공지사항
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- 디지털 시대의 디지털 액티비티
- 뎡야핑
Dr. As'ad Ghanem, teaches comparative politics at the school of political science, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel
Email: ghanemasad@yahoo.com
and
Mohanad Mustafa
PhD student at the school of political science, University of Haifa
Address: School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel
Abstract
This article aims to present a comprehensive explanation of the development of Islamic political movements among the Palestinians. It focuses specifically on analyses of three public Islamic movements: Two that are active among the Palestinians in Israel proper, the Southern Islamic movement and the Northern Islamic movement, and the Hamas movement that is active among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Much can be learned about the nature of the political Islam, in general, and among the Palestinians in particular, from these three movements that differ substantially in their platforms, orientations, methods of political involvement, and attitudes toward the future of the Palestinian problem, Israel and the Jews. Through the analysis of these movements, the authors have built a broad explanatory set of factors that go beyond the Islamic movement itself to address the human and political environment in which supporters and leaders of political Islam operate. In this article a pyramid of four factors constitute together the multi-layered explanation that helps to understand the different approaches in political Islam: the context, the public orientation, the leaders' movements preferences, and the interpretation of the religious text.
Key words: Political Islam; Islamic Movements; Palestinians; Israel; Hamas;
Theoretical Background
Explaining the development of Islamic political movements, in general, and Palestinian political Islam in particular, has attracted great interest in the last few decades. The theoretical explanations of 'political Islam' among the Palestinians have been similar to the explanations provided for the general phenomena of political Islam and Islamic political revival.i. We contend to the contrary, however, that different and alternative explanations apply to political Islam observed among Palestinians.
Islamic revival, in essence, usually seen as a reflection of the desire to implement the religious text in daily life: politics, culture, economy, social domains, etc. According to the "fundamentalist approach", Islam in modern times is a political phenomenon that aims to implement the commands that appear in the text of the Islamic Shari'a (laws). These commands are based on (a) the Quran, Islam's holy book; (b) the Sunnah (the Prophet Muhammad's trodden path, custom, or tradition; (c) the Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings); or (d) any later religious regulations that were created or developed by the top religious figures (Ulama) in Muslim communities. In other words, the mission of political Islam is to implement the commands of the religious text (the shari’a) in the modern life of Muslims.ii
Literature on the subject refers to Islamic "fundamentalism" as a reflection of rigid beliefs and a specific way of life. Fundamentalists are described as idealistic, highly devoted, ready to live an austere lifestyle filled with struggle and sacrifice, and pledging absolute obedience to Allah and to the leader of the fundamentalist movementiii. Radical fundamentalists are portrayed as extremist and fanatic persons (muta'assibun), who suffer from an inferiority complex that is reflected in their aggressiveness, authoritarianism, intolerance, paranoia, and conspiratorial tendencies. In accordance with this view, Lewis has noted that the Islamic movements active during the second half of the twentieth century, were rooted in a universal belief in the unity of 'church and state;' Islam formed the central element in Muslim identity. Likewise, more modern Islamic movements (e.g., pan-Islamism of Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz in the 1870s; the rise of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1930s; and the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979), were also manifestations of this universality and centrality.iv
Many researchers, failing to distinguish different groups and orientations among political Islam, have used this model to explain Palestinian Islamic movements. Raphael Israeli, for example, maintains that all Islamic movements are identical in their goals and political targets and that any differences between movements are minor or superficial. For example, Israeli claims that no substantive difference exists between the goals of Israel’s two Islamic movements. Further, he maintains that these goals are identical to those of other Islamic fundamentalist movements. According to Israel, although they use different tactics to realize the goals,v all aim to destroy Israel, and to establish an Islamic entity in Palestine. Similarly, Bukay argues that there is only one Islamic culture and that there is no difference among Islamic streams, including in their interpretations of religious text. Like Israeli, Bukay believes that all Islamic movements aim to destroy the state of Israel and establish an Islamic state.vi Rekhess also denies any distinction among followers of Islam. He claims that strong ties exist among different Islamic movements, including between Palestinians in Israel and their brothers in the occupied Palestinian territories. Political Islam in Israel, he maintains, is merely a branch of general Palestinian Islamic fundamentalism - meaning that characteristics of the Islamic communities in Israel and in the Palestinian authority are identical.vii
An alternative explanation of political Islam is one that understands it as part of the political phenomena that exist within the context of ongoing political, social and economic development of a modern state and society. According to this approach, Islamic rivival movements are first and foremost "social and political movements engaged in mobilization, organization, and possibly the seizure of the political authority."viii. Therefore, these movements are directed, first and foremost, to political cost-benefit calculus, at least in the short run. In addition, similar to other socio-political forces, these movements are characterized by factional politics, personal conflicts, and controversies over strategies and tactics to achieve their common goals. According to this alternative perspective, political Islamic movements are populist movements. Their populist nature is expressed symbolically in their self-perception and presentation to the public as "fronts" (jabahat) open to all Muslims, rather than as regular political parties representing particular interests. The populist nature of these political Islamic movements is also reflected in their heterogeneous social base which includes the poor and the rich, the rural and the urban, the educated and uneducated, and which allows Islamic movements to appear in different forms and to adopt different targets and strategies.
This alternative perspective holds that Islamic activism is conditioned and much affected by local, regional and global contexts and forces. It views Islamic activism as reflecting a desperate search to find a stabilizing anchor in a traditional social order that has been disrupted by haphazard modernization projects and failed nationalismsix Thus, they claim that the ecology of Islamic activism is always in flux, combining fixity with pragmatism as it responds to environmental challenges. In other words, the Islamic past is appropriated to justify courses of action deemed necessary to produce effective Islamic social movement in today's environment.
Several researchers have applied the foregoing model of political Islam in order to understand Palestinian Islamic movements, in general, and political Islam in Israel, in particular. According to these researchers, political Islam in Israel, although part of the general awakening of Islamic rivival that began in the 1970s, has special characteristics rooted in the Israeli experience. For example, the Israeli experience features an Arab minority and includes development of the Islamic movement in a Jewish state with clear Jewish political and cultural hegemonyx. Palestinian Islamic movements, in Israel proper and in the West Bank and Gaza, are a complex phenomenon that must take into consideration the interaction with Israel, as a Jewish state (in Israel Pre-1967 border), occupied power (in the West Bank and Jerusalem), and Semi-Occupied Power (in Gaza); the general context of the Muslims (including the holy text); and the characteristics of the Palestinian reality in different domains. These parallel contexts affect the content of the different Islamic political movements and their orientation in Israel.
The Development of Palestinian Political Islam
“Political Islam” began organizing in Mandatory Palestine before 1948. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the 1920s, did not begin to take an interest in events in Palestine until the mid-1930s. After the eruption of the Palestinian revolt against the British and Jewish immigration in 1936, movement representatives came from Egypt to encourage the Palestinians in their struggle. The first local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Jerusalem in 1946. During the 1948 war, three battalions of volunteers from the Brotherhood enlisted in the Egyptian armyxi. However, the results of the 1948 war - the dispersal of Palestinians and the establishment of Israel; the Jordanian rule over the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Egyptian rule over the Palestinians in Gaza Strip; and the imposition of foreign rule over Palestinian communities in the exile - limited the activity of political Islam. In fact, one cannot point to any such organization by Palestinians during the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s. This situation changed as a result of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip when new conditions were created for the development of political Islam among the Palestinians.
Palestinians in Israel numbered close to 1,200,000 in 2009. They constitute 18% of Israel’s population. Ten per cent are Christians and 10% are Druze. Eighty per cent are Sunni Muslims, the largest Palestinian community in Israel and part of the region’s Muslim majority.xii Currently, three Islamic movements are active among the Palestinians: the Islamic movement founded among the Palestinians in Israel during the seventies of the 20th century and divided in 1996 into the 'Northern' and the 'Southern' Islamic movements and the Hamas Movement founded in 1987-8 and active among the West Bank, Gaza Strip and exiled Palestinian communitiesxiii. The Northern and Southern movements are active in Israel proper; Palestinians who are Israeli citizens are their main target for mobilization. However, all three movements believe and act as part of the Islamic and Arab world, rather than as a minority group of Muslims who immigrated to a new society. Following the establishment of the State of Israel, each movement developed its own way of coping with the new Palestinian reality.xiv
A number of young Palestinians from Israel who completed high school and were attracted to an Islamic environment continued their studies in the Islamic colleges and institutes in the occupied west bank and Gaza strip. These colleges prepared them for the title of “sheikh.” These young men began unorganized activity preaching religion in their home communities and elsewhere in Muslim communities, including sermons in the mosques and meetings held at Muslim festivals. Their activity paved the way for the Islamic stream to organize political and social associations.xv
The Islamic movement focused its efforts on propaganda and on providing the services associated with the institutions of civil society. Ever since its founding, the Islamic movement has provided essential services to the local population in every community in which it is activexvi. These services include an educational network to supplement the state system, libraries, computer centers, community centers, pre-schools, medical and dental clinics, rehabilitation centers for ex-convicts and addicts, and so on. These can be found all over the community, including towns where the Islamic Movement is not part of the local governing coalition (e.g., Umm al-Fahm, Kafr Qasim, Kafr Bara, Kafr Kanna, Nazareth, Kabul, Nahaf, and others).
