CINA

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Wishful Thinking and the (F*cking) Reality

While Clinton sees signs of progress for the 6-Party Talks, according to Yonhap (2.26) it might well be that the reality is a bit(^^) different, as D. Kirk assumes in the following piece, published in Asia Times (2.27):

Conflicting priorities on North Korea

Professor Wang Jisi of Beijing University may not speak for his government, the Communist Party or his country, but his view of efforts to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program provides a startling note of realism that seems to have escaped non-Chinese negotiators.

"The DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea - North Korea] will keep going nuclear, period," he told a small audience here this week. "There is no other endgame, at least from Pyongyang's point of view." That's the kind of blunt declaration that United States and South Korean nuclear envoys do not seem capable of making or even thinking, to judge from their public utterances.

United States envoy Stephen Bosworth while on a swing through the region repeated the mantra of urging North Korea to return to the six-party talks and promised that all topics would be open for discussion. And South Korea's negotiator Wi Sun Lac, meeting Bosworth after both of them had conferred with China's negotiator, Wu Dawei, in Beijing, talked about "the need for the parties to resume six-party talks".

Both the Americans and the South Koreans acknowledge, however, that the whole process remains stuck on North Korea's insistence on conditions that have no immediate chance of acceptance. These include the demand for a Korean War peace treaty - a deal the North couples with the withdrawal of the remaining 28,500 US troops from the South - and an end to United Nations sanctions imposed after its long-range missile test and then its nuclear tests last April and May.

Just in case anyone doubted the North's position, the North Korean military came out with an appropriately tough statement warning of the consequences of joint US-South Korea war games scheduled for next month. It was one thing to vow to "mercilessly destroy the bulwark of aggression", as the Korean People's Army warned, but another to promise "all offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent".

Nobody expects North Korea to drop any atomic bombs from its decrepit fleet of MiG fighters or attach a nuclear device to one of its vaunted missiles. In fact, it's quite uncertain whether North Korean engineers and scientists have actually figured out how to deliver a warhead. Nonetheless, the statement would seem to leave one clear point: North Korea intends to remain a nuclear power.

Wang Jisi, delivering a paper at a forum in Seoul on North Korea's nuclear problem, expanded on his realistic outlook - one that is difficult to dispute unless you're either a US or South Korean negotiator or an academic equally prone to wishful thinking.

Wang did not have to refer specifically to Bosworth's mission to Pyongyang in December to get across the futility of it all. From all that has gone before, he said, "It is hard to imagine any genuine progress on denuclearization - even if North Korea-US contacts were upgraded or the six-party talks were to be resumed soon."

Wang did not claim any real inside knowledge of what North Korean leader Kim Jong-il talks about in meetings with the generals he commands from his pinnacle as chairman of the National Defense Commission, the center of power in Pyongyang. For that matter, he did not let us know if Kim talks to his generals at all. For all anyone knows, maybe he just tells them what to do and think, they bow in assent, and that's it.

"It is almost impossible for outsiders to know whether there were any debates within the North Korean leadership about the pros and cons of going nuclear," he said. Why bother, was the rhetorical implication. "Even if there had been any doubts and hesitations," he said, clearly "the perseverance to attain nuclear weapons is serving the leaders' interests very well".

The logic was simple, from Wang's perspective. "Achievement of nuclear arms should help consolidate their position at home and increase diplomatic leverage," he said. "They feel little increased military pressure while they know how to take one step forward in nuclearization and then pause to show an ostensible readiness to negotiate over denuclearization."

All the while, as Wang noted, humanitarian aid and economic assistance continue to flow into the North.

The degree to which Wang reflects the outlook of Wu Dawei and others in Beijing is not exactly clear, but it seems more than likely that he gets to lecture at home and abroad as both analyst and a messenger of high-level thinking. Looked at that way, Wang's pessimism about North Korea giving up its nukes comes across as a sign of what Beijing sees as a higher priority, that is, propping up the North Korean regime against the danger of collapse and chaos. Wang got that point across too with a candor that's not readily apparent in narrow official pronouncements from Beijing.

"Unlike other partners," he said, in a jibe at the Americans and possibly the South Koreans, "Beijing would look at a possible political implosion in North Korea in most negative terms." For that reason his government "would never try to destabilize that country or join others" in attempting "to do so".

Indeed, he added for good measure, it was "a consensus among many observers in China that the Pyongyang government, with the social order it maintains, may survive for a long time to come" in view of "traditional friendship" between Beijing and Pyongyang, a not-too-subtle allusion to Beijing's rescue of North Korea in the Korean War, as well as "shared interests".

Not that China is supporting whatever North Korea does. Reports persist that China is anxious somehow to tamp down North Korea's nuclear ambitions, to discourage the North from another nuclear test that many observers here are predicting will happen this year - and to engage in serious, effective economic reform.

Japan's influential national daily, Asahi Shimbun, for instance, this week cited diplomatic sources in Beijing as saying that China had responded with "an unexpectedly harsh reaction" to the North's nuclear test of May 25.

"The Communist Party of China told North Korea to reform and open up its economy, end its hereditary succession of political power and abandon its nuclear development programs," said Asahi, attributing those sweeping demands to party sources. It was against this background, said the article, that Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-un, visited Beijing while his father eased up on disastrous economic reforms.

Wang's remarks, however, may not have convinced influential North Korea-watchers in Japan and the US. The differences were apparent at the same forum, held at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think-tank financed in large measure by Hyundai money and led by Han Sung-joo, a former foreign minister noted for his moderately conservative views.

Evans Revere, president of the Korea Society in New York and a former diplomat with a long background in Korea, Japan and China, warned that "China could be forced to make hard choices between traditional support for its ally/partner and a new approach".

