poor and the rich, the rural and the urban, the educated and uneducated, and which allows Islamic movements to appear in different forms and to adopt different targets and strategies.

This alternative perspective holds that Islamic activism is conditioned and much affected by local, regional and global contexts and forces. It views Islamic activism as reflecting a desperate search to find a stabilizing anchor in a traditional social order that has been disrupted by haphazard modernization projects and failed nationalismsix Thus, they claim that the ecology of Islamic activism is always in flux, combining fixity with pragmatism as it responds to environmental challenges. In other words, the Islamic past is appropriated to justify courses of action deemed necessary to produce effective Islamic social movement in today's environment.

Several researchers have applied the foregoing model of political Islam in order to understand Palestinian Islamic movements, in general, and political Islam in Israel, in particular. According to these researchers, political Islam in Israel, although part of the general awakening of Islamic rivival that began in the 1970s, has special characteristics rooted in the Israeli experience. For example, the Israeli experience features an Arab minority and includes development of the Islamic movement in a Jewish state with clear Jewish political and cultural hegemonyx. Palestinian Islamic movements, in Israel proper and in the West Bank and Gaza, are a complex phenomenon that must take into consideration the interaction with Israel, as a Jewish state (in Israel Pre-1967 border), occupied power (in the West Bank and Jerusalem), and Semi-Occupied Power (in Gaza); the general context of the Muslims (including the holy text); and the characteristics of the Palestinian reality in different domains. These parallel contexts affect the content of the different Islamic political movements and their orientation in Israel.

The Development of Palestinian Political Islam

“Political Islam” began organizing in Mandatory Palestine before 1948. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the 1920s, did not begin to take an interest in events in Palestine until the mid-1930s. After the eruption of the Palestinian revolt against the British and Jewish immigration in 1936, movement representatives came from Egypt to encourage the Palestinians in their struggle. The first local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Jerusalem in 1946. During the 1948 war, three battalions of volunteers from the Brotherhood enlisted in the Egyptian armyxi. However, the results of the 1948 war - the dispersal of Palestinians and the establishment of Israel; the Jordanian rule over the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Egyptian rule over the Palestinians in Gaza Strip; and the imposition of foreign rule over Palestinian communities in the exile - limited the activity of political Islam. In fact, one cannot point to any such organization by Palestinians during the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s. This situation changed as a result of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip when new conditions were created for the development of political Islam among the Palestinians.

Palestinians in Israel numbered close to 1,200,000 in 2009. They constitute 18% of Israel’s population. Ten per cent are Christians and 10% are Druze. Eighty per cent are Sunni Muslims, the largest Palestinian community in Israel and part of the region’s Muslim majority.xii Currently, three Islamic movements are active among the Palestinians: the Islamic movement founded among the Palestinians in Israel during the seventies of the 20th century and divided in 1996 into the 'Northern' and the 'Southern' Islamic movements and the Hamas Movement founded in 1987-8 and active among the West Bank, Gaza Strip and exiled Palestinian communitiesxiii. The Northern and Southern movements are active in Israel proper; Palestinians who are Israeli citizens are their main target for mobilization. However, all three movements believe and act as part of the Islamic and Arab world, rather than as a minority group of Muslims who immigrated to a new society. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, each movement developed its own way of coping with the new Palestinian reality.xiv

A number of young Palestinians from Israel who completed high school and were attracted to an Islamic environment continued their studies in the Islamic colleges and institutes in the occupied west bank and Gaza strip. These colleges prepared them for the title of “sheikh.” These young men began unorganized activity preaching religion in their home communities and elsewhere in Muslim communities, including sermons in the mosques and meetings held at Muslim festivals. Their activity paved the way for the Islamic stream to organize political and social associations.xv

The Islamic movement focused its efforts on propaganda and on providing the services associated with the institutions of civil society. Ever since its founding, the Islamic movement has provided essential services to the local population in every community in which it is activexvi. These services include an educational network to supplement the state system, libraries, computer centers, community centers, pre-schools, medical and dental clinics, rehabilitation centers for ex-convicts and addicts, and so on. These can be found all over the community, including towns where the Islamic Movement is not part of the local governing coalition (e.g., Umm al-Fahm, Kafr Qasim, Kafr Bara, Kafr Kanna, Nazareth, Kabul, Nahaf, and others).

The Islamic movement employed various means to manage and fund these services. It focused on volunteer activity and on mobilizing its members, for example, in projects that addressed their communal needs. The mosques, found in every community where there are Muslims, hosted these projects. The movement also took control of the task of collecting the zakat, the tax that every Muslim is required to pay to support the poor. These funds underwrote a large portion of the movement’s activities. In localities where the movement could draw on other financial sources, including governmental sources — especially in places where it controlled the local council — it did so.

 

 

The Evolution of Northern and Southern Islamic Movements in Israel: The emergence of the Northern and Southern Islamic Movements is best described beginning with a brief history of Islamic religious organization in Israel. Islamic religious organization in Israel can be divided into three periods. The first period (1979–1981) featured a semi-military underground organization composed of a small core of people who believed in armed struggle against the Jews and the State of Israel; they called themselves 'Usrat al-Jihad' (The Family of Jihad). This group was apprehended by the Israeli security forces in 1981 and its leaders imprisoned, putting an end to this period. The second period, from 1983 through the 1996, began with the emergence of Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish of Kafr Qasim (in the Triangle) as the leader of a new organization that called itself the “Young Muslims.” The Northern and Southern Islamic movements emerged during the third period, 1996 through the present, when the Islamic movement split into two movements with different political orientations, goals, and methods.

Until 1996, the Islamic movement did not participate officially in Knesset elections, although it did not formally boycott them. Before Election Day the movement would call upon its members to act in accordance with their conscience. Before the 14th Knesset elections (1996), however, the Islamic movement set up a joint list with the Democratic Arab Party. Movement representatives then won two of the four seats on the joint list; Subsequently, two movement representatives won seats to the 15th Knesset (out of five seats for the joint list).