The Islamic movement employed various means to manage and fund these services. It focused on volunteer activity and on mobilizing its members, for example, in projects that addressed their communal needs. The mosques, found in every community where there are Muslims, hosted these projects. The movement also took control of the task of collecting the zakat, the tax that every Muslim is required to pay to support the poor. These funds underwrote a large portion of the movement’s activities. In localities where the movement could draw on other financial sources, including governmental sources — especially in places where it controlled the local council — it did so.
The Evolution of Northern and Southern Islamic Movements in Israel: The emergence of the Northern and Southern Islamic Movements is best described beginning with a brief history of Islamic religious organization in Israel. Islamic religious organization in Israel can be divided into three periods. The first period (1979–1981) featured a semi-military underground organization composed of a small core of people who believed in armed struggle against the Jews and the State of Israel; they called themselves 'Usrat al-Jihad' (The Family of Jihad). This group was apprehended by the Israeli security forces in 1981 and its leaders imprisoned, putting an end to this period. The second period, from 1983 through the 1996, began with the emergence of Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish of Kafr Qasim (in the Triangle) as the leader of a new organization that called itself the “Young Muslims.” The Northern and Southern Islamic movements emerged during the third period, 1996 through the present, when the Islamic movement split into two movements with different political orientations, goals, and methods.
Until 1996, the Islamic movement did not participate officially in Knesset elections, although it did not formally boycott them. Before Election Day the movement would call upon its members to act in accordance with their conscience. Before the 14th Knesset elections (1996), however, the Islamic movement set up a joint list with the Democratic Arab Party. Movement representatives then won two of the four seats on the joint list; Subsequently, two movement representatives won seats to the 15th Knesset (out of five seats for the joint list).
Some members of the Young Muslims movement seceded in protest against the group’s participation in these elections; these individuals established an alternate movement, led by Raed Salah, Mayor of Umm al-Fahmxvii. Abu-Raiya attributes the 1996 fracture of Israel’s Islamic movement into competing movements, in part, to this disagreement regarding the Knesset elections. Further, Abu-Raiva argues that two types of religious interpretation within the movement led to the split: abstract interpretation of Islam that allows for a relatively large amount of flexibility, versus concrete interpretation that translates the religious faith into political “dos and don’ts.”xviii
One stream, led by Sheikh Raed Salah (the mayor of Umm al-Fahm at the time), employed a concrete interpretation asserting that participation in the Knesset elections would endanger the values of the Islamic movement as a religious movement and would lead to the Israelization of the Muslim society. This extra-parliamentary Islamic movement is also known as the Northern Islamic movement. The second stream, led by Sheikh Nimr Darwish, subscribed to a more abstract interpretation. This parliamentary Islamic movement, also known as the Southern movement, believed that participation in the Knesset could advance the goals of the Islamic movement and of Arab society and that representation of the movement would improve the situation of the Palestinians and of Arab parliamentary politicsxix. Ibrahem Sarsur, who succeeded Darwish as the leader of the parliamentary Islamic movement, admits that the united Islamic movement, until 1996, did not accommodate divergent views. Sarsur believes the split was necessary in order to distinguish between the various viewpoints within the Islamic movement. Furthermore, because of the incompatible views and profound disagreements between the streams in the united Islamic movement, Sarsur feels a split was necessary to preserve the pure principles of the Islamic movementxx. Sheikh Salah concurs with Sarsur, claiming that what happened in 1996 was not the “result of an isolated incident, but the cumulative result of numerous incidents over many years”xxi.
The Evolution of the Hamas Movement: Parallel to the institutionalization of the Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel, political Islam among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip was very hesitant until the creation of the Hamas Movement in 1988. The name “Hamas” is an acronym of the organization’s full name, 'Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya', which means Islamic Resistance Movement. The word Hamas in Arabic, means 'zeal'. The organization has its roots in another Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Brotherhood is originally Egyptian, it maintains branches throughout the Arab worldxxii. Hamas’ founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s inactive branch in the Palestinian-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yassin founded the Islamic Center of Gaza (al-Mujamma’ al-Islami) in 1973 “to coordinate the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activities in Gaza.” After the beginning of the first intifada in 1987, Yassin created Hamas out of the Brotherhood’s Gazan branchxxiii.
Prior to December 1987, when it issued its first Intifada statement, Hamas was a religious and social movement without any political platform. Like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas strove to become a driving force in the Intifada. However, over time a conflict emerged between the PLO and Hamas over their respective influence on the Intifada and their competing claims of responsibility for gains made. One of the fears of the PLO, the majority of whose leadership was abroad (mainly in Tunisia), was that Hamas - by virtue of its armed resistance - would become a leading force in the Intifada and, consequently, a central power among Palestinians in the occupied territories.xxiv
In March of 2004 - following a failed September 2003 attempt - Israel assassinated Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin with a missile strike. More than two hundred thousand Palestinians attended his funeral on March 22. Less than a month later, on April 17, Israel assassinated Yassin’s successor, Abdel Aziz Rantissi. A similar number of Palestinians came to mourn at his funeralxxv. Despite the sudden loss of two leaders, Hamas survived. The large numbers who attended the funerals of Yassin and Rantissi indicate the level of popular support that the group enjoyed in the Palestinian territories.
In 2004 and 2005, Hamas began to participate in the electoral process, standing in municipal elections in 2004 and 2005 and posting strong showings in Gaza. While taking part in local elections, the group boycotted the 2005 Palestinian Authority presidential race and decided to join the September 2005 race for the legislative elections. Despite political setbacks in 2005, Hamas managed to take control of the Palestinian parliament by winning legislative elections in January 2006. Hamas defeated Fatah, the leading faction in the PLO, by a large margin, winning 76 of 132 seats and the right to form President Mahmoud Abbas’ cabinet. With this victory, Hamas now had control of the Palestinian Authority and formed a government with Ismail Hanieh (a senior figure in Hamas) as Prime Minister. However, the group continued its refusal to recognize the state of Israel. As a result, the United States and the European Union, who had provided most of the Palestinian Authority’s $1.5 to $1.7 billion annual budget through foreign aid, withdrew their financial backing in order to avoid funding a terrorist group. This led to a massive budget shortfall for the movementxxvi.
Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections also led to a power struggle with Fatah, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. In June 2007, the competition between the two groups became violent, as fighting erupted between gunmen from Hamas and Fatah. An armed Hamas defeated security forces loyal to Fatah, drove the rival group out of Gaza altogether, and took over the entire Gaza stripxxvii. In response, Abbas sacked Haniya as Prime Minister and replaced him with Salam Fayyad - a move that was ignored by the Hamas-dominated legislature. As a result of the confrontation, the Palestinian territories were effectively been split in two, with Fatah governing the West Bank and Hamas ruling the Gaza Strip. Despite Egyptian efforts to bring about reconciliation, talks have failed and the split remains in effectxxviii.
Variation in the Palestinian Political Islam
Substantial differences in the political orientations of the three Palestinian Islamic movements provide a basis for explaining the diverse ways in which the movements implemented Islam. The following examination enumerates the political and ideological differences that characterize each of the three Islamic movements, including the movement’s vision of its current and future relationship with Israel and the Jews.
1 - Islamic Movements 'Moment of Creation'. One substantive difference among the three Palestinian Islamic movements was its moment of the creation. The Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel was re-established in the early 1980's, following a period of security restriction and the arrest of its founder, Sheikh Darwish. Nevertheless, Darwish insisted on creating a public and legal movement in accordance with the Israeli law. Until the split in 1996, Darwish made sure that the Islamic movement declared its recognition of the state of Israel and its acceptance of the fact that Palestinians in Israel are Israeli citizens who acknowledge their minority status in the Jewish state.