Nor did Revere seem all that happy about the outlook of South Korea's government. He did not seem impressed by President Lee Myung-bak's repeated declarations that North Korea must give up its nuclear program as a precondition for the aid the North was accustomed to receiving in the decade of the "Sunshine" policy of reconciliation initiated by the late president Kim Dae-jung in 1998.

The South "will need to decide whether it must now get tougher", said Revere, while the North "must ask itself whether intransigence risks sowing the seeds of even further isolation".

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LB27Dg02.html

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Hamas' "Prince" Who Was Spy For Israel

He was Israel's most valuable spy inside Hamas - and certainly the most unlikely.

For more than a decade, Mosab Hassan Yousef disrupted dozens of suicide bombings and assassination attempts by Palestinian militant groups, incl. Hamas.

Infiltrating the upper echelons of Hamas came relatively easy for Yousef: He is the son of Hamas founder Sheikh Hassan Yousef.

Yousef was recruited by the Shin Bet, Israel's internal security agency, in 1996 after he was arrested.

Inside Israel's intelligence community, he became known as the "Green Prince" - a nod to the color of Hamas' flag and his pedigree as the son of one of its founders.

Yousef's exploits are the stuff of legend.

Yousef's astonishing career as a spy is chronicled in his soon-to-be released memoir, "Son of Hamas" (Salt River Press).

To learn more (MUST READ!!):
☞ Israel's man in Hamas just 'wanted to save lives' (Haaretz, 2.26)

While the release of "Son of Hamas" attracted/attracts a lot of attention in the int'l (of course mainly bourgeois) media, Hamas' on-topic statement (via PIC, 2.24) was somehow fuzzy:

Masri belittles pro-Israeli news fabrications against Hamas

Senior Hamas official Mushir Al-Masri on Wednesday played down the importance of news fabrications published by Israeli media outlets and some Palestinian and Arab newspapers loyal to Israel, affirming that such smear campaigns would never affect the bright image of his Movement.

In a press statement, Masri called on the Palestinian and Arab media to be precise about the news reported by the Israeli media and biased newspapers.

He underlined that it was not the first time the pro-Zionist media fabricated news in an attempt to undermine the will of the resistance and affect the spirits and steadfastness of the Palestinian people.

“There is no doubt that such fabricated news are meant to mix up cards and influence the investigation into the assassination of martyr Mabhouh, but all this will not affect the bright image of Hamas and the resistance," the Hamas official emphasized.

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Enjoy the weekend reading!!

PYONGYANG JOURNAL (source: Asia Times, 2.25/26)

Happy birthday, Comrade Kim
By Pepe Escobar

It's a cold, crisp, sunny morning in the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and there could not be a more important game in town. Billboards bearing the numbers "2.16 [February 16]" - usually decorated with huge red flowers - are all over the place. The flowers are the only splashes of full color against drab grays and browns. They are of course kimjongilia, a modified begonia programmed to bloom exactly on - when else - 2.16.

For Pyongyang's 2 million or so residents, it's time to party. Today is the 68th birthday of the general secretary of the Worker's Party of Korea, chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army - comrade Kim Jong-il.

Kim Jong-il, aka the Dear Leader, has been the maximum leader of North Korea for almost 12 years now. But he's not the president (the titular head of state is the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-nam.) A key reason is that he's not very fond of the endless, obligatory diplomatic round of meeting foreign heads of state.

The relentlessly apocalyptic Western media narrative would lead one to believe that on this eventful day the citizens of what is routinely depicted as a "Stalinist/communist/terrorist/totalitarian/insane/rogue/axis of evil gulag" would be one step short of showering a battery of commemorative missiles over South Korea, Japan or the west coast of the US for that matter, not to mention conduct another nuclear test. Reality though bears no "axis of evil" overtones.

Holiday on ice
 

The day starts with an early morning visit to the imposing bronze statue of president Kim Il-sung - aka the Great Leader, the father of the nation - on top of Mansu hill. It is officially 20 meters high (and certainly looks bigger). At the end of the Japanese colonial period, this site housed the largest Shinto shrine in Pyongyang; thus the Great Leader's statue had to be no-holds-barred imposing.

Everyone and his neighbor seems to have come, bringing flowers, bowing respectfully, and always arriving in neatly arranged groups, from soldiers and high-ranking officials to village elders and the very good-looking traffic ladies in their blue winter jackets. Higher ups arrive with their wives in black Mercedes or Audis, the men in black suits, the women sporting extremely elegant and colorful versions of the Korean national dress.

Then it's off to an international figure skating exhibition - not competition - that includes athletes from England, Switzerland, Ukraine, Belarus and even a Russian, who was a bronze medalist in the 2006 Turin Winter Olympics, a favorite of the crowd. Call it Pyongyang's counterpart to the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics. The real stars though are the locals skaters, kids included, and their apotheosis routine bearing the North Korean flag and the Juche flag - with its hammer, sickle and flame, symbolizing workers, peasants and intellectuals who, according to Kim Il-sung, are "the true masters of society", as "creators of both material and spiritual wealth".

Next stop is the 14th Kimjongilia Festival - a wacky, dazzling flower extravaganza with arrangements offered by everyone from military organs, ministries, national agencies and cooperatives to businesses, overseas Koreans, international organizations and foreign embassies, all featuring the hybrid red begonia (not the national flower of North Korea though; that's the magnolia). The "flower of Kim Jong-il" was created by a Japanese botanist in 1988, symbolizing, according to the official narrative, "wisdom, love, justice, and peace". The Great Leader Kim Il-sung, of course, has his own flower, the Kimilsungia.