Some members of the Young Muslims movement seceded in protest against the group’s participation in these elections; these individuals established an alternate movement, led by Raed Salah, Mayor of Umm al-Fahmxvii. Abu-Raiya attributes the 1996 fracture of Israel’s Islamic movement into competing movements, in part, to this disagreement regarding the Knesset elections. Further, Abu-Raiva argues that two types of religious interpretation within the movement led to the split: abstract interpretation of Islam that allows for a relatively large amount of flexibility, versus concrete interpretation that translates the religious faith into political “dos and don’ts.”xviii

One stream, led by Sheikh Raed Salah (the mayor of Umm al-Fahm at the time), employed a concrete interpretation asserting that participation in the Knesset elections would endanger the values of the Islamic movement as a religious movement and would lead to the Israelization of the Muslim society. This extra-parliamentary Islamic movement is also known as the Northern Islamic movement. The second stream, led by Sheikh Nimr Darwish, subscribed to a more abstract interpretation. This parliamentary Islamic movement, also known as the Southern movement, believed that participation in the Knesset could advance the goals of the Islamic movement and of Arab society and that representation of the movement would improve the situation of the Palestinians and of Arab parliamentary politicsxix. Ibrahem Sarsur, who succeeded Darwish as the leader of the parliamentary Islamic movement, admits that the united Islamic movement, until 1996, did not accommodate divergent views. Sarsur believes the split was necessary in order to distinguish between the various viewpoints within the Islamic movement. Furthermore, because of the incompatible views and profound disagreements between the streams in the united Islamic movement, Sarsur feels a split was necessary to preserve the pure principles of the Islamic movementxx. Sheikh Salah concurs with Sarsur, claiming that what happened in 1996 was not the “result of an isolated incident, but the cumulative result of numerous incidents over many years”xxi.

 

The Evolution of the Hamas Movement: Parallel to the institutionalization of the Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel, political Islam among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip was very hesitant until the creation of the Hamas Movement in 1988. The name “Hamas” is an acronym of the organization’s full name, 'Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya', which means Islamic Resistance Movement. The word Hamas in Arabic, means 'zeal'. The organization has its roots in another Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood is originally Egyptian, it maintains branches throughout the Arab worldxxii. Hamas’ founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s inactive branch in the Palestinian-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yassin founded the Islamic Center of Gaza (al-Mujamma’ al-Islami) in 1973 “to coordinate the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activities in Gaza.” After the beginning of the first intifada in 1987, Yassin created Hamas out of the Brotherhood’s Gazan branchxxiii.

Prior to December 1987, when it issued its first Intifada statement, Hamas was a religious and social movement without any political platform. Like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas strove to become a driving force in the Intifada. However, over time a conflict emerged between the PLO and Hamas over their respective influence on the Intifada and their competing claims of responsibility for gains made. One of the fears of the PLO, the majority of whose leadership was abroad (mainly in Tunisia), was that Hamas - by virtue of its armed resistance - would become a leading force in the Intifada and, consequently, a central power among Palestinians in the occupied territories.xxiv

In March of 2004 - following a failed September 2003 attempt - Israel assassinated Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin with a missile strike. More than two hundred thousand Palestinians attended his funeral on March 22. Less than a month later, on April 17, Israel assassinated Yassin’s successor, Abdel Aziz Rantissi. A similar number of Palestinians came to mourn at his funeralxxv. Despite the sudden loss of two leaders, Hamas survived. The large numbers who attended the funerals of Yassin and Rantissi indicate the level of popular support that the group enjoyed in the Palestinian territories.

In 2004 and 2005, Hamas began to participate in the electoral process, standing in municipal elections in 2004 and 2005 and posting strong showings in Gaza. While taking part in local elections, the group boycotted the 2005 Palestinian Authority presidential race and decided to join the September 2005 race for the legislative elections. Despite political setbacks in 2005, Hamas managed to take control of the Palestinian parliament by winning legislative elections in January 2006. Hamas defeated Fatah, the leading faction in the PLO, by a large margin, winning 76 of 132 seats and the right to form President Mahmoud Abbas’ cabinet. With this victory, Hamas now had control of the Palestinian Authority and formed a government with Ismail Hanieh (a senior figure in Hamas) as Prime Minister. However, the group continued its refusal to recognize the state of Israel. As a result, the United States and the European Union, who had provided most of the Palestinian Authority’s $1.5 to $1.7 billion annual budget through foreign aid, withdrew their financial backing in order to avoid funding a terrorist group. This led to a massive budget shortfall for the movementxxvi.

Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections also led to a power struggle with Fatah, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. In June 2007, the competition between the two groups became violent, as fighting erupted between gunmen from Hamas and Fatah. An armed Hamas defeated security forces loyal to Fatah, drove the rival group out of Gaza altogether, and took over the entire Gaza stripxxvii. In response, Abbas sacked Haniya as Prime Minister and replaced him with Salam Fayyad - a move that was ignored by the Hamas-dominated legislature. As a result of the confrontation, the Palestinian territories were effectively been split in two, with Fatah governing the West Bank and Hamas ruling the Gaza Strip. Despite Egyptian efforts to bring about reconciliation, talks have failed and the split remains in effectxxviii.

 

Variation in the Palestinian Political Islam

 

Substantial differences in the political orientations of the three Palestinian Islamic movements provide a basis for explaining the diverse ways in which the movements implemented Islam. The following examination enumerates the political and ideological differences that characterize each of the three Islamic movements, including the movement’s vision of its current and future relationship with Israel and the Jews.