However, in 1996, a majority decision of the Islamic movement’s Shura council to participate in the Knesset election led to the movement’s split and stimulated the moment of creation for the Northern Islamic (extra parliamentary) movement among Palestinians in Israel. At that moment, it become clear that the larger Islamic movement actually was comprised of two groups with differing orientations to the basic issues facing them and the general Palestinian public in Israel.
For Hamas the moment of creation was triggered by the situation of Palestinians in the occupied territories. They were not citizens in Israel and did not want to remain under Israeli control. Rather, they sought independence and futures divergent from their brothers in Israel. Hamas’ anti-Israeli political programs and charter were shaped by its declaration of existence at the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada and during an escalation of anti Israeli feelings among Palestinians in the west Bank and Gaza xxix.
Each movement’s 'moment of creation' shaped its orientations towards Israel, its existence, and the rights of the Jews. The two Islamic movements in Israel - the Northern and the Southern Islamic movements - share the goal of strengthening religious identity as an important component in the collective identity of the Palestinians in Israel. They pursue this goal through religious preaching and various religious and social activities that generate a wave of Islamization among the Palestinian population in Israel.xxx However, a close look at the activity of these two movements indicates that they are not partners with regard to the future of the Muslims in Israel, particularly in terms of relations between the State and the Muslim minority.
2 - Politics of Recognition vs. Politics of Difference vs. Politics of Rejection: Theoretically, it is possible to discern differing political approaches in the three movements: The parliamentary Southern Islamic movement shares the tools and objectives of general Palestinians in Israel politics; the Southern movement emphasizes the politics of recognition.xxxi The extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement, on the other hand, is distinguishable from general Israeli politics - and from parliamentary Islamic politics, in particular -, by its intensive use of tools that reflect the politics of difference, and Hamas mentioned a third type of politics, the politics of rejection.
The distinction between the politics of recognition and the politics of difference is related to the question of citizenship and to relations between the state’s majority and the minority populations. The politics of recognition attempt to improve the status and situation of the Palestinians in Israel through negotiation and through influence and pressure on the state and on the majority, in order to compel them to adopt measures and policies of equality, affirmative action, and recognition of the identity and status of Palestinians as an indigenous minority entitled to collective rights that are recognized and supported by the state. The politics of difference, on the other hand, emphasize activities conducted within the community, eschew any support from the state, and has no interest in recognition by the majority populace or by the state. The politics of difference as implemented by the extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement is aimed at building an independent society that can exist and manage itself in isolation from the state. Sheikh Salah has called this project “al-mujtam’a al-Isami” (the independent community).xxxii
At the community level, the extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement has expressed its religious fundamentalism by forging a community with separate and distinct institutions. Community members conduct most of their lives within it and feel great loyalty toward it.xxxiii The movement is not an integrative project and thus, suffers more constant scrutiny and persecution by the security and political establishment in Israel than the parliamentary Southern Islamic counterpart. While the activity of the parliamentary Islamic movement is considered integrative, in that the movement views Israeli citizenship as an important political tool,, the activity of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement, which does not share this view, is regarded by the Israeli establishment as endangering the fragile relations between the Palestinian minority and the Jewish state.xxxiv Interestingly, the political-ideological dimension of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s activity invokes more fear on the part of the State than the security dimension of this activity. Specifically, the State fears that the extra-parliamentary movement is gradually coalescing into a powerful mass social movement with broad popular support and great ability to mobilize the public.xxxv
The extra-parliamentary Northern Islamic movement reflects Sheikh Salah’s conceptualization of an independent community in numerous ways. First, for example, in concert with Sheikh Salah’s belief that forging an independent Arab-Muslim community is the only solution for the Arab-Muslim minority in Israel, the extra parliamentary Islamic movement rejects other solutions offered by Palestinians in Israel and by the Jewish majority (e.g., a state for all citizensxxxvi, a bi-national statexxxvii, or various other autonomy proposalsxxxviii).
Second, the movement reflects Sheikh Salah’s concept of the independent community as a community based on fundamental principles related to three elements in Arab society: science (or human capital), land, and economics For example, the principle of “purity of capital” asserts that capital should come only from Islamic sources (e.g., charity, Islamic endowment – the waaf, and contributions from Muslim entities and individuals). Consequently, maintaining that non-Muslim contributions are not “pure” and that they seek to change the character and identity of the Muslim community,xxxix the leaders of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement reject any contribution from non-Muslim entities. Foreign money, they argue, does not come “without a negative price;” the foreign entities will demand something in exchange for this money and that demand is liable to threaten the independence of the Muslim community. Third, in alignment with Sheikh Salah’s contention that establishment of an independent community requires closer symbolic, cultural, and practical ties with the Arab world and with the Moslems in the world, the extra parliamentary movement (a) denies the unique situation and status of Muslims in Israel, (b) seeks to deepen ties with the Islamic world, and (c) sees itself as an integral part of pan Arab-Muslim political Islam. (Recall that, conversely, the parliamentary movement believes that the Muslims in Israel are in a special situation and that the unique context of political Islam in Israel demands special treatment for all issues on the agenda of Muslims in Israelxl).
Citizenship, Peace and Conflict in Context: The variations of Palestinian Islamic movements are related to a complex of variables, but the main differences between the three political Islamic movements are derived mainly from their basic orientations towards Israel and the Islamic-Israeli-West conflict. The basic question that raises here is: what is the basic orientation of the three Islamic movements towards Israel, the future of the Palestinian problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?. We will examine this question by referring to three main domains; The relationship with Israel as a state and a society in the practical-daily level; the political terminology that are used by the three Islamic movement when it comes to Israel and the Jews; and the future of the conflict, including the war, peace or truce options. These three domains are interconnected as part of the stand of each Islamic movement and are organized around the core political orientation of each movement.
For example, the Southern Islamic movement in Israel is accepting the civic status of the Palestinians in Israel as Israeli citizens that struggle for equal rights and as part of the Israeli citizenship. Derived from this political stand, they are accepting the two-states solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they have strong political relationships with the Palestinian PLO leadership that supports the two states solution, and they reject the use of violence as a mean for change.
On the other hand, the Northern Islamic movement does not consider the Israeli citizenship as a main vehicle for empowerment for the Palestinians in Israel. The struggle for equality within Israel is considered by the movement as a marginal object, and they develop the concept of independent community in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Israeli citizens. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they have reservations towards the two states solution and they have great sympathy with the regional opponents of Israel and any peace agreements with it (Hammas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran).
Hamas, as an Islamic movement that is active among Palestinian communities outside Israel, especially in Gaza and the West Bank, do not refer to the citizenship in Israel as an option, they develop a "politics of rejection" for the peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, and developed a strong ties and relationships with the the regional powers that reject the Israeli existence: Islamic rivival groups in the Arab and Islamic worlds (mainly: Hizbullah, Iran and Syria as an Arab nationalist regime that support the resistance against Israel)
Civic Status in Israel and types of Political Orientations: The independent community concept is a significant component differentiating the politics of difference practiced by the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement, from the politics of recognition practiced by the parliamentary Islamic movement. For example, while the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement tends to focus on activity within the community and to mobilize the Muslim community to attain its goals, the parliamentary Islamic movement employs all of the means provided by Israeli politics to strengthen the Muslim society in Israel and to convince the State to institute measures that would raise the status of the Muslims in Israel. Thus, while the former might work to protect Muslim sacred property via community activity, such as organizing days for Muslim volunteers to improve the condition of graves in abandoned Palestinian villages, the latter would address the same goal by trying to pass legislation in the Knesset that would require the State to preserve the holy places of the Muslims in Israel and allocate resources for this purpose.
Among the other variables that differentiate the extra parliamentary and parliamentary branches of political Islam in Israel is terminology. The political terminology employed by the two movements reflects their differences in the political discourse. The extra-parliamentary Islamic movement calls itself “the Islamic movement in the Palestinian interior.” This terminology attempts to ignore the Israeli context and emphasizes the Palestinian place in the identity of the Islamic movement. The parliamentary Islamic movement, on the other hand, generally refers to itself as “the Islamic movement in Israel.” Another example of differing terminology is found in the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s use of the term “the Israeli establishment” to describe the various authorities of the State of Israel, while the parliamentary movement uses the term “the government of Israel” or “the State of Israel” to describe the same authorities. The use of diverse terms is not merely a matter of semantics. Rather, the terms are indicative of the users’ political-ideological orientations.