The hall is absolutely packed. Everyone seems to have a portable digital camera that somehow materialized from China, and whole families and reams of schoolchildren are eager to pose for a flowery photo of ruby red Kimjongilias enveloping globes, displayed under depictions of high-speed trains, under emblems of the Dear Leader himself and even flanked by mini-replicas of Taepodong missiles.

Then it's time for a mass open-air dance in a square flanked by government buildings - well, not really "mass"; a few hundred couples, the men in dark suits and the women in white, jade green, light pink, cream or black chima (skirt) and jogori (blouse), the "evocative of the fairies in the heavens" Korean national dress. They are all dancing to traditional songs blared to ear-splitting level by what could be dubbed the North Korean version of the Jamaican sound system.

The few steps are very simple, involving a bit of handclapping; the few gaping foreigners are welcomed to join the fun. The locals perform it all stone-faced, although not robotically. Sex in North Korea is not exactly in the air. Schools are segregated by sex. Even holding hands in public is considered very improper behavior. Unmarried single mothers are virtually non-existent (but if it happens, the newborn is meticulously taken care of by the state - just as Korea war orphans were.)

The highlight of the day is synchronized swimming - in an arena in the sports village. The elaborate ballets, performed by dozens of teenagers, rival China's. Kimjongilia panels adorn the arena. Party elders and higher ups get the best seats. The foreign figure-skating stars are also attending. The highlight is a stunning aquatic socialist ballet featuring a native siren in red swimsuit.

That's it; then socialist formalism dissolves, and the locals are off to dinner with relatives, mostly using the metro (two lines), or the aging, mobile works of socialist realism that are the local buses and trams. Some folk may eventually go bowling in the state-of-the-art Pyongyang Golden Lane Bowling Alley (45 lanes in fact; a detailed diagram on the wall shows the itinerary followed by Kim Il-sung on its inauguration day, and even all the spots where he stood). One fact though stands out; all through these merry proceedings, the Dear Leader Kim Jong-il himself was nowhere to be seen.

To be or not to be

 
Kim Jong-il was born on February 16, 1942, in an anti-Japanese guerrilla camp near Khabarovsk, just across the border from Manchukuo in occupied China. By this time, both his parents had been fighting the Japanese occupation for no less than 10 years.

All trap doors in secretive North Korea seem eventually to lead to what is in fact the royal Kim family - whose Shakespearean saga, if ever brought to a TV mini-series (maybe a Chinese or Hong Kong investor?) would undoubtedly enthrall a global audience.

The Dear Leader's father Kim Il-sung, over six feet tall [1.82 meters] and sporting a broad forehead (a big thing among Korean mothers), was charisma personified. His mother, Kim Chong-suk, widely revered as the ultimate anti-Japanese heroine, was less than five feet tall, pear-shaped, always in guerrilla fatigues, with a round, wide, smiling face, friendly but not very well educated. Kim Jong-il looks more like mom. And to put it mildly, that has made him extremely uneasy all his life.

While he was still a boy, Kim Jong-il suffered two terrible traumas; the accidental drowning of his younger brother in 1947, and the death of his mother in childbirth in 1949. That's when - sporting a state-issued polyester summer uniform and plastic shoes - he started going to gender-segregated elementary school.

Fast forward, and the plot thickens. The focus now is on Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-il's son - and until recently heir not-so-apparent (for years he's been living in China on and off). And also on Li Nam-ok, Kim Jong-il's daughter, adopted by him to tutor and play with his beloved son. She is from an aristocratic landowning family from, well, the enemy, South Korea. And although she was born - and lived - with a silver spoon in her mouth, inevitably there would come a day when she would rebel.

The great love of Kim Jong-il's life is and has always been his mistress, the ravishing - and also Southern aristocrat - Sung Hae-rim, the absolute top North Korean movie star. She happens to double as Li Nam-ok's aunt. And it gets even juicier - she is Kim Jong-nam's mother. This means Kim Jong-nam, a possible future DPRK leader (but by now bypassed by his youngest half-brother Kim Jong-un) is technically an illegitimate son.

Kim Jong-nam, tall and handsome like his grandfather Kim Il-sung, grew up much like Pu Yi - the last emperor of China; hyper-protected, hyper-pampered and in fact cloistered in the most cloistered society on the planet. At first he was educated by palace tutors, and had a court attending to his every whim. Meanwhile Li Nam-ok was developing different roles; at first she was his playmate, then his teacher, till finally she became his sister.

And here lies a crucial plot twist; these brother-and-sister royals lived virtually their whole early life as strangers in their own land. That's definitely, deeply imprinted in the psyche of a possible future North Korean leader.

Later as teenagers, both Kim Jong-nam and Li Nam-ok were sent to expensive secondary schools in Geneva - with the inevitable corollary of partying with the rich and famous in Paris. That's when la dolce vita made Li Nam-ok "betray" North Korea. Now she believes that even Kim Jong-il himself regards as nonsense the monolithic official narrative of post-1912 North Korea - the year the father of the nation, Kim Il-sung, was born.

Arguably the best informed source available anywhere on Kim Jong-il is Li Nam-ok herself, through her Breaking North Korean Silence: Kim Jong-il's Daughter, A Memoir, written by Imogen O'Neill. Here one learns that the Dear Leader is very intelligent and very sensitive - a prudish and rather shy guy who'd rather stay at home and work in his pyjamas, as indeed he does.

He is not the socializing type - he'd probably rather drop dead than join Facebook. That in itself would explain why he didn't make a public appearance on "2.16". Like a grand maestro, Kim Jong-il apparently orchestrates all manner of North Korean spectaculars but is bored to tears to show up. He also seems to
have a sharp comment about everything - solutions included - and is capable of mimicking virtually anyone. And - very important - he loves to laugh.