1 - Islamic Movements 'Moment of Creation'. One substantive difference among the three Palestinian Islamic movements was its moment of the creation. The Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel was re-established in the early 1980's, following a period of security restriction and the arrest of its founder, Sheikh Darwish. Nevertheless, Darwish insisted on creating a public and legal movement in accordance with the Israeli law. Until the split in 1996, Darwish made sure that the Islamic movement declared its recognition of the state of Israel and its acceptance of the fact that Palestinians in Israel are Israeli citizens who acknowledge their minority status in the Jewish state.

However, in 1996, a majority decision of the Islamic movement’s Shura council to participate in the Knesset election led to the movement’s split and stimulated the moment of creation for the Northern Islamic (extra parliamentary) movement among Palestinians in Israel. At that moment, it become clear that the larger Islamic movement actually was comprised of two groups with differing orientations to the basic issues facing them and the general Palestinian public in Israel.

For Hamas the moment of creation was triggered by the situation of Palestinians in the occupied territories. They were not citizens in Israel and did not want to remain under Israeli control. Rather, they sought independence and futures divergent from their brothers in Israel. Hamas’ anti-Israeli political programs and charter were shaped by its declaration of existence at the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada and during an escalation of anti Israeli feelings among Palestinians in the west Bank and Gaza xxix.

Each movement’s 'moment of creation' shaped its orientations towards Israel, its existence, and the rights of the Jews. The two Islamic movements in Israel - the Northern and the Southern Islamic movements - share the goal of strengthening religious identity as an important component in the collective identity of the Palestinians in Israel. They pursue this goal through religious preaching and various religious and social activities that generate a wave of Islamization among the Palestinian population in Israel.xxx However, a close look at the activity of these two movements indicates that they are not partners with regard to the future of the Muslims in Israel, particularly in terms of relations between the State and the Muslim minority.

2 - Politics of Recognition vs. Politics of Difference vs. Politics of Rejection: Theoretically, it is possible to discern differing political approaches in the three movements: The parliamentary Southern Islamic movement shares the tools and objectives of general Palestinians in Israel politics; the Southern movement emphasizes the politics of recognition.xxxi The extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement, on the other hand, is distinguishable from general Israeli politics - and from parliamentary Islamic politics, in particular -, by its intensive use of tools that reflect the politics of difference, and Hamas mentioned a third type of politics, the politics of rejection.

The distinction between the politics of recognition and the politics of difference is related to the question of citizenship and to relations between the state’s majority and the minority populations. The politics of recognition attempt to improve the status and situation of the Palestinians in Israel through negotiation and through influence and pressure on the state and on the majority, in order to compel them to adopt measures and policies of equality, affirmative action, and recognition of the identity and status of Palestinians as an indigenous minority entitled to collective rights that are recognized and supported by the state. The politics of difference, on the other hand, emphasize activities conducted within the community, eschew any support from the state, and has no interest in recognition by the majority populace or by the state. The politics of difference as implemented by the extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement is aimed at building an independent society that can exist and manage itself in isolation from the state. Sheikh Salah has called this project “al-mujtam’a al-Isami” (the independent community).xxxii

At the community level, the extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement has expressed its religious fundamentalism by forging a community with separate and distinct institutions. Community members conduct most of their lives within it and feel great loyalty toward it.xxxiii The movement is not an integrative project and thus, suffers more constant scrutiny and persecution by the security and political establishment in Israel than the parliamentary Southern Islamic counterpart. While the activity of the parliamentary Islamic movement is considered integrative, in that the movement views Israeli citizenship as an important political tool,, the activity of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement, which does not share this view, is regarded by the Israeli establishment as endangering the fragile relations between the Palestinian minority and the Jewish state.xxxiv Interestingly, the political-ideological dimension of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s activity invokes more fear on the part of the State than the security dimension of this activity. Specifically, the State fears that the extra-parliamentary movement is gradually coalescing into a powerful mass social movement with broad popular support and great ability to mobilize the public.xxxv

The extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement reflects Sheikh Salah’s conceptualization of an independent community in numerous ways. First, for example, in concert with Sheikh Salah’s belief that forging an independent Arab-Muslim community is the only solution for the Arab-Muslim minority in Israel, the extra parliamentary Islamic movement rejects other solutions offered by Palestinians in Israel and by the Jewish majority (e.g., a state for all citizensxxxvi, a bi-national statexxxvii, or various other autonomy proposalsxxxviii).

Second, the movement reflects Sheikh Salah’s concept of the independent community as a community based on fundamental principles related to three elements in Arab society: science (or human capital), land, and economics For example, the principle of “purity of capital” asserts that capital should come only from Islamic sources (e.g., charity, Islamic endowment – the waaf, and contributions from Muslim entities and individuals). Consequently, maintaining that non-Muslim contributions are not “pure” and that they seek to change the character and identity of the Muslim community,xxxix the leaders of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement reject any contribution from non-Muslim entities. Foreign money, they argue, does not come “without a negative price;” the foreign entities will demand something in exchange for this money and that demand is liable to threaten the independence of the Muslim community. Third, in alignment with Sheikh Salah’s contention that establishment of an independent community requires closer symbolic, cultural, and practical ties with the Arab world and with the Moslems in the world, the extra parliamentary movement (a) denies the unique situation and status of Muslims in Israel, (b) seeks to deepen ties with the Islamic world, and (c) sees itself as an integral part of pan Arab-Muslim political Islam. (Recall that, conversely, the parliamentary movement believes that the Muslims in Israel are in a special situation and that the unique context of political Islam in Israel demands special treatment for all issues on the agenda of Muslims in Israelxl).