Methods of change: Political Participation in context: The question of political participation in the elections to the Israeli parliament is an additional variable that differentiates the two Islamic movements in Israel. As noted, the dispute over participating in Knesset elections led to the rift within political Islam in Israel. The Northern movement boycotts elections, led by Sheikh Salah, who continually argues against the participation of Arab parties in the elections. Sheikh Salah frames his view on boycotting the Knesset elections around two main contentions: (a) the Knesset is a symbol of the State’s Jewishness and part of “the Zionist project,” and (b) representation in the Knesset does not enable the Muslims and Palestinians in Israel to improve their status and situationxli.
On the eve of each election campaign, Salah publishes a series of articles describing his arguments in support of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement’s opposition to participating in the Knesset elections. His central argument is that the Knesset is nothing more than a forum for protest and cannot change the situation of the Muslims in Israel. Sheikh Salah also contends that the Knesset represents the Zionist movement, which is responsible for the nakba of the Palestinians. Thus, any participation in the elections, in his view, grants legitimacy to this institution, which symbolizes “the Zionist project,” enacts laws that discriminate against the Palestinians and Muslims in Israel, and creates only hardship for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.
Sheikh Salah’s article on the eve of the 2003 Knesset elections appeared in the movement’s newspaper – Sawt al-Haqq wal-Huriyya (Voice of Justice and Freedom) – under the title, “The Elections and Us.” In it he argued: “….the Knesset is the supreme establishment of the Zionist project, which does not recognize us as a national minority or as citizens entitled to receive equal rights. Therefore, the Knesset has never been a supreme establishment for us, the Palestinian Arab minority in this land”xlii. Salah’s article on the eve of the 2006 Knesset elections, continued in the same vein, calling for a boycott of the Knesset elections and arguing that:
I am more and more convinced that the mechanism of the Knesset is one of the expressions of the Zionist enterprise and is only designed to serve the Zionist enterprise – both on the local level and on the global level … If there are accomplishments by some of the Arab members of Knesset, they are very modest achievements in relation to the amount of time all of the Arab members of Knesset spend within the Knesset mechanism.xliii
The Knesset boycott by the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement is an ideological boycott rather than a political one. A political boycott, the dominant type of boycott among Palestinians in Israel, typically relates to the boycotters’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the Arab political parties and protests their inferior status in the State. An ideological boycott, on the other hand, relates more to the idea of rejecting the existing political system and to the aspiration of changing it.xliv
Unlike the extra-parliamentary stream, the parliamentary Islamic movement believes that participation in the Knesset elections is an inseparable part of the overall outlook of political Islam; this outlook asserts: “Islam is the solution.” During an interview published in the movement’s newspaper Al-Mithaq (The Covenant), Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur - the head of the parliamentary Islamic movement, states, “Religious preaching is the main thing and politics is part of it, and the parliament is a branch of the religious activity. …. Therefore, there is no contradiction between our participation in the parliament and the rest of our activity.xlv”
The parliamentary Islamic movement argues that participation in the Knesset elections is aimed at working to improve everyday life for Palestinians. Another argument used to justify participation in Knesset elections is the need to counter the rise of the extreme right in Israel, which calls for the political exclusion and even the physical transfer of Israel’s Arab minority. The parliamentary movement believes it is necessary to increase the representation of the Palestinians in the Knesset in order to neutralize the aspirations of the extreme right in Israel.xlvi
Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, the founder of the Islamic movement in Israel and the leader of the movement from its inception and until 2003, takes issue with the Islamic stream that boycotts the Knesset elections. Sheikh Darwish, considered a moderate religious person in Israel, led the movement to participate in the Knesset elections in 1996 and has consistently maintained that a strong basis exists in Islamic law justifying the Islamic movement’s participation in the parliament of the Jewish state.xlvii
Peace and conflict and the future of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation: The principal disagreement between the parliamentary and extra parliamentary movements is related to the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. The parliamentary Islamic movement supports a peace process that would ultimately lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, the former leader of this parliamentary Islamic movement, Sheikh Darwish, supported the Oslo accords and even participated several times in assemblies and rallies in support of the Oslo accords and the peace process. However, Sheikh Salah, the head of the extra-parliamentary movement strongly opposed the Oslo accords. He called them “an act of treason;” while his deputy, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, called them “a betrayal of the rights of the Palestinian people”xlviii.
Parallel to the discussion between the two Islamic movements in Israel and the evolution of the politics of recognition and the politics of difference, Hamas was forging a new path that might be called the politics of rejection. Hamas politics of rejection was articulated in its organizational charter published on August 18th, 1988.xlix Article One of the movement’s charter states that, “the Movement’s program is Islam;” Article Two identifies the organization as, “one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.” Article Nine defines the Hamas mission as, “discarding the evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert [to their owners]… announcing the reinstitution of the Muslim state.” Similarly, Article Six articulates the following purpose: “[Hamas] strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.” The charter goes on to declare that, “Palestine is an Islamic Waqf (endowment) . . . . No one can renounce it or part of it. . . . . No Arab country nor the aggregate of all Arab countries… nor any organization or the aggregate of all organizations” has that right.
Several references in the charter to the history of the conflict outline the differences between Hamas and other political organizations. For example, Article Six, states that “[Hamas] is a distinct Palestinian Movement which owes its loyalty to Allah.” This statement might be a direct reference to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded by Egyptian President Jamel Abdel Nasser and the Arab League in 1964 (UN.int). The charter also clearly states Hamas’ opposition to any peace with Israel: “….the so-called peaceful solutions… are contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement.”
Hamas signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Washington on September 13, 1993. However, the movement subsequently adopted a hard-line position against the agreement. Ahmad Yassin sent a letter from prison to his followers stating that the accord disregarded basic issues regarding Jerusalem, the settlements, and the demarcation of borders. According to Yassin, the interim solution did not meet the ultimate goals of the Palestinian people. Thus, he called upon his followers to reject the agreement and resist it with “the civilized means at their disposal."l Hamas' stance was further clarified in a statement made by the movement's spokesman, Ibrahim Ghousheh, on September 4, 1993. In his statement, Ghousheh stated that:
The Gaza-Jericho agreement does not represent the Palestinian people at all, nor does it represent the Palestinian national and Islamic factions; it doesn’t even represent the PLO bodies themselves ... and therefore, Hamas will continue the long battle against the Zionist enemy. The Gaza-Jericho agreement does not commit our people or ourselves to anything stated in the agreement. These events and developments only consolidate and increase our belief in the righteousness of our Islamic belief and approach to liberate Palestine. These developments make Hamas and the other factions strongly believe in our ability to meet our people’s aspirations and to lead the people on the path of jihad and liberation.li
Hamas' hard-line stance on the Gaza-Jericho Agreement stemmed from two basic factors. First was the sense, as mentioned above, that the agreement did not meet Palestinian demands given that it did not address the basic issues of the conflict. Second, the agreement was reached without any consultation with the Palestinians within Palestine. As Ghousheh declared in the following statement,
The agreement was for meager autonomy over less than 2 percent of the land of Palestine. This autonomy would be dominated by the occupying power without any authority or sovereignty, without the return of refugees, and with Jerusalem remaining under the occupation, which would also retain control over border passages. lii
A review of these positions reveals that Hamas focused on final status issues. Hamas believed that the way these issues were addressed in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement constituted a violation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and considered the agreement’s lack of solutions as a strong reason to consider the agreement a threat to the essence of the Palestinian cause and, therefore, to resist it.