He apparently quit smoking a few years ago and drinks basically at formal occasions. Surprisingly for many, he is said to be not at all fond of the non-stop hero worship. In a very Korean manner, he's a family man, whose company he prefers to anybody else's. He seems to keep Joseph Stalin's timetable - waking up in the middle of the night, working through the early morning and sleeping before noon. He used to like partying, when his 20 or so preferred guests indulged in beer, imported French cognac and ginseng whisky. But then the system's elite can do the same in selected Pyongyang hotels.

As much as he may dislike the DPRK's massive bureaucracy, he could not but be acutely aware of his own - and the state's - security; he only trusts his close relatives. The top commanders in charge of Pyongyang's security are four brothers who are in-laws to Kim Jong-il's sister. In a nutshell, Kim Jong-il seems not to suffer fools, nor sycophants, gladly; he'd rather listen to honest straight-shooters, a rare commodity in his circle.

It comes as no surprise that Kim Jong-il could never be immune from the seductive soft power of American and Western mass culture. He's an inveterate fan of Western post-modernity. Thus the array of Sony LED televisions in every room of his many palatial abodes, which means that Kim Jong-il may tune in to every trashy offering on Japanese, South Korean and American cable. He surfs the Internet every day and is very well informed in a variety of issues. He's a collector with an immense video and DVD library. especially from Hollywood. He loves classical music but also the Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys and Pink Floyd (there's a fabulous black and white photo of Kim Jong-il in 1977 with rebel hair and dark glasses. What would be his Western role model then? Joe Strummer of The Clash? Would he be listening to White Riot?)

And then there's his fleet of over 20 cars, including American brands but most of all his now iconic black armored Mercedes S-600 with tinted windows, sometimes glimpsed in Pyongyang's boulevards (but not on this 2.16).

Whether or not he's the Dr Evil portrayed by Western corporate media, what is certain is that Kim Jong-il urgently has to sort out plenty of turbulence rattling the DPRK.

The house the Great Leader built

Close observation of Pyongyang reveals that the North Korean system may be now like an overlapping maze of Chinese boxes - some more elaborate than others, but all very circumscribed in trying to defeat the law of gravity and keep their relative privileges. The "law of gravity" in this case is an economy that's been in chronic crisis for the past two decades.

Kim Jong-il's official "military-first" policy means heavy weaponry benefits from 25% to 30% of North Korea's annual budget (well, the US shifts 19% of federal spending and 44% of tax revenues to the Pentagon; the Iraq and AfPak wars, both funded by borrowing from foreign powers, have cost each American family $25,000, according to Canadian media). But the crucial problem is that the army now has become more important than the Worker's Party, which in a socialist system spells certified disaster for the toiling, loyal masses. The party still regiments no less than over a third of the DPRK's adult population.

The massive bureaucracy has acquired a life of its own. The historically centralized, and bureaucratically planned, supply of goods and services by the state sometimes breaks down to a halt at the local level. There's a tremendous generation gap/shock between the old Korean War (1950-1953) revolutionaries and the baby boomers - the North Korean version.

The only Great Leader that North Korea ever had has been dead for almost 16 years - and the official narrative can be seen as a perpetual meditation/mourning of this loss. And there's one confrontation after another with the United States.

Kim Jong-il must think that North Korea definitely is not Somalia; this is a much more developed and modern economy. But what is it, exactly?

The house the Great Leader Kim Il-sung built from scratch could possibly be described as an ultra-nationalist, family values, Confucian corporate state. It is Confucian in its profound respect for the family and its respect for a supposedly enlightened, learned elite. Chu Hsi, the founder of neo-Confucianism during the Song Dynasty (960-1279) would arguably feel at home in the DPRK.

As for nationalism, it manifested himself, for instance, by the choice of a "pure" indigenous language, based on an alphabet invented by King Sejong in the early 15th century, and thus not contaminated by either English or Japanese.

But the most striking aspect of North Korea's official narrative is that no less than five millennia of very rich history are condensed and everything is telescoped to April 15, 1912, the birth date of Kim Il-sung ("the day of the Sun") and the ground zero of the juche (pronounced chuch'e) idea.

Juche was Kim Il-sung's indigenous remix of Marxism/Leninism/Stalinism inflected with heavy boosts of Confucianism and metaphysics. On face value, juche means "self-reliance" and independence, not only in ideology and politics but also in all matters economic. Juche was in action already in 1955, when the DPRK declared its independence from the USSR, and again in the mid-1960s, when it reaffirmed its independence from both the USSR and China. It was to a great extent by formalizing juche that Kim Il-sung was revered all over the developing world as one of the great 1950s icons of decolonization.

Bruce Cumings, arguably the best American scholar on North Korea, gets straight to the point: "The term is really untranslatable; the closer one gets to its meaning, the more the meaning slips away. For a foreigner its meaning is ever-receding, into a pool of everything that makes Koreans Korean, and therefore ultimately inaccessible to the non-Korean. Juche is the opaque core of North Korean national solipsism."

In his own book On the Juche Idea (1982), a perennial best-seller at the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il seems to break away from the DPRK's irredeemable solipsism to trace a surefire path for economic development. He writes that "heavy industry with the machine-building industry as its backbone is the pillar of an independent national economy". This in turn will "accelerate the development of light industry and agriculture", and it must be coupled with "solving the problem of food on one's own through successful farming".

In sum: "If one is to be economically self-sufficient and develop the economy on a safe basis and with a long-term perspective, one must depend on one's own raw materials and fuel sources."