 

Citizenship, Peace and Conflict in Context: The variations of Palestinian Islamic movements are related to a complex of variables, but the main differences between the three political Islamic movements are derived mainly from their basic orientations towards Israel and the Islamic-Israeli-West conflict. The basic question that raises here is: what is the basic orientation of the three Islamic movements towards Israel, the future of the Palestinian problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?. We will examine this question by referring to three main domains; The relationship with Israel as a state and a society in the practical-daily level; the political terminology that are used by the three Islamic movement when it comes to Israel and the Jews; and the future of the conflict, including the war, peace or truce options. These three domains are interconnected as part of the stand of each Islamic movement and are organized around the core political orientation of each movement.

For example, the Southern Islamic movement in Israel is accepting the civic status of the Palestinians in Israel as Israeli citizens that struggle for equal rights and as part of the Israeli citizenship. Derived from this political stand, they are accepting the two-states solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have strong political relationships with the Palestinian PLO leadership that supports the two states solution, and they reject the use of violence as a mean for change.

On the other hand, the Northern Islamic movement does not consider the Israeli citizenship as a main vehicle for empowerment for the Palestinians in Israel. The struggle for equality within Israel is considered by the movement as a marginal object, and they develop the concept of independent community in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Israeli citizens. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they have reservations towards the two states solution and they have great sympathy with the regional opponents of Israel and any peace agreements with it (Hammas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran).

Hamas, as an Islamic movement that is active among Palestinian communities outside Israel, especially in Gaza and the West Bank, do not refer to the citizenship in Israel as an option, they develop a "politics of rejection" for the peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, and developed a strong ties and relationships with the the regional powers that reject the Israeli existence: Islamic rivival groups in the Arab and Islamic worlds (mainly: Hizbullah, Iran and Syria as an Arab nationalist regime that support the resistance against Israel)

Civic Status in Israel and types of Political Orientations: The independent community concept is a significant component differentiating the politics of difference practiced by the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement, from the politics of recognition practiced by the parliamentary Islamic movement. For example, while the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement tends to focus on activity within the community and to mobilize the Muslim community to attain its goals, the parliamentary Islamic movement employs all of the means provided by Israeli politics to strengthen the Muslim society in Israel and to convince the State to institute measures that would raise the status of the Muslims in Israel. Thus, while the former might work to protect Muslim sacred property via community activity, such as organizing days for Muslim volunteers to improve the condition of graves in abandoned Palestinian villages, the latter would address the same goal by trying to pass legislation in the Knesset that would require the State to preserve the holy places of the Muslims in Israel and allocate resources for this purpose.

Among the other variables that differentiate the extra parliamentary and parliamentary branches of political Islam in Israel is terminology. The political terminology employed by the two movements reflects their differences in the political discourse. The extra-parliamentary Islamic movement calls itself “the Islamic movement in the Palestinian interior.” This terminology attempts to ignore the Israeli context and emphasizes the Palestinian place in the identity of the Islamic movement. The parliamentary Islamic movement, on the other hand, generally refers to itself as “the Islamic movement in Israel.” Another example of differing terminology is found in the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s use of the term “the Israeli establishment” to describe the various authorities of the State of Israel, while the parliamentary movement uses the term “the government of Israel” or “the State of Israel” to describe the same authorities. The use of diverse terms is not merely a matter of semantics. Rather, the terms are indicative of the users’ political-ideological orientations.

Methods of change: Political Participation in context: The question of political participation in the elections to the Israeli parliament is an additional variable that differentiates the two Islamic movements in Israel. As noted, the dispute over participating in Knesset elections led to the rift within political Islam in Israel. The Northern movement boycotts elections, led by Sheikh Salah, who continually argues against the participation of Arab parties in the elections. Sheikh Salah frames his view on boycotting the Knesset elections around two main contentions: (a) the Knesset is a symbol of the State’s Jewishness and part of “the Zionist project,” and (b) representation in the Knesset does not enable the Muslims and Palestinians in Israel to improve their status and situationxli.

On the eve of each election campaign, Salah publishes a series of articles describing his arguments in support of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s opposition to participating in the Knesset elections. His central argument is that the Knesset is nothing more than a forum for protest and cannot change the situation of the Muslims in Israel. Sheikh Salah also contends that the Knesset represents the Zionist movement, which is responsible for the nakba of the Palestinians. Thus, any participation in the elections, in his view, grants legitimacy to this institution, which symbolizes “the Zionist project,” enacts laws that discriminate against the Palestinians and Muslims in Israel, and creates only hardship for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

Sheikh Salah’s article on the eve of the 2003 Knesset elections appeared in the movement’s newspaper – Sawt al-Haqq wal-Huriyya (Voice of Justice and Freedom) – under the title, “The Elections and Us.” In it he argued: “….the Knesset is the supreme establishment of the Zionist project, which does not recognize us as a national minority or as citizens entitled to receive equal rights. Therefore, the Knesset has never been a supreme establishment for us, the Palestinian Arab minority in this land”xlii. Salah’s article on the eve of the 2006 Knesset elections, continued in the same vein, calling for a boycott of the Knesset elections and arguing that:

I am more and more convinced that the mechanism of the Knesset is one of the expressions of the Zionist enterprise and is only designed to serve the Zionist enterprise – both on the local level and on the global level … If there are accomplishments by some of the Arab members of Knesset, they are very modest achievements in relation to the amount of time all of the Arab members of Knesset spend within the Knesset mechanism.xliii

The Knesset boycott by the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement is an ideological boycott rather than a political one. A political boycott, the dominant type of boycott among Palestinians in Israel, typically relates to the boycotters’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the Arab political parties and protests their inferior status in the State. An ideological boycott, on the other hand, relates more to the idea of rejecting the existing political system and to the aspiration of changing it.xliv

Unlike the extra-parliamentary stream, the parliamentary Islamic movement believes that participation in the Knesset elections is an inseparable part of the overall outlook of political Islam; this outlook asserts: “Islam is the solution.” During an interview published in the movement’s newspaper Al-Mithaq (The Covenant), Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur - the head of the parliamentary Islamic movement, states, “Religious preaching is the main thing and politics is part of it, and the parliament is a branch of the religious activity. …. Therefore, there is no contradiction between our participation in the parliament and the rest of our activity.xlv”