The infighting between Hamas and the PLO did not distract the movement from its original enemy: Israel. On June 19th, 2008, an Egyptian-brokered cease fire between Israel and Hamas came into effect for six months. In December of 2008, the ceasefire expired, and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (who lives in exile in Syria) announced that it would not be extended. The agreement officially expired on December 19th; on December 27th, Israel began an assault on Gaza named “Operation Cast Lead.” Hamas, in turn, fired rockets into Israel from the Strip and engaged in urban warfare, using training from Hezbollah and Iran to create a network of tunnels, booby traps, and hidden bombs. By the time Operation Cast Lead ended on January 17th, over 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis had been killed, including many civilians.liii A UN commission created after the war released, in September, 2009, the Goldstone Report, which indicated that both Israel and Hamas had committed war crimes during the conflict. The rebuilding process in Gaza has been immensely difficult due to an Israeli blockade of the Strip that has been in effect since the Hamas takeover in June, 2007. To date, Gaza is still under blockade.liv
Despite Hamas’ official rejection of any permanent compromise, observers and participants do not assume that Hamas will never accept a peace agreement. For example, Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid maintain that:
Hamas’s positions regarding the political process and Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be understood in three stages: in the first stage, it maintained a principled position of refusing political resolution without elaborating on its reasoning; in the second stage, it refused to consider the implications of any political settlement that entailed a waiver of any rights or entitlements of the Palestinian people; and in the third stage, it declared its willingness to accept a truce with Israel under certain conditions but maintained that there would be no recognition of Israel’s legitimacy in the land of Palestine. To these three stages, we may also add a fourth stage, namely the acceptance of a short-term temporary truce (tahadiya) with conditions less stringent than those that would be required for a longer-term truce (hudna).lv
The Hamas leader himself, Khaled Meshaal, has also addressed the possibility of peace. In an interview with Foreign Policy magazine, Meshaal stated that, “Today the balance of power is in Israel’s favor. Israel has military superiority.” The reality of Israeli military strength lies behind Hamas proposals for a hudna with Israel.lvi In another interview, Mashaal declared that "We as Palestinians accept the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital and the implementation of the right of return."lvii Indeed, in recent interviews, Mashal, has offered to cooperate with U.S. efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has indicated a willingness to implement an immediate and reciprocal ceasefire with Israel, and has stated that the militant group would accept and respect a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.lviii
Toward a Comprehensive Model for Understanding the Phenomenon of Palestinian Islamic Movements
A comprehensive explanation of the three political Islam movements that are active among the Palestinians requires considering four factors that, in combination, explain the differing orientations of these movements lix: (a) political context - the broadest factor; (b) the political orientation of the general public (as potential community support for the movement; (c) the nature, orientation, and preferences of the movement’s leadership; and (d) the meanings attributed religious text by Islamic political leadership. Following is a discussion of each of these four factors.
1) Political context: Like secular or semi-secular political organizations, political Islam movements operate within a political, social, cultural and economic environment at all of the levels that affect life in the modern state (ie., local, national, regional and international levels). Every political party, including the Islamic movements, tries to advance its objectives and develop work methods in accordance with its assessment of the extent of influence by environmental factors. Palestinian political Islam, in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza strip, like other political organizations that operate among the Palestinians, has developed and continues to develop in light of four main dimensions: First, international developments, including the Islamic-Western dispute and the "war on terror"; Second, the regional level that is related to the awaking of Islamic fundamentalism, and the regional role that is played by Iran, Hizbullah and other Islamic powers and groups in the region; Third, the interaction with Israel, including the conflict, occupation, citizenship and the national and civic status of the Palestinians within a framework of the Israeli public vs. the Palestinians under full or partial Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza; and Fourth, the social, cultural, economic and political topics of internal disputes, especially the Northern and the Southern Islamic movements interaction with secular and national streams among the Palestinains in Israel, and the Hamas interaction with the Fateh group (and other leftist\secular groups), in the West Bank and Gaza on Political, cultural and Social domainslx.
Thus, political Islam has been affected by the general situation regarding the future of the Palestinians - particularly Palestinian aspirations for self-determination and political developments among the Palestinians overall. Among the most salient political developments are (a) power struggles between the religious stream and the secular stream of the Palestinian national movement and (b) confrontations – both violent and non-violent - in the Arab and Islamic arena of the region (for example, the Islamic stream has competed in elections in Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey). The “war of the Western world” against political Islam, including the fight against “Islamic terror,” constitutes another layer of environmental factors that have impacted the activity, objectives, and basic orientation of the Islamic movements among the Palestinians and have impacted Palestinians’ political choices in the context of the social and political questions that concern the society.
Differences among the Palestinian political Islamic movements with regard to Israel, particularly with regard to its existence as a state and as a political expression of the collective aspirations of the Jews, derive from several interrelated factors. First of all, the differences are related to the general political context of the movements’ relationship to Israel and other regional, anti-Israeli powers. In practice, the Southern Islamic movement, active among the Palestinians in Israel, advocates integration into the Israeli political system and tries to influence the system from within. This stream is aware of the limitations of the Israeli context, but attempts to advance issues and concrete matters that could relatively improve the status of the Muslims\Arabs in Israel. The Northern Islamic movement, however, sees Israeli politics as a foreign environment and does not believe that the Palestinians and Muslims in Israel can influence their religious and civic status in its framework. This extra-parliamentary stream views the Israeli-Jewish context as part of the overall Zionist project that excludes the Palestinians and, by definition, discriminates against them. The Hamas movement considers the whole territory of Palestine as a Waqf, a holy Islamic land that cannot be negotiated. Nevertheless, Hamas is ready to consider a long term truce with Israel and clings to the hope that, in the future, an Islamic entity will be established in this country.
2) The political orientation of the public: The basic orientation of the group in which political Islam operates is key to explaining the Islamic movement’s orientation and methods of operation. In other words, each Islamic movement, like any political party or movement, seeks to win public support and operates under the assumption that its ideology, objectives, and methods resonate among a community of supporters that constitutes the basic potential reservoir of the movement’s members, activists, supporters, and voters. The movements of political Islam that are active in Israel, the west Bank and Gaza conduct their activity under the assumption that the Palestinian public, and the Muslims within it, might consider joining the Islamic movement as activists, rank-and-file members, supporters and voters.
Research regarding the political orientation of the Palestinian public has attracted considerable attention during the past three decades.lxi This research has drawn the following common conclusions:
Most of the Palestinians in Israel have accepted their minority status in the State of Israel and view their future as different than that of the rest of the Palestinians and Muslims in the region.
Most Palestinians in Israel oppose the Jewish character of Israel and demand the establishment of an equal state for themselves and for the Jews.
Palestinians in the west bank and Gaza seek self determination in a separate Palestinian state in the west bank and Gaza that provides for: (a) a considerable amount of support for the Islamic state model and for social and cultural orientation and (b) specific support for Hamas as a political alternative to the Fateh movement (support that was transformed to an actual political backing in local and national electionslxii).
Significant differences in the basic orientation exist between the two political Islamic movements in Israel. These differences explain the emergence and the continuation of the Islamic movements. Specifically, the movements hold differing views about (a) the status of Palestinians in Israel, (b) their citizenship, (c) the existence of the State of Israel, and (d) the future of the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, etc.lxiii.
The political orientation of the Palestinian public in general and the supporters of political Islam, in particular explains the differences and the disparate orientations of the three movements of political Islam among the Palestinians. The leadership is aware of the disagreement among the public regarding the issues on the agenda and adapts its positions in accordance with its assessment of how the ideas it proposes would be accepted by the Palestinian public and by its supporters. The disagreement among the public concerning the question of the future status of the Palestinians, the nature of relations with the state of Israel, (and the differences in opinion vis-à-vis social and cultural issues that are on the agenda of the Palestinians, such as the political status of women, the attitude toward the holy places and Jerusalem) constitutes the arena in which the leaders of the three movements design its strategy of conduct and activity.
3) Preferences and interests of Islamic movements leadership: The personal preferences and interests of movement leaders themselves and, in many respects, the elites who support those leaders, provide some explanation for political Islam. The leadership of Islam movements in the Arab and Islamic world makes decisions about movement attitude vis-à-vis the state and other groups in the society (including non-Muslims) as part of the profit-loss considerations of the leaders themselves.
For example, the initiative to establish the Hamas movement as the representative of the Islamic public stream in the West Bank and Gaza during the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1992), was a political decision made by the founding leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his followers. Following Yassin’s assassination by Israel, a new generation of young leaders took office and led the movement. Khalid Mashaal was elected head of the political bureau of Hamas; Ismael Hanieh and Mahmoud Al-Zahar became leaders of the movement in Gaza and the West Bank, where Hanieh was elected the Palestinian prime minister following Hamas victory in the 2006 elections. This contingent of leaders influenced the current political orientation of Hamas.
Significant support from the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza goes to Hamas. In a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) two months after the 2006 election, 47% of respondents said they would vote again for Hamas, compared to 39% for Fatah. The main reasons respondents said they would vote for Hamas included a desire for the implementation of Sharia law, but also the “desire to have an authority that would fight corruption.” The poll also found that the Palestinian public considered Fatah’s loss a punishment for the corruption, internal divisions, and lack of order that had emerged in the Palestinian Authority under its leadershiplxiv.