Is it working? Not exactly. Kim Jong-il has roughly a little over two years to turn things around - amid insistent rumors about his health and his succession - and, in official terminology, "open the gate to a thriving nation in 2012", when there will be a massive national party to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Great Leader Kim Il-sung.

So no wonder in the end he had better things to do than show up for his own birthday party. But a few nagging questions remain. Considering his background and his tastes, does he ever feel like escaping from his own fortress? Does this certified recluse harbor the subversive thought of going to a mall somewhere in the West and watching a disaster movie in a cineplex, just like anybody else? Or ultimately would this movie buff - author of the quite decent On the Art of the Cinema (1973) - rather be the star in an alternative plot?

PYONGYANG JOURNAL Part 2:
☞ Happiness rolls over us like a wave
PYONGYANG JOURNAL Part 3:
☞ The last frontier of the Cold War

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Two days ago: to protest against the (Lunar) New Year's crackdown on (Nepali) migrant workers in Seoul's Dongdaemun district MTU, KCTU and some supporting groups held a press conference in front of Seodaemun Police Office:

Yesterday's (bourgeois) Korea Herald reported following:

Activists protest against abuse of migrant workers 

 
On Feb. 15, the last day of the Lunar New Year holidays, police officers and immigration authorities raided a Nepali restaurant in Dongdaemun, northern Seoul, where 30 migrant workers were having a community meeting.

The crackdown, according to the Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency, was aimed at breaking up an illegal gambling syndicate in the area. However, they could not find any evidence of gambling on the premises.

The officers divided the Nepali workers into two groups - one staying here legally and the other staying illegally - and arrested 10 illegal residents immediately.

Despite police denial, no related rules on immigrant crackdown were abided by during the whole procedure, migrant workers' groups said at a press conference yesterday.

"The police didn't follow the minimum rules such as informing them of their Miranda rights. Immigrant workers are one of the most vulnerable groups in Korea. We don't understand why the authorities treat them so harshly in the name of justice," said Rep. Lee Soo-ho of the minority Democratic Labor Party.

When the Korean authorities investigate migrant workers regardless of their legal status here, they must abide by a code of practices, which took effect in June last year. The guidelines are to be offered in 14 languages.

However, because the rules are an administrative order, not legally binding, migrant groups have pointed out that there is still the possibility of human rights abuses.

Under the rules, at least one female officer should join every crackdown in case of the arrest or body check of female foreigners.

However, no female officer accompanied the police squad when they arrested 10 Nepali workers, including one woman. Moreover, she was found later to be married to a Korean man and was released after three hours of false detention.

"Hypocrites," said Michel, president of the Migrants' Trade Union, who asked not to be fully named. Assisted by Korean activists, the group helps migrant workers on legal and abuse issues.

"You (the Korean government) spend millions if not billions on advertising on how Korea is a multicultural society. ... But your policies are aimed at using our labor to feed your economy. Our rights do not matter to you," he said.

It has been four years since the 39-year-old Filipino factory worker came to Korea.

Despite its highly-publicized campaign for multiculturalism, nothing has changed in the government's treatment of migrant workers, he said. "Rather, the situation has never been worse."

"Back then when I first came here, illegal workers also used to participate in our street marches. However, now, even those staying legally feel danger and fear about the government's repressive attitude," he said.

During the press conference held by some 20 activists in front of the Seodaemun Police Agency in central Seoul, scores of police officers were dispatched, with riot police buses blocking the participants from leaving the area.

"When an event for making rice-cake soup with migrant workers was held on one side, the police were cruelly clamping down on them on the other. It is just hypocrisy and barbarism," said a statement issued jointly by migrant workers' groups.

While no official comment came from the police, the groups submitted a complaint against the Gyeonggi Police, demanding an official apology as well as a thorough investigation into the crackdown.
 

http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/02/24/201002240046.asp

Related:

☞ 설 연휴 이주노동자 불법적 단속, 경찰청을 규탄한다! (기자회견문)
☞ 설 연휴 이주노동자 강제단속 경찰청 규탄 (KCTU, 2.23)

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Last Saturday(2.20) in front of Seoul Stn:

The representatives of five social-democratic parties - two "left"-wing (DLP and NPP) and three right-wing (DP, CKP and PPP - offshoots from the former ruling 'Yeollin Uri'-dang, led by Roh Moo-hyun) - and their entourage prepared for the collaboration...

Yeah, that's really a "democratic/progressive alternative" for S. Korea's future!!!(^^)

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I'm positive that the "Dear Leader" will really love the following f*cking great idea (published in today's Chosun Ilbo, probably Kim Jong-il's favorite S. Korean newspaper):

Kim Jong-il 'Could Be Indicted at Int'l Criminal Court'

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il could be hauled before the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity if South Korea and Japan can prove that North Korea abducted their citizens during a bizarre campaign in the 1970s and 80s to find trainers for spies.

Kwon O-gon, the vice president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, made the remarks at the first human rights and environment convention under the sponsorship of the Korean Bar Association in Cheongju, North Chungcheong Province on Monday.

"Under ICC rules of procedure and evidence, it's impossible for the court to investigate or indict North Korea on its own, because North Korea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute," Kwon said. "But South Korea and Japan can ask the ICC to place Kim on trial if they are determined, because crimes like abuse of South Korean POWs and abduction of South Korean and Japanese citizens took place within the territories of the two countries, which are signatories to the Rome Statue and are within ICC jurisdiction."

"Under the rules, the ICC can handle only crimes that have taken place since 2002, but it could be argued that the crimes are still in progress because the North has refused requests from South Korea and Japan to repatriate the abduction victims."