The parliamentary Islamic movement argues that participation in the Knesset elections is aimed at working to improve everyday life for Palestinians. Another argument used to justify participation in Knesset elections is the need to counter the rise of the extreme right in Israel, which calls for the political exclusion and even the physical transfer of Israel’s Arab minority. The parliamentary movement believes it is necessary to increase the representation of the Palestinians in the Knesset in order to neutralize the aspirations of the extreme right in Israel.xlvi

Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, the founder of the Islamic movement in Israel and the leader of the movement from its inception and until 2003, takes issue with the Islamic stream that boycotts the Knesset elections. Sheikh Darwish, considered a moderate religious person in Israel, led the movement to participate in the Knesset elections in 1996 and has consistently maintained that a strong basis exists in Islamic law justifying the Islamic movement’s participation in the parliament of the Jewish state.xlvii

 

Peace and conflict and the future of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation: The principal disagreement between the parliamentary and extra parliamentary movements is related to the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. The parliamentary Islamic movement supports a peace process that would ultimately lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, the former leader of this parliamentary Islamic movement, Sheikh Darwish, supported the Oslo accords and even participated several times in assemblies and rallies in support of the Oslo accords and the peace process. However, Sheikh Salah, the head of the extra-parliamentary movement strongly opposed the Oslo accords. He called them “an act of treason;” while his deputy, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, called them “a betrayal of the rights of the Palestinian people”xlviii.

 

Parallel to the discussion between the two Islamic movements in Israel and the evolution of the politics of recognition and the politics of difference, Hamas was forging a new path that might be called the politics of rejection. Hamas politics of rejection was articulated in its organizational charter published on August 18th, 1988.xlix Article One of the movement’s charter states that, “the Movement’s program is Islam;” Article Two identifies the organization as, “one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.” Article Nine defines the Hamas mission as, “discarding the evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert [to their owners]… announcing the reinstitution of the Muslim state.” Similarly, Article Six articulates the following purpose: “[Hamas] strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.” The charter goes on to declare that, “Palestine is an Islamic Waqf (endowment) . . . . No one can renounce it or part of it. . . . . No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries… nor any organization or the aggregate of all organizations” has that right.

Several references in the charter to the history of the conflict outline the differences between Hamas and other political organizations. For example, Article Six, states that “[Hamas] is a distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah.” This statement might be a direct reference to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded by Egyptian President Jamel Abdel Nasser and the Arab League in 1964 (UN.int). The charter also clearly states Hamas’ opposition to any peace with Israel: “….the so-called peaceful solutions… are contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”

Hamas signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Washington on September 13, 1993. However, the movement subsequently adopted a hard-line position against the agreement. Ahmad Yassin sent a letter from prison to his followers stating that the accord disregarded basic issues regarding Jerusalem, the settlements, and the demarcation of borders. According to Yassin, the interim solution did not meet the ultimate goals of the Palestinian people. Thus, he called upon his followers to reject the agreement and resist it with “the civilized means at their disposal."l Hamas' stance was further clarified in a statement made by the movement's spokesman, Ibrahim Ghousheh, on September 4, 1993. In his statement, Ghousheh stated that:

The Gaza-Jericho agreement does not represent the Palestinian people at all, nor does it represent the Palestinian national and Islamic factions; it doesn’t even represent the PLO bodies themselves ... and therefore, Hamas will continue the long battle against the Zionist enemy. The Gaza-Jericho agreement does not commit our people or ourselves to anything stated in the agreement. These events and developments only consolidate and increase our belief in the righteousness of our Islamic belief and approach to liberate Palestine. These developments make Hamas and the other factions strongly believe in our ability to meet our people’s aspirations and to lead the people on the path of jihad and liberation.li

Hamas' hard-line stance on the Gaza-Jericho Agreement stemmed from two basic factors. First was the sense, as mentioned above, that the agreement did not meet Palestinian demands given that it did not address the basic issues of the conflict. Second, the agreement was reached without any consultation with the Palestinians within Palestine. As Ghousheh declared in the following statement,

The agreement was for meager autonomy over less than 2 percent of the land of Palestine. This autonomy would be dominated by the occupying power without any authority or sovereignty, without the return of refugees, and with Jerusalem remaining under the occupation, which would also retain control over border passages. lii

A review of these positions reveals that Hamas focused on final status issues. Hamas believed that the way these issues were addressed in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement constituted a violation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and considered the agreement’s lack of solutions as a strong reason to consider the agreement a threat to the essence of the Palestinian cause and, therefore, to resist it.

The infighting between Hamas and the PLO did not distract the movement from its original enemy: Israel. On June 19th, 2008, an Egyptian-brokered cease fire between Israel and Hamas came into effect for six months. In December of 2008, the ceasefire expired, and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (who lives in exile in Syria) announced that it would not be extended. The agreement officially expired on December 19th; on December 27th, Israel began an assault on Gaza named “Operation Cast Lead.” Hamas, in turn, fired rockets into Israel from the Strip and engaged in urban warfare, using training from Hezbollah and Iran to create a network of tunnels, booby traps, and hidden bombs. By the time Operation Cast Lead ended on January 17th, over 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis had been killed, including many civilians.liii A UN commission created after the war released, in September, 2009, the Goldstone Report, which indicated that both Israel and Hamas had committed war crimes during the conflict. The rebuilding process in Gaza has been immensely difficult due to an Israeli blockade of the Strip that has been in effect since the Hamas takeover in June, 2007. To date, Gaza is still under blockade.liv

Despite Hamas’ official rejection of any permanent compromise, observers and participants do not assume that Hamas will never accept a peace agreement. For example, Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid maintain that:

Hamas’s positions regarding the political process and Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be understood in three stages: in the first stage, it maintained a principled position of refusing political resolution without elaborating on its reasoning; in the second stage, it refused to consider the implications of any political settlement that entailed a waiver of any rights or entitlements of the Palestinian people; and in the third stage, it declared its willingness to accept a truce with Israel under certain conditions but maintained that there would be no recognition of Israel’s legitimacy in the land of Palestine. To these three stages, we may also add a fourth stage, namely the acceptance of a short-term temporary truce (tahadiya) with conditions less stringent than those that would be required for a longer-term truce (hudna).lv

The Hamas leader himself, Khaled Meshaal, has also addressed the possibility of peace. In an interview with Foreign Policy magazine, Meshaal stated that, “Today the balance of power is in Israel’s favor. Israel has military superiority.” The reality of Israeli military strength lies behind Hamas proposals for a hudna with Israel.lvi In another interview, Mashaal declared that "We as Palestinians accept the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital and the implementation of the right of return."lvii Indeed, in recent interviews, Mashal, has offered to cooperate with U.S. efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has indicated a willingness to implement an immediate and reciprocal ceasefire with Israel, and has stated that the militant group would accept and respect a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.lviii

 

Toward a Comprehensive Model for Understanding the Phenomenon of Palestinian Islamic Movements

A comprehensive explanation of the three political Islam movements that are active among the Palestinians requires considering four factors that, in combination, explain the differing orientations of these movements lix: (a) political context - the broadest factor; (b) the political orientation of the general public (as potential community support for the movement; (c) the nature, orientation, and preferences of the movement’s leadership; and (d) the meanings attributed religious text by Islamic political leadership. Following is a discussion of each of these four factors.

1) Political context: Like secular or semi-secular political organizations, political Islam movements operate within a political, social, cultural and economic environment at all of the levels that affect life in the modern state (ie., local, national, regional and international levels). Every political party, including the Islamic movements, tries to advance its objectives and develop work methods in accordance with its assessment of the extent of influence by environmental factors. Palestinian political Islam, in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza strip, like other political organizations that operate among the Palestinians, has developed and continues to develop in light of four main dimensions: First, international developments, including the Islamic-Western dispute and the "war on terror"; Second, the regional level that is related to the awaking of Islamic fundamentalism, and the regional role that is played by Iran, Hizbullah and other Islamic powers and groups in the region; Third, the interaction with Israel, including the conflict, occupation, citizenship and the national and civic status of the Palestinians within a framework of the Israeli public vs. the Palestinians under full or partial Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza; and Fourth, the social, cultural, economic and political topics of internal disputes, especially the Northern and the Southern Islamic movements interaction with secular and national streams among the Palestinains in Israel, and the Hamas interaction with the Fateh group (and other leftist\secular groups), in the West Bank and Gaza on Political, cultural and Social domainslx.

Thus, political Islam has been affected by the general situation regarding the future of the Palestinians - particularly Palestinian aspirations for self-determination and political developments among the Palestinians overall. Among the most salient political developments are (a) power struggles between the religious stream and the secular stream of the Palestinian national movement and (b) confrontations – both violent and non-violent - in the Arab and Islamic arena of the region (for example, the Islamic stream has competed in elections in Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey). The “war of the Western world” against political Islam, including the fight against “Islamic terror,” constitutes another layer of environmental factors that have impacted the activity, objectives, and basic orientation of the Islamic movements among the Palestinians and have impacted Palestinians’ political choices in the context of the social and political questions that concern the society.

Differences among the Palestinian political Islamic movements with regard to Israel, particularly with regard to its existence as a state and as a political expression of the collective aspirations of the Jews, derive from several interrelated factors. First of all, the differences are related to the general political context of the movements’ relationship to Israel and other regional, anti-Israeli powers. In practice, the Southern Islamic movement, active among the Palestinians in Israel, advocates integration into the Israeli political system and tries to influence the system from within. This stream is aware of the limitations of the Israeli context, but attempts to advance issues and concrete matters that could relatively improve the status of the Muslims\Arabs in Israel. The Northern Islamic movement, however, sees Israeli politics as a foreign environment and does not believe that the Palestinians and Muslims in Israel can influence their religious and civic status in its framework. This extra-parliamentary stream views the Israeli-Jewish context as part of the overall Zionist project that excludes the Palestinians and, by definition, discriminates against them. The Hamas movement considers the whole territory of Palestine as a Waqf, a holy Islamic land that cannot be negotiated. Nevertheless, Hamas is ready to consider a long term truce with Israel and clings to the hope that, in the future, an Islamic entity will be established in this country.

 

2) The political orientation of the public: The basic orientation of the group in which political Islam operates is key to explaining the Islamic movement’s orientation and methods of operation. In other words, each Islamic movement, like any political party or movement, seeks to win public support and operates under the assumption that its ideology, objectives, and methods resonate among a community of supporters that constitutes the basic potential reservoir of the movement’s members, activists, supporters, and voters. The movements of political Islam that are active in Israel, the west Bank and Gaza conduct their activity under the assumption that the Palestinian public, and the Muslims within it, might consider joining the Islamic movement as activists, rank-and-file members, supporters and voters.

Research regarding the political orientation of the Palestinian public has attracted considerable attention during the past three decades.lxi This research has drawn the following common conclusions:

• Most of the Palestinians in Israel have accepted their minority status in the State of Israel and view their future as different than that of the rest of the Palestinians and Muslims in the region.

• Most Palestinians in Israel oppose the Jewish character of Israel and demand the establishment of an equal state for themselves and for the Jews.

• Palestinians in the west bank and Gaza seek self determination in a separate Palestinian state in the west bank and Gaza that provides for: (a) a considerable amount of support for the Islamic state model and for social and cultural orientation and (b) specific support for Hamas as a political alternative to the Fateh movement (support that was transformed to an actual political backing in local and national electionslxii).