Recently, however, public opinion has shifted somewhat. The PCPSR conducted another poll in August of 2009, after Fatah held its Sixth Congress and elected new leadership. Respondents to this poll widely favored Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority President (52% approval rating) over Ismail Haniyeh who received a 38% approval rating. Respondents’ support for Fatah versus Hamas was likewise 44% to 28%, respectively, a result likely attributable to an improved view of Fatah’s administration of the West Bank, where it remains in power. West Bank respondents to the PCPSR poll indicated significant improvement in their perception of their own personal safety; fewer respondents felt there was corruption in Abbas-controlled PA institutionslxv. Thus, while Hamas took advantage of Fatah’s weakness to win power in 2006, its political rival has had recent success in improving its image in the eyes of the Palestinians.
In the Israeli context of political Islam, the Islamic movement formed in the 1970s acted and developed as a united movement as long as the founding leader was in control of the organization and rivals did not arise at the leadership level. In the early 1990s, a new generation of leadership began to appear, consisting primarily of mayors or regional leaders and activists who were endowed with charisma and dared to express the platform of political Islam.
The new generation included people who regarded themselves as potential leaders of the Islamic movement; they began to compete with the founding leader, Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish. Competitors included the former head of the Kafr Qasim local council and the current head of the parliamentary branch of the movement, Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur; the former head of the Kafr Bara local council, Sheikh Kamal Rian; the former mayor of Umm al-Fahm, Sheikh Raed Salah (who is today the head of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement); and Salah’s deputy, Sheikh Kamal Khatib. Sheikh Salah and Sheikh Khatib suspected Sheikh Darwish of planning to pass on the leadership to a family member - Sheikh Sarsur - and of steering the Islamic movement in a way that served his own interests (e.g., Darwish enjoyed close relations with the Jewish establishment in the state). These suspicions played a central role in the movement’s 1996 schism.
The preferences and interests of the leaders themselves are important elements in explaining the split of the Islamic movement in Israel into two competing movements. The aspirations of the younger generation to attain leadership positions in the movement have sharpened the differences between the movements and facilitated the split. Movement leadership has also led each stream to become more entrenched in its position. The leadership of political Islam in Israel is responsible for the failures of many efforts that aim to unify the two Islamic movements. The opposing interests of leaders at the national, regional, and local levels have foiled attempts to unify the movements. The perspective of the leadership is that unification of the two movements is liable to lead to some loss of status and erosion of authority. Therefore, leaders tend to preserve the status quo; they transform personal disagreements into ideological-political disagreements by emphasizing the dispute between the two streams, at the expense of the unifying factors.
4) The interpretation of religious text: Religious text must be accorded a very important place in explaining the phenomenon of political Islam for numerous reasons.lxvi For example, political text lacks the substantive or decisive significance to explain the phenomenon of political Islam in the modern era. The interpretation attributed to the political text is only important in the eyes of the leadership, activists, members, and supporters of the Islamic movements, based on the general political context, the orientation of the particular public, and the interests of the leadership. Of greater import are the various and profound meanings of each religious text in the context of specific Islamic activity. Gaping contradictions exist in the interpretations of the religious text by the different Islamic movements.
Religious text, in its various aspects, is translated at the political and practical level in completely different ways by the leadership of the three Palestinian Islamic movements (ie., the Northern movement in Israel, the Southern movement in Israel and the Hamas movement). The contradictions and disparate meanings assigned to the same text support our assertion the text’s significance stems from its interpretation. In fact the leadership of the Palestinian Islamic movements understands the same religious text in opposite ways demonstrates the importance of the interpretation of the text in the eyes of the leadership and its supporters, with the text itself adapted to the choice of each side’s leadership.
Following is a pictorial representation of preceding four explanatory factors discussed above. The picture presents the factors in the form of a pyramid with political context, (the broadest factor), at the base of the pyramid and interpretation of the religious text at the apex.
Interpretation of
the religious text
Leadership preferences
The Public political orientation
The political context
Prospects for the Future
The future of the three Palestinian Islamic movements, which are the Southern and the Northern Islamic movements within Israel in the Pre-1967 borders, and the Hamas movement within the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip, depends mainly on the dynamics related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, it also depends on the local, regional and international developments surrounding the future of the conflict, or the peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, and the way that Palestinian public and the Islamic movements' leadership will handle these developments.
The dynamics of peace and conflict between the Palestinians and Israel during the last two decades show clearly that the politics of recognition were more accepted among the Palestinians during the period of peace negotiations and relative reconciliation. This was also true for Hamas in the West Bank which was at its weakest position following the signing of the Oslo agreement between the PLO and Israel. On the other hand, that was also true for the Southern vs. the Northern Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel. The fact is that the peace negotiations and the relative reconciliation following the signing of the Oslo agreement, led to more positive policies by the Israeli government towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel on the years 1993-1996lxvii.
After the winning of the Israeli right wing coalition on the 1996 elections, followed by the harsh politics led by the new elected government, a spread of frustration among Palestinians inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, lead to the empowerment of the politics of deference and rejection among the Palestinians. This trend was intensified following the collapse of the peace process in 2000 and the start of the second intifada and the Israeli open war against the Palestinian Authority during the years 2000-2003.
The deterioration in the relationships between Israel and the Palestinian leadership led to a collapse of the support for the peace settlement and the rise-up of the support for the political powers that rejected the peace efforts; the Northern Islamic movement in Israel and Hamas were the main winners on the public level. This support was clear when Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections for the PAlxviii. While the Northern Islamic movement inside Israel succeeded, with other powers, to convince a large portion of the Palestinians in Israel to boycott the Israeli general elections in 2003 and in 2006lxix. The growing support for Hamas in the West Bank and the Northern Islamic movement in Israel got its peak public sympathy following the Israeli failure in the wars, against Hizbullah in 2006 and against Hamas in Gaza in 2008\9. The relative ability of Hamas and Hizbullah to resist the Israeli attack was partially attributed to the Iranian financial and military support for these two Islamic powers, this led to a growing sympathy to Iran and a growing support for its stand against Israel and the West World. On the other hand, a high support was developed for the regional-Islamic and Arab solidarity against the peace process with Israel and against the Palestinian groups that support reconciliation with Israel.
Depending on the current situation of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, the prospects for a substantive peace settlement is very minimal, and the evidences are: Palestinians are divided and their leadership is very weak; Israel is moving to the extreme right wing, continues its settlements policies in the West Bank and refuses to accept any just settlement with the Palestinianslxx; and we are witnessing an escalation of conflectual relationships between Israel and the Palestinian, inside and outside Israel and a deterioration in the prospects for peace settlement. This led and will continue to lead to the increasing support for the politics of difference among the Palestinians in Israel and the politics of rejection among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.
As a conclusion, the future of the Palestinian Islamic movements, in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, depends, more than any other factor, on the success or the failure of the peace efforts between the Palestinians and Israel and the way this process will be received by the Palestinian public and the leaders of the Islamic movements, including the interpretation that will be given to any escalation or reconciliation process.
In the political level the main benefited side from the current situation and the expected prospects of escalation are the Northern Islamic movement among the Palestinians in Israel and Hamas among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, who are both expected to be among the main powers that will shape the future of the region and the prospects for shrinking reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians.
Conclusion
Factionalism has been a continuing political phenomenon in Islam since his early days, in the seventh century. Primary explanations for the internal schisms in Muslims organizations reside in the political domain: different approaches and schools of thought regarding the state structure, the extant political and social regime, and competition by the elite members of the society. Following the emergence of the modern national state in the Middle East, political Islam emerged in the form of political parties within the different states where it has reflected the political, social and cultural realities in these states, while also reflecting the same political aims and types of action as other, non-religious political parties. Thus, although most scholars in the field have insisted that these political Islamic movements and political parties are new political phenomena that were derived from the desire to implement the religious text and to re-create the Islamic state, this school of thought has been challenged by other researchers, like ourselves, who maintain that the political Islamic movements are not a new phenomena, it exists in Islam since the seventh century, and that a prominent factor in shaping the political, social and cultural plans, as well as the political action methods of the Islamic movements has been the context in which these movements operate.