"Basically, the ICC handles individual criminal responsibility, so a mere allegation that a leader is feeding and clothing only himself while his people are starving doesn't necessarily incriminate him. In this case, there would have to be careful investigation of facts," Kwon said. "It's essential to present evidence that Kim Jong-il was aware of the criminal activities, and planned and gave orders himself to carry them out."

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/02/23/2010022300311.html

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Last Friday: the Defense Committee at the South Korean National Assembly approved the government’s plan to send troops to Afghanistan(*).

Only one day later (Saturday): the indescribable huge(^^) number of 300 people gathered in front of Seoul Stn. to protest against the plan to send troops to Afghanistan(**)...

Well, here an argumentation aid for the (possibly) ongoing struggle against the plan:
☞ Hamid Gul: Taliban is the future (al-Jazeera interview, 2.18)

* Related article:
☞ Korean troops one step closer to Afghanistan (JoongAng Ilbo, 2.20)

 
** Reports about the rally you can read here (VoP), here (OMN) and here (TiN).

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Two days ago The Hankyoreh reported following:

Independent film directors protest KOFIC decision..

 
Some 155 directors who signed a boycott statement(*) say they cannot allow their films to be screened in theaters to be managed by the KOFIC-appointed ADKF

Independent film directors are sharply criticizing the outcome of the selection process for the new managers of the independent film theater IndieSpace and MediACT Media Center programs. Some are saying that a biased selection process has resulted in a government push to hand management rights to pro-government groups.

A press conference for “One Hundred Independent Filmmakers Opposed to the Unfair Independent Film Theater Management Selection” took place Thursday afternoon at Neutinamu Hall in the basement of the People’s Solidarity for a Participatory Democracy (PSPD) headquarters in the Tongin neighborhood of Seoul’s Jongno district. The eight directors in attendance included Lee Chung-ryul, whose film “Old Partner” set a monumental box office record by drawing three million viewers last year, and Yang Ik-june, whose “Breathless” elevated the standing of Korean independent film as it swept through acclaimed world film festivals. Some 155 independent directors signed a boycott statement saying that they could not allow their films to be screened at IndieSpace, a theater now managed by the Association for Diversity in Korean Film (ADKF), which was selected through the recent screening to manage the independent film theater program.

Lee said, “I came here not because my views or ideas differ from those of the current administration or the Korean Film Council, but simply because I feel that there has been a recent string of events that I cannot understand in common sense terms.” Lee also noted that last-place finishers in the first selection process for the independent film theater and MediACT project managers came in first in the second selection process. Lee added, “This is not suited to the Lee Myung-bak administration and its talk about efficiency.” Lee said the developing situation is “like watching some low comedy.”

Yang said, “Over the decade of my involvement in independent film, I have been learning bit by bit what independent film is.” However, he commented that the people selected to manage the programs “are people I do not know at all, and I have no way of knowing how they intend to run the independent film theater program or MediACT.”

Yang added, “It is ironic that creators, who should be encountering viewers through their films, instead show their faces before the media like this; it shows how constricted the windpipe of our culture is.” Yang said that current administration “is making someone like me, who did not even know what ruling and opposition parties were, read up on society.”

IndieSpace, the independent film theater program and MediACT are projects that were proposed to the government by the Association of Korean Independent Film and Video (KIFV) after more than a decade of preparation and discussions. Until last year, the projects were entrusted to the KIFV by the Korean Film Council (KOFIC). However, in 2009 KOFIC announced that it was switching to a competitive selection system, and after failing to be selected as project managers during the first competition, ADKF and the Institute for Citizen Visual Culture (ICVC), were selected respectively to operate IndieSpace and MediACT during the second competitive selection process in January.
 

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_entertainment/405579.html

Related editorial in The Hankyoreh(2.20):
☞ KOFIC should reconduct selection of MediACT management

* The list of the 155 initial signers: 