• Significant differences in the basic orientation exist between the two political Islamic movements in Israel. These differences explain the emergence and the continuation of the Islamic movements. Specifically, the movements hold differing views about (a) the status of Palestinians in Israel, (b) their citizenship, (c) the existence of the State of Israel, and (d) the future of the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, etc.lxiii.

 

The political orientation of the Palestinian public in general and the supporters of political Islam, in particular explains the differences and the disparate orientations of the three movements of political Islam among the Palestinians. The leadership is aware of the disagreement among the public regarding the issues on the agenda and adapts its positions in accordance with its assessment of how the ideas it proposes would be accepted by the Palestinian public and by its supporters. The disagreement among the public concerning the question of the future status of the Palestinians, the nature of relations with the state of Israel, (and the differences in opinion vis-à-vis social and cultural issues that are on the agenda of the Palestinians, such as the political status of women, the attitude toward the holy places and Jerusalem) constitutes the arena in which the leaders of the three movements design its strategy of conduct and activity.

 

3) Preferences and interests of Islamic movements leadership: The personal preferences and interests of movement leaders themselves and, in many respects, the elites who support those leaders, provide some explanation for political Islam. The leadership of Islam movements in the Arab and Islamic world makes decisions about movement attitude vis-à-vis the state and other groups in the society (including non-Muslims) as part of the profit-loss considerations of the leaders themselves.

For example, the initiative to establish the Hamas movement as the representative of the Islamic public stream in the West Bank and Gaza during the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992), was a political decision made by the founding leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his followers. Following Yassin’s assassination by Israel, a new generation of young leaders took office and led the movement. Khalid Mashaal was elected head of the political bureau of Hamas; Ismael Hanieh and Mahmoud Al-Zahar became leaders of the movement in Gaza and the West Bank, where Hanieh was elected the Palestinian prime minister following Hamas victory in the 2006 elections. This contingent of leaders influenced the current political orientation of Hamas.

Significant support from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza goes to Hamas. In a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) two months after the 2006 election, 47% of respondents said they would vote again for Hamas, compared to 39% for Fatah. The main reasons respondents said they would vote for Hamas included a desire for the implementation of Sharia law, but also the “desire to have an authority that would fight corruption.” The poll also found that the Palestinian public considered Fatah’s loss a punishment for the corruption, internal divisions, and lack of order that had emerged in the Palestinian Authority under its leadershiplxiv.

Recently, however, public opinion has shifted somewhat. The PCPSR conducted another poll in August of 2009, after Fatah held its Sixth Congress and elected new leadership. Respondents to this poll widely favored Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority President (52% approval rating) over Ismail Haniyeh who received a 38% approval rating. Respondents’ support for Fatah versus Hamas was likewise 44% to 28%, respectively, a result likely attributable to an improved view of Fatah’s administration of the West Bank, where it remains in power. West Bank respondents to the PCPSR poll indicated significant improvement in their perception of their own personal safety; fewer respondents felt there was corruption in Abbas-controlled PA institutionslxv. Thus, while Hamas took advantage of Fatah’s weakness to win power in 2006, its political rival has had recent success in improving its image in the eyes of the Palestinians.

In the Israeli context of political Islam, the Islamic movement formed in the 1970s acted and developed as a united movement as long as the founding leader was in control of the organization and rivals did not arise at the leadership level. In the early 1990s, a new generation of leadership began to appear, consisting primarily of mayors or regional leaders and activists who were endowed with charisma and dared to express the platform of political Islam.

The new generation included people who regarded themselves as potential leaders of the Islamic movement; they began to compete with the founding leader, Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish. Competitors included the former head of the Kafr Qasim local council and the current head of the parliamentary branch of the movement, Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur; the former head of the Kafr Bara local council, Sheikh Kamal Rian; the former mayor of Umm al-Fahm, Sheikh Raed Salah (who is today the head of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement); and Salah’s deputy, Sheikh Kamal Khatib. Sheikh Salah and Sheikh Khatib suspected Sheikh Darwish of planning to pass on the leadership to a family member - Sheikh Sarsur - and of steering the Islamic movement in a way that served his own interests (e.g., Darwish enjoyed close relations with the Jewish establishment in the state). These suspicions played a central role in the movement’s 1996 schism.

The preferences and interests of the leaders themselves are important elements in explaining the split of the Islamic movement in Israel into two competing movements. The aspirations of the younger generation to attain leadership positions in the movement have sharpened the differences between the movements and facilitated the split. Movement leadership has also led each stream to become more entrenched in its position. The leadership of political Islam in Israel is responsible for the failures of many efforts that aim to unify the two Islamic movements. The opposing interests of leaders at the national, regional, and local levels have foiled attempts to unify the movements. The perspective of the leadership is that unification of the two movements is liable to lead to some loss of status and erosion of authority. Therefore, leaders tend to preserve the status quo; they transform personal disagreements into ideological-political disagreements by emphasizing the dispute between the two streams, at the expense of the unifying factors.

 

4) The interpretation of religious text: Religious text must be accorded a very important place in explaining the phenomenon of political Islam for numerous reasons.lxvi For example, political text lacks the substantive or decisive significance to explain the phenomenon of political Islam in the modern era. The interpretation attributed to the political text is only important in the eyes of the leadership, activists, members, and supporters of the Islamic movements, based on the general political context, the orientation of the particular public, and the interests of the leadership. Of greater import are the various and profound meanings of each religious text in the context of specific Islamic activity. Gaping contradictions exist in the interpretations of the religious text by the different Islamic movements.