To explicate this contention, we have examined, in this article, the political programs,methods and the future orientations of the three public Palestinian Islamic movements, particularly we analyzed their attitudes with regard to Israel and the Jews. We have analyzed differences among the parliamentary Southern Islamic movement and the extra parliamentary Northern Islamic movement active in the Palestinian community in Israel proper, the pre- 1967 borders. Further, we have analyzed differences between these two political movements and the Hamas movement, the leading Islamic movement active among Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza strip and those in exile.
Differences among these movements are byproducts of multi layered issues, wherein the political text constitutes one distinguishing factor. Differences among these movements are rooted also in three additional factors: (a) the public support or opposition to the ideas presented by the movement; (b) the choices made by the political leaders of these movements; and (c) the interpretation of religious text in the shadow of the social, cultural and political developments. It is our contention that the internal order of these factors is paramount to understanding the phenomenon of political Islam as an organized party or movement active within a specific political reality.
Notes
i See for example: Khalid Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2007); Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Seif Da'na, "Islamic Resistance in Palestine: Hamas, The Gaza War and the Future of Political Islam", Holy Land Studies 8.2 (2009). Pp. 211-228.
ii See: Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988); Godfrey Jansen, Militant Islam (NewYork: Harper and Row, 1979), and: M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).
iii H. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
iv Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 133-154.
v Raphael Israeli, Arabs in Israel: Friends or Foes? (Jerusalem: ACPR Publishers, 2002).
vi David Bukay, Muhammad’s Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences (Green Forest, AR: Balfour Books, 2004).
vii Elie Rekhess, “Political Islam in Israel and its Connection to the Islamic Movement in the Territories.” In Elie Rekhess (ed.) The Arabs in Israeli Politics: Dilemmas of Identity (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1998), pp. 73-84. (in Hebrew).
viii Hassan Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence: Sources, Dynamics, and Implications," in his (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (Praeger, 1982), p. 4.
ix Y Haddad, “Islamists and the 'Problem of Israel': The 1967 Awakening”. Middle East Journal 46, 266-285. and: M.E Salla, “Political Islam and the West: A New Cold War or Convergence?”, Third World Quarterly 18, 1997),734. Joun Espisito Voll. Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modem World. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).
x See: Nohad Ali, "Political Islam in an Ethnic Jewish State: Its Historical Evolution, Contemporary Challenges and Future Prospects". Holy Land Studies 3, 1. (2004), 69-92. Elie Rekhess. "Fundamentalist Islam among Israeli Arabs." Pp. 34-44 in Perspectives in Israeli Pluralism, edited by Kitty O. Cohen. New York: Israeli Colloquium, 1991; Elie Rekhess. “Resurgent Islam in Israel.” Asian and African Studies 27, 1-2 (March-July 1993): 189-206.
xi Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Moslem Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
xii These figures exclude over 250,000 Arabs in East Jerusalem and 15,000 Arabs in the Golan Heights who are by and large not Israeli citizens (but they are included in the official statistics because these areas were incorporated by Israeli law).
xiii In this study we do not refer to the Islamic Jihad movement, which is a very small armed group, that does not seek to convince the public to join it as members. It is not a popular and public political movement that seeks to shape social, political and cultural domains.
xiv In this context, we would like to note that we are aware to the literature regarding the 'Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities" (Fiqh El-Aqalliyyalt Al-Muslima) discourse, but we believe that this literature is not applicable in the case of the Palestinians Islamic movements, who see themselves as part of the Islamic world.
xv Elie Rekhess, “Political Islam in Israel and its …”.
xvi See the list in: Issam Abu-Raiya, Developmental Leadership: The Case of the Islamic Movement in Umm-al-Fahm, Israel (MA thesis, Clark University, Clark, 1989).
xvii As’ad Ghanem, The Palestinian Arab Minority In Israel: A Political Study (Albany University of New York Press, 2001).
xviii Issam Abu-Raiya, “Concrete Religions Versus Abstract Religions: The Case of the Split in the Islamic Movement in Israel.” Migamot, (43, 4, 2005), 682-698. (Hebrew)
xix Asad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, Palestinians in Israel: Indigenous Group Politics in the Jewish State (Ramallah: Madar center, 2009). (in Arabic).
xx Ibrahem Sarsur, “The Islamic Movement and the State.” In Yitzhak Reiter (ed.), Dilemmas in Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel. (Tel Aviv: Schocken Press, 2005), pp. 242-249. (Hebrew)
xxi Sawt al-Haq wal-Huriyya newspaper, 4/4/1997, 5.
xxii See: Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Moslem Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
xxiii Baumgarten, Helga. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005." Journal of Palestine Studies 34 (2005): 25-48.
xxiv Mohamad Hasanin Haikal, Secret Negotiations Between the Arabs and Israel: Illusions Peace, Oslo – the Before and Aftermath, Part three (Cairo: Al Shorouk House, 1996) (in Arabic).
xxv Urquhart, Conal, and Gaby Hinsliff. "Israeli missile attack kills new Hamas chief." The Guardian 18 Apr. 2004. Web. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/18/israel>.
xxvi As'ad Ghanem. Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement. Indiana University Press, 2009)
xxvii Ibid
xxviii See: Ghanem. Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement
xxix Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2007)
xxx Nohad Ali, Religious Fundamentalism as Ideology and Practice: The Islamic Movement in Israel in Comparative Perspective. Doctoral dissertation (Haifa: Sociology Department, University of Haifa, 2006). (Hebrew)
xxxi See: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
xxxii Raed Salah, “Toward an Independent Society.” Sawt al-Haq wal-Huriyya (weekly newspaper of the Islamic movement). (July 13, 2001), p. 5. (Arabic)
xxxiii Ali, "Political Islam in an Ethnic Jewish State…./"
xxxiv Sammy Smooha & As’ad Ghanem. "Political Islam among the Arabs in Israel." in Dealing with Difference: Religion, Ethnicity and Politics: Comparing Cases and Concepts, edited by Theodor Hanf. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002). Pages 143-173.
xxxv Abu-Raiya, " Concrete Religions Versus Abstract Religions…."
xxxvi See: Azmi Bishara, The Arabs in Israel: Internal view (Beirut: Center of Arab Unit Studies, 1998). (Arabic)
xxxvii Asad Ghanem, “The Bi-National State Solution”. Israel Studies (14,2, 2009), pp. 120-133
xxxviii Sammy Smooha, Autonomy for Arabs in Israel? (Beit Berl: The Institute for Israeli Arab Studies, 1999). (Hebrew)
xxxix Ali, " Religious Fundamentalism as Ideology and Practice….."
xl Sarsur, “The Islamic Movement and the State.”
xli An interview with Sheikh Raed Salah, head of the extra-parliamentary Islamic movement. The interview was conducted on April 13, 2008.
xlii Raed Salah, “The Elections and Us.” Sawt al-Haq wal-Huriyya, (Nov. 29, 2002), p. 5. (Arabic)
xliii Salah, 2006. p. 5.
xliv Ghanem and Mustafa, "Palestinians in Israel…..".
xlv Al-Mithaq Newspaper (weekly of the Southern Islamic movement in Israel), Nov. 21, 2008, 4.
xlvi An interview with Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur, head of the parliamentary Islamic movement. The interview was conducted on September 20, 2008
xlvii Ghanem and Mustafa, "Palestinians in Israel.."
xlviii Elie Rekhess, “Political Islam in Israel, p. 75.
xlix For the full text of the charter, see: www.theisraelproject.org/site/pp.aspx?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=5086383&printmode=1
l Ahmad Yassin, Two letters sent from the prison by Hamas leader to his followers, The Journal of Palestine Studies 12-17 (1993), 49-25.
li Ibrahim Ghousheh, A statement by the Hamas spokesperson denouncing the draft Israeli-Palestinian agreement. The Journal of Palestine Studies 11, (1993) 213-210.
lii Ibid.
liii See: As'ad Ghanem. "The Fallout from the Gaza War: A Turning Point in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?". Holy land Studies Journal, 8.2 (2009) 195–210.
liv For the full text of the Goldeston report, please see: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf
lv See: Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid. Hamas - Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibility. Special report. (Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 2009). P. 8.
lvi See: "Seven Questions: The World According to Hamas." Foreign Policy. Jan. 2008. Web. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4147>.
lvii Interview with Mashaal on August 16, 2009. See: http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=43539 (in Arabic)
lviii Livingstone, Ken. “Exclusive: Hamas Leader Interview.” Newstatesman. 17 September 2009. <http://www.newstatesman.com/print/200909170013>.