강미자(푸른 강은 흘러라) / 경순(쇼킹패밀리) / 고은기(내 사랑 유리에) / 공미연(전장에서 나는) / 구자환(우공이산) /권우정(땅의 여자) / 권효(원웨이 티켓) / 김경만(바보는 감기에 걸리지 않는다) / 김경묵(청계천의 개) / 김곡(고갈) / 김동명(이상한 나라의 바툼바) / 김동령(아메리칸 엘리) / 김동원(송환) / 김명준(우리 학교) / 김미례(외박) / 김선(자가당착) / 김성균(기타이야기) / 김숙현(모던한 쥐선생과의 대화) / 김영남(내 청춘에게 고함) / 김영근(산책가) / 김예영(산책가) / 김유리(뭐 때문에 살아) / 김은경(뉴스페이퍼맨: 어느 신문지국장의 죽음) / 김은민(내 청춘을 돌려다오) / 김이찬(동행) / 김일란(3xFTM) / 김일안(피바랜 광주) / 김조광수(친구사이?) / 김종관(Down Down FTA!) / 김준호(길) / 김주현(그날 이후) / 김지곤(오후 세 시) / 김지현(앞산전) / 김지현(고양이들) / 김진열(진옥언니, 학교 가다) / 김태진() /김태일(안녕 사요나라) / 김현성(흩날리는 것들) / 김형남(외가) / 김홍완(기차역에서) / 김환태(국경은 없다) / 김효정(춤추는 동물원) / 김희철(진실의 문) / 나루(돌 속에 갇힌 말) / 나비(개청춘) / 남다정(아이들은 잠시 외출했을 뿐이다) / 남태제(학교) / 란희(쉼터를 만나다) / 류미례(엄마…) / 류형기(너와 나의 이십일 세기) / 문정현(할매꽃) / 민동현(지우개 따먹기) / 민용근(도둑소년) / 민환기(소규모아카시아밴드이야기) / 박경태(나와 부엉이) / 박동훈(계몽영화) / 박성용(춤추는 동물원) / 박소현(우리 학교) / 박수정(다시, 삶으로) / 박은영(토굴 속의 아이) / 박인희(청춘예찬) / 박정숙(동백아가씨) / 박종필(거리에서) / 박준영(허웅이야기) / 박지완(여고생이다) / 박홍열(이것은 다큐멘터리가 아니다) / 박홍준(소년마부) / 백승기(출동 사십삼 호) / 백승빈(장례식의 멤버) / 백현진(디 엔드) / 변해원(철탑, 2008년 2월25일 박현상씨) / 부지영(지금, 이대로가 좋아요) / 서동일(핑크팰리스) / 서재경(외출) / 선우문영() / 성충경(출동 사십삼 호) / 소상민(나는 곤경에 처했다) / 소준문(올드랭사인) / 손경화(개청춘) / 손광주(단속평형) / 손영(잊지 않을 거야) / 손영성(약탈자들) / 송해나(환심) / 신이수(구보씨일보) / 신동일(반두비) / 안슬기(지구에서 사는 법) / 양익준(똥파리) / 양해훈(저수지에서 건진 치타) / 언저리(그의 자연) / 연상호(사랑은 단백질) / 오건영(에필로그) / 오영필(서쪽나라) / 유동종(간이역) / 윤강로(가지 않는, 모든 것들) / 윤성호(은하해방전선) / 윤영호(바이칼) / 윤지석(스위치) / 이강길(살기 위하여) / 이강현(파산의 기술) / 이걸기(시합) / 이경원(경북 문경으로 시작하는 짧은 주소) / 이란희(파마) / 이마리오(주민등록증을 찢어라!) / 이성강(살결) / 이송희일(탈주) / 이숙경(어떤 개인 날) / 이승영(여기보다 어딘가에) /이영(OUT: 이반검열 두 번째 이야기) / 이용배(사랑을 찾아서) / 이우정(개를 키워봐서 알아요) / 이유림(새끼여우) / 이재수(새만금 네가 아프니 나도 아프다) / 이정아(남의 속도 모르고) / 이종필(불을 지펴라) / 이지상(몽실언니) / 이지연(김문정) / 이진필(알고 싶지 않은) / 이충렬(워낭소리) / 이현정(192-399: 더불어사는집이야기) / 이혜란(우리들은 정의파다) / 임덕윤(조금 불편한 그다지 불행하지 않은 0.24) / 임창재(바람의 노래) / 임춘민(평촌의 언니들) / 임호경(Act of life) / 장건재(회오리바람) / 장세경(누구세요) / 장은주(교미기2. 비밀스런 짐승) / 장형윤(무림일검의 사생활) / 장훈(불한당들) / 전경진(학교이야기) / 정경록(고기도시) / 정미나(불안의 최전방) / 정병길(우린 액션배우다) / 정재훈(호수길) / 정지연(봄에 피어나다) / 정창영(경계에 선 인생) / 조대흠() / 조세영(버라이어티 생존토크쇼) / 조재형(그 날) / 주현숙(계속된다: 미등록 이주노동자 기록되다) / 지민(개청춘) / 지윤정(Page_214) / 진소영() / 채기(빛나는 거짓) / 최신춘(알바당선언) / 최영태(스크린플레이) / 최창환(호명인생) / 태소정(더 밴드) / 태준식(샘터분식) / 한영희(레즈비언 정치도전기) / 한범승(가리봉 오거리) / 홍지유(레즈비언 정치도전기) / 홍형숙(경계도시2) / 황윤(어느 날 그 길에서) / 황철민(양 한 마리, 양 두 마리)

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The Migrants' Trade Union(MTU) published two days ago following info/protest:

We blame the police's crackdown on LunarNewYear

Report on Crackdown in Dongdaemun

Place : FEWA Restaurant, Dongdaemun

Time : around 12:00 nn, Feb 15th

· There was a meeting of a Nepal political community named UML(*).

· There were around 40 Nepali people inside the restaurant and they were about to have a meeting.

· There were two assumed immigration officers who initially came in with video cameras.

· They announced that they are allowed by law to conduct all actions that they were doing and will do.

· They were vague in introducing whether they were from the immigration or police so were the warrant statements they announced.

· The announcement was read in Nepali with written notes in Nepali and the Korean equivalent guide in pronunciation.

· They demanded everyone to not take any videos or make calls.

In the span of one hour or more they did the following actions:

· They asked for everyone’s ID.

· They took the camera of the Nepali participant in the meeting who was taking the video of the entire event.

· They deleted all the files of the said Nepali camera man who was recording the arrest proceedings.

· In the course of this raid they took documents from the restaurant owner.

· They arrested 10 people and handcuffed them in pairs. Including a woman without identification papers.

· The woman’s legal residency was verified on the immigration bus and was released after a few hours.

· The arrested workers were directly driven to the Yangju immigration office/detention center.

· Among the 10 people arrested, five are MTU members including our MTU North Branch general secretary, the UML president and other Nepal community/organization leaders.

· Of the 9 migrants who are now detained, 5 of them are known leaders in their community including MTU, three members from MTU and UML, one remains unidentified.

· A team of 15 immigration officers and police raided FEWA restaurant and the responsible/primary arresting agency was not determined initially.