Religious text, in its various aspects, is translated at the political and practical level in completely different ways by the leadership of the three Palestinian Islamic movements (ie., the Northern movement in Israel, the Southern movement in Israel and the Hamas movement). The contradictions and disparate meanings assigned to the same text support our assertion the text’s significance stems from its interpretation. In fact the leadership of the Palestinian Islamic movements understands the same religious text in opposite ways demonstrates the importance of the interpretation of the text in the eyes of the leadership and its supporters, with the text itself adapted to the choice of each side’s leadership.

Following is a pictorial representation of preceding four explanatory factors discussed above. The picture presents the factors in the form of a pyramid with political context, (the broadest factor), at the base of the pyramid and interpretation of the religious text at the apex.

 

 

 

 

Interpretation of

the religious text

 

 

 

 

 

Leadership preferences

 

 

 

 

The Public political orientation

 

 

 

 

The political context

 

 

 

Prospects for the Future

The future of the three Palestinian Islamic movements, which are the Southern and the Northern Islamic movements within Israel in the Pre-1967 borders, and the Hamas movement within the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip, depends mainly on the dynamics related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, it also depends on the local, regional and international developments surrounding the future of the conflict, or the peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, and the way that Palestinian public and the Islamic movements' leadership will handle these developments.

The dynamics of peace and conflict between the Palestinians and Israel during the last two decades show clearly that the politics of recognition were more accepted among the Palestinians during the period of peace negotiations and relative reconciliation. This was also true for Hamas in the West Bank which was at its weakest position following the signing of the Oslo agreement between the PLO and Israel. On the other hand, that was also true for the Southern vs. the Northern Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel. The fact is that the peace negotiations and the relative reconciliation following the signing of the Oslo agreement, led to more positive policies by the Israeli government towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel on the years 1993-1996lxvii.

After the winning of the Israeli right wing coalition on the 1996 elections, followed by the harsh politics led by the new elected government, a spread of frustration among Palestinians inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, lead to the empowerment of the politics of deference and rejection among the Palestinians. This trend was intensified following the collapse of the peace process in 2000 and the start of the second intifada and the Israeli open war against the Palestinian Authority during the years 2000-2003.

The deterioration in the relationships between Israel and the Palestinian leadership led to a collapse of the support for the peace settlement and the rise-up of the support for the political powers that rejected the peace efforts; the Northern Islamic movement in Israel and Hamas were the main winners on the public level. This support was clear when Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections for the PAlxviii. While the Northern Islamic movement inside Israel succeeded, with other powers, to convince a large portion of the Palestinians in Israel to boycott the Israeli general elections in 2003 and in 2006lxix. The growing support for Hamas in the West Bank and the Northern Islamic movement in Israel got its peak public sympathy following the Israeli failure in the wars, against Hizbullah in 2006 and against Hamas in Gaza in 2008\9. The relative ability of Hamas and Hizbullah to resist the Israeli attack was partially attributed to the Iranian financial and military support for these two Islamic powers, this led to a growing sympathy to Iran and a growing support for its stand against Israel and the West World. On the other hand, a high support was developed for the regional-Islamic and Arab solidarity against the peace process with Israel and against the Palestinian groups that support reconciliation with Israel.

Depending on the current situation of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, the prospects for a substantive peace settlement is very minimal, and the evidences are: Palestinians are divided and their leadership is very weak; Israel is moving to the extreme right wing, continues its settlements policies in the West Bank and refuses to accept any just settlement with the Palestinianslxx; and we are witnessing an escalation of conflectual relationships between Israel and the Palestinian, inside and outside Israel and a deterioration in the prospects for peace settlement. This led and will continue to lead to the increasing support for the politics of difference among the Palestinians in Israel and the politics of rejection among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

As a conclusion, the future of the Palestinian Islamic movements, in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, depends, more than any other factor, on the success or the failure of the peace efforts between the Palestinians and Israel and the way this process will be received by the Palestinian public and the leaders of the Islamic movements, including the interpretation that will be given to any escalation or reconciliation process.

In the political level the main benefited side from the current situation and the expected prospects of escalation are the Northern Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel and Hamas among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, who are both expected to be among the main powers that will shape the future of the region and the prospects for shrinking reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians.

Conclusion

Factionalism has been a continuing political phenomenon in Islam since his early days, in the seventh century. Primary explanations for the internal schisms in Muslims organizations reside in the political domain: different approaches and schools of thought regarding the state structure, the extant political and social regime, and competition by the elite members of the society. Following the emergence of the modern national state in the Middle East, political Islam emerged in the form of political parties within the different states where it has reflected the political, social and cultural realities in these states, while also reflecting the same political aims and types of action as other, non-religious political parties. Thus, although most scholars in the field have insisted that these political Islamic movements and political parties are new political phenomena that were derived from the desire to implement the religious text and to re-create the Islamic state, this school of thought has been challenged by other researchers, like ourselves, who maintain that the political Islamic movements are not a new phenomena, it exists in Islam since the seventh century, and that a prominent factor in shaping the political, social and cultural plans, as well as the political action methods of the Islamic movements has been the context in which these movements operate.

To explicate this contention, we have examined, in this article, the political programs,methods and the future orientations of the three public Palestinian Islamic movements, particularly we analyzed their attitudes with regard to Israel and the Jews. We have analyzed differences among the parliamentary Southern Islamic movement and the extra parliamentary Northern Islamic movement active in the Palestinian community in Israel proper, the pre- 1967 borders. Further, we have analyzed differences between these two political movements and the Hamas movement, the leading Islamic movement active among Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza strip and those in exile.

 

Differences among these movements are byproducts of multi layered issues, wherein the political text constitutes one distinguishing factor. Differences among these movements are rooted also in three additional factors: (a) the public support or opposition to the ideas presented by the movement; (b) the choices made by the political leaders of these movements; and (c) the interpretation of religious text in the shadow of the social, cultural and political developments. It is our contention that the internal order of these factors is paramount to understanding the phenomenon of political Islam as an organized party or movement active within a specific political reality.

 

Notes