lix We are aware of the fact that many researchers, including those who we mentioned earlier, are using different segments of these factors as explanation variables for the political Islam phenomena, we think that only when these factors are combined together, on the same structure that we explain below, then they can be used as a satisfactory explanation.
lx See: Ghanem. Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement. . Chap. 6.
lxi See for example, public polls among the Palestinians in Israel: Sammy Smooha, The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel.( Haifa: University of Haifa, 1984). And Rekhess, 1993, Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009, and Nadim Rouhana, Identities in Conflict: Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State.( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, see the results of the public bolls: The Jerusalem media and communication center (JMCC): http://www.jmcc.org/; and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR): http://www.pcpsr.org/;
lxii See: Ghanem "Palestinian Politics after Arafat"
lxiii For details see: Sammy Smooha and Asad Ghanem, Ethnic Religious and Political Islam among the Arabs in Israel. (Haifa: University of Haifa, 1998).
lxiv The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR): http://www.pcpsr.org/; Poll #19.
lxv Ibid, Poll #33.
lxvi For example see: Lewis, 1988. and Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 221, and Mansoor Moaddel. “The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology (Vol. 28, 2002), pp. 359-386.
lxvii Hareven, Aluf. 1994 Annual Progress Report: Equality and Integration. Sikkuy, Jerusalem; Hareven, Aluf . 1995. Annual Progress Report: Equality and Integration. Sikkuy, Jerusalem.
lxviii See: Ghanem, Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement.. Chap. 6.
lxix See: Ghanem, As'ad & Muhanad Mustafa. 2007. " The Palestinians in Israel and the 2006 Knesset Elections: Political and Ideological Implications of the Election Boycott" . The Holy Land Studies. Volume 6, No. 1. Pages 51-73.
lxx For details see: Ghanem, Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement. Chapters 4 & 7; Hilliard, Constance. 2009. Does Israel Have a Future? The Case for Post-Zionist State. Washington D.C. Potomac Books, Inc.
http://gaza.scoop.ps/2014/07/moh-gaza-press-release-international-human-shields-to-protect-shifa-hospital/
http://mondoweiss.net/2014/06/reconciliation-palestinian-israels.html
7월 25일 이스라엘 경찰 대변인은, 서안지구 불법 유대인 정착촌의 유대인 청소년 세 명 납치살해 사건이 하마스가 아닌 소규모 조직의 단독 범행으로 보인다고 밝혔다. 이스라엘이 이번 가자 침공을 어떤 명목으로 시작했었는가 생각하면 기가 막힌다. 소년들이 실종되자 이스라엘의 네타냐후 총리는 하마스의 부인에도 불구하고 하마스를 범인으로 지목하며 용의자 2인의 집을 폭파시키고, 하마스 대원을 100명 이상 체포하더니, 급기야는 하마스를 소탕하겠다며 가자 지구를 침공했다. 소년들이 실종된 6월 12일 당일에, 이미 ISIS 계열이라는 조직이 이스라엘군이 작년에 이들 조직원 세 명을 살해한 데 대한 보복으로 자신들이 소년들을 납치했음을 주장했다. 이스라엘은 처음부터 하마스가 범인이 아님을 알고 있었다. 스스로 범인이 따로 있음을 밝힌 뒤에도 가자지구에 공격을 퍼부으며, 이스라엘은 노골적으로 소년들의 죽음이 가자 침공의 구실이었을 뿐임을 드러냈다.
이스라엘이 가자를 침공한 것은 이번이 처음이 아니다. 22일간 1400여명을 학살했던 2008-9년의 침공, 하마스 지도부 암살을 시작으로 8일간 170여명을 학살했던 2012년의 침공에 이어 이번이 세 번째다. 앞의 두 번은 이스라엘 총선에서 승리하기 위한 집권 여당의 선거 전략이라고 분석됐다. 이번 침공은 팔레스타인의 양대 정치 세력인 하마스와 파타의 통합정부 구성을 깨기 위한 것이라는 분석이 지배적이다.
2006년 팔레스타인 총선에서 하마스가 압승하자 기존의 집권당이던 파타가 이에 불복하며 쿠데타를 일으킨다. 2007년 내전 끝에 가자지구와 서안지구는 각각 하마스와 파타의 지배하에 놓이고, 곧바로 이스라엘 내각은 가자지구를 '적대 지역'으로 지정, 이집트의 협조 속에 가자지구를 육해공 모두 봉쇄한 채 지금에 이르렀다. 이스라엘의 분열 공작과 크고 작은 침공에도 불구하고 대다수 팔레스타인인들의 염원 속에 최근 하마스와 파타는 다시 통합정부 구성 논의를 마무리 짓고 출범을 앞두고 있었다. 바로 지난 6월 2일의 일이다. 열흘 뒤 이스라엘 소년들이 실종됐고, 이스라엘이 팔레스타인 전역에 군사 행동을 단행하며 다시 팔레스타인 통합정부 구성은 불투명하게 되었다.
오랫동안 팔레스타인 리더쉽의 분열을 조장하며 그 수혜를 받아온 이스라엘로서는 통합정부 구성이 달가울리 없다. 피점령자들이 점령자가 아니라 서로에게 총구를 겨누게 하고, 피점령자들을 위계 지어 각기 다른 차별 정책을 적용해 서로를 의심케 하고 분열, 와해시키는 것은 이스라엘만의 점령 방식도 아니다. 파타는 (마치 이스라엘의 의중을 감지한 듯) 하마스에게 일단 이집트의 휴전안을 받아들이라면서 가자의 상황을 하마스의 '정치적 이익'을 위해 이용하지 말라고 비난하고 있다. 대대적인 침공으로 가자 주민들을 살해하고, 무인기를 이용해 일상적으로 폭격하고, 8년간 가자를 봉쇄하며 가자 주민들을 말려죽인 것은 하마스가 아닌 이스라엘이다. 그러나 파타는 이번에도, 이스라엘의 공작에 말려들었다기보다는, 진정 자신들의 '정치적 이익'을 위해 앵무새처럼 이스라엘과 같은 이야기를 반복하고 있는 것이다.
최소한 휴전 협상에 대해서만 말하자면 처음 이스라엘이 응할 의사를 밝힌 이집트의 휴전안은 반대당사자인 하마스와 사전에 논의된 바 없으며, 하마스는 심지어 언론 보도를 통해 휴전안을 알았다고 한다. 가자지구의 그 누구와도 얘기되지 않은 휴전안을 일방적으로 받아들
이미 이스라엘의 점령으로 황폐화된 가자의 생활 기반을, 산업을, 교육을, 삶 자체를 파괴하기 충분했다. 별다른 상황 없이 이스라엘이 휴전 협정을 지킬 것을 기대하기도 힘들다. 이스라엘이 과거에도 협정을 깬 전례가 있기 때문이다.
봉쇄의 고통. 휴전 조건.
최근 상황
사실 이스라엘이 팔레스타인 전역을 점령하고 있는 상황에서
하지만 오히려 하마스를. 특히 휴먼 실드.
새삼스레 놀라울 것도 없지만, 유럽 국가들은 셰자이야 한 마을에서만 60명 이상이 살해당한 뒤에도 오직 하마스에게만 무장을 해제할 것을 요구하는 성명서를 냈다. 이에 발맞춰서 이스라엘은 셰자이야가 하마스의 테러 요새라며 민간인 학살을 정당화하고 있다. 이스라엘의 연간 군사비의 오분의 일에 상응하는 30억 달라를 매년 원조하는 미국이 이스라엘을 규탄하는 UN 인권이사회의 결의안에 반대표를 던진 것 또한 전혀 새로울 것이 없다.
상황이 이런데도 이스라엘은 가자 침공을 정당화하는 프로파간다를 쉬지 않고 쏟아내고 있다. 지난 주 60인 이상이 살해당한 마을 '셰자이야'가 하마스의 테러 요새란다.
동예루살렘 영토 병합, 고립장벽 건설, 유대인 전용 도로 건설, 점령지에 유대인 정착촌 건설, 인간 방패 등 전쟁 범죄 등등 수없이 많은 유엔 기구들이 이스라엘의 불법행위를 적시하고 규탄해왔지만 이스라엘은 유엔의 결의안이 종이장에 불과함을 계속해서 증명해 왔다. 유엔 학교를 폭격한 것은 이번이 처음이 아니다.
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