 
The witnesses are assuming that the crackdown was probably reported by opposing political factions or they were relating it to the fight that ensued the night before. MTU inquired about this situation calling police stations where the presumed fight was under jurisdiction. There was no complaint or police blotter relating to a fight filed in the police stations in Hyehwa-dong or Dongdaemun. Afterwards, we called the Yangju immigration office to confront them about their illegal crackdown operation during the Chinese New Year season. They in turn denied responsibility in initiating the crackdown operation in Dongdaemun. They also claimed that the arrested people were merely turned over to them and claimed they had no way of knowing who or which agency turned them over. By this time we have already reported the incident to several news reporters who were able to squeeze out the information from the Yangju immigration/detention center after doing their own investigations and inquiries.

 
Early the following day, we came to learn that the operation was done by both the Gyeonggi police and Incheon airport immigration. The Gyeonggi police denied that it was them who led the operation and stated that Incheon airport immigration asked for their assistance. When the Incheon airport immigration was asked in turn, they claimed that it was the Gyeonggi police agency that asked for their assistance. Finally, after several hours and under much interrogation, the Gyeonggi police agency admitted that they were doing an investigation on the so called "illegal gambling operations" in the vicinity. They asked the Incheon airport immigration for assistance in their operation claiming that they needed assistance from the immigration because they needed to check the ID's and that they are ignorant of the rules for foreigners.

 
On the same day, February 16, we went to the immigration/detention center in Yangju and interviewed the detained migrant workers. During our initial application we were briefly interviewed by the immigration officer who appeared surprised to learn that there was a crackdown operation. Through our research, inquiries and information we received, we were able to establish the following facts:

 
1. The police and immigration did not provide adequate introductions.

2. Both immigration and police officers (15 people) were in civilian clothes.

3. They failed to clearly announce the objectives of the raid despite of the warrant.

4. The warrant they presented was merely for search of evidences and identification and not for arrest.

5. The warrant was issued by a certain judge in Uijeongbu.

6. The warrant was issued under premises and conditions that were unclear.

7. There were clearly no list of names of suspects for any criminal activity nor was there any commission of a crime.

8.  It was not clear whether the arresting officers were the police or the immigration.

9. The police claimed that they did the raid/search in the course of an investigation against reports of gambling sessions in the area.

10. There was a community meeting and no such gambling session or any other criminal activity.

11. There was also no mission order from the immigration in doing a crackdown in the said restaurant.

12. The immigration played as the supporting agency in the crackdown.

13. There is an established separation of functions between the police and the court, and the immigration.

 
Conclusion:

A police arrest can only be done with a proper warrant or when suspects are in the act of commissioning a crime. The fact that they read out the declaration in the foreigners native tongue as stated in the condition on the Korean Criminal Procedure Law suggest that their ignorance of the law is unfounded and they have separate but established protocols in the arrest of foreigners who committed or are committing (a) crime/s. If they were indeed ignorant of the law, these operations should have never been done in the first place without ensuring that proper protocols are established. There is also a question as to what motivation did the court have in issuing the warrant, and its' exact contents. Clearly it shows that the arrest was illegal in the way that it was carried out. It is questionable on how the court would allow the police agency on conducting the raid and checking of the migrants' immigration status without compelling circumstances that would warrant such action. Clearly this is a blatant disregard for the law and its' protocol as well as the blurring of the lines between the function of the immigration and police. 

 
After the police finally admitted that they were the primary initiator which led to the crackdown in Dongdaemun, we have also established the fact that the Gyeonggi police officials are liars when they denied their role in the operation. They have consistently changed their statement in trying to cover up their illegal arrests. The immigration official in Yangju also called up the MTU vice-general secretary and stated that the Gyeonggi police was also conducting an investigation on the alleged "violence or fight" between Nepalese individuals in the night of February 14. The "fight" was not even existent as far as the police stations in Hyehwa and Dongdaemun are concerned. While actual arrest of migrants doing such "illegal activities" may give them a sense of justification for forming the task-force against the migrant workers. It should also be noted that even among the Korean society, small bets or gambling and slight altercation among friends or peers could hardly be considered a crime.

 
If the police were conducting a criminal investigation they would not have needed the presence of the immigration officers. They should have stated their reason for inquiry/investigation, they could only ask for identification to establish identity, invite them for questioning then release them. Since there was no crime being committed there is no justification for the arrest. The migrants should have also been advised of their rights to ask for the assistance of lawyers in case of an arrest. The immigration detention center is not the proper institution that should hold suspected criminal elements.

 
If it was an immigration crackdown operation. They had no right to invade a tax-paying establishment unless they have a warrant to do so. As usual, there was no detention order, they were not in uniform, they did not give proper introductions, there was no account of a female immigration officer that handled the arrest of the Nepali woman in the restaurant. The establishment owner was not informed nor was asked for permission.

 
The arrested migrants were deprived of their human rights and legal rights and were targeted for being organized. It is also our conclusion that the raid was intended to further reinforce their propaganda of criminalizing the migrant workers. Accounting for the huge possibility of failure in their purpose, they made sure that undocumented migrant workers would be arrested by conniving with the Incheon airport immigration.

 
The facts and incidences of this matter only gave rise to more questions from this incidence.

1. Is the police now being mobilized to do crackdowns?

2. If they were, are there any legal provisions in the Korean Law that upholds these actions?

3. Will this incident be a precedent of the introduction of future laws or actions to empower the police force in questioning migrants if we have documentation and arrest us if we don't?

 
Korean Multiculturalism is a fallacy!

MTU
2010.2.16

http://migrant.nodong.net/?document_srl=26599#0

* Certainly the 'Communist' Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninst), in Nepal popularly known as "UML"... Despite its strange name just a (left) social-democratic party, currently the leading force, beside the reactionary Congress Party, in the Nepali gov't.

Related article:
☞ Immigration Makes New Year Raid on Nepalis (K. Times, 2.18)