159개의 게시물을 찾았습니다.
"Outbreak of war in Korea is now just a matter of time. Nothing can prevent war from breaking out. When all our guns go off and missiles fly through the air, the whole of south Korea will be burned to ashes..." (Editorial in today's Rodong Shinmun)
But thankfully some forces - at least in S. Korea - are preferring PEACE on the peninsula:
Y'day evening: Citizen's Peace/Anti-war Rally in Ansan
Last Sunday's Korea Times published the following piece, written by A. Lankov:
Libya and North Korea
So the military operation in Libya continues. Its eventual outcome is not quite clear, but the prognosis is not good for the regime in Tripoli. However, it is already clear that the developments in Libya are likely to influence the current situation on the Korean Peninsula, where tensions between the North and South have been remarkably high in the last few years.
It seems that in Korea the impact of the international intervention in Libya will produce results that at first glance might appear to be contradictory. In one regard it is likely to make the North Korean government more confrontational while in other ways will probably make it more cautious.
Kim Jong-il right now may feel very happy about his wisdom which he demonstrated by stubbornly rejecting denuclearization proposals. Colonel Gadhafi in 2003 did exactly what Kim said he would never do ― Gadhafi agreed to swap his nuclear weapons program for better relations with the West and economic rewards. As we see, it did not help the eccentric strongman. Once his subjects rose in rebellion, the West intervened and chose its military might to assist the rebels.
In private conversations, North Korean officials often say: ``Had Sadam had nukes he would still be in his palace right now.” From now on, they probably will add: ``And had Gadhafi not surrendered his nukes, nobody would have intervened when he was exterminating the rebels.”
But what is the likely overall impact of such thinking on the North Korean actions? If anything, it increases the already high probability of another nuclear test and/or missile launch. The preparations for such undertakings have been underway for some time. Now, North Korean leaders might believe that this is a good time to show off their steadily growing nuclear and missile capabilities. This is a way to send a message to the Obama administration, and the message will read like this: ``Mr. President, we are dangerous and its better not to get involved with us even if we do something which is not to your or anybody’s liking”.
At the same time, it’s now less likely that North Korea will attempt a major provocation aimed at South Korea. Until recently, one could be almost certain that in the near future (in April or May, perhaps), the North would repeat what they did with frigate Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. Now they will probably think twice before making another attack.
While the attacks on Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island are usually described as ``provocations” this is essentially a misnomer. ``Provocation” describes an act whose goal is to elicit an irrational and/or excessive reaction from the target of the incident. It was clearly not the case with the Cheonan or Yeonpyeong attack. The North attacked under the assumption that the South would not react in a meaningful way and would be incapable of inflicting any serious damage on assets valuable to the North Korean leadership (the lives of rank-and-file soldiers do not belong to this category).
North Koreans are aware that currently the South Korean public and government are in an unusually bellicose mood. They therefore expect a massive retaliation to follow in the event of another attack. Until recently the North Korean leadership probably anticipated that the South Korean retaliation would be limited, since neither the South nor its major ally, the United States, would do anything which might lead to an escalation of an exchange of fire on the border to a full scale war.
Therefore from Pyongyang’s point of view, another military operation made perfect sense. It would be a good way to demonstrate that North Korea is not going to be quiet when ignored. They wanted to show that for Seoul and Washington, it’s essentially cheaper to pay some protection money to Pyongyang (in the shape of aid and concessions) than to deal with the ever-present possibility of a North Korean attack and related sense of tensions and instability.
However, the recent developments in Libya might have changed the equation ― for a while, at least. Libya shows that under certain circumstances the U.S. and its major allies may indeed choose to launch a large-scale military operation. The assumption that Seoul and Washington will avoid escalation seems still to be true, but Pyongyang may have started to have grave doubts about this.
So it is quite possible that the coming spring will be quieter than the present author (and many of his colleagues) have until recently expected. This does not mean that North Korea has turned into a pacifist state, but from the vantage point of Pyongyang it makes sense to postpone their operations against the South and wait for the dust to settle. And of course, by being quiet for a while they can save resources which will be needed to better prepare the next missile launch and next nuclear test.
☞ Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces US Military Attack on Libya (KCNA, 3.22)
☞ Libya's Lesson for North Korea (K. Times, 2008.9.11)
☞ Will North Korea Follow Libya's Lead? (FPIF, 2004.4.14)
The S. Korean PeaceNetwork published last week the following "analysis":
'A butterfly effect' of Libya and North Korea
“When the North collapses _ and one day it will, of course _ we’re going to face a problem that we’ve been spared in Libya. You have to bet that the (North Korean) leadership is going to threaten to use its weapons to stay in power. Even if they are bluffing, it’s going to change the entire strategy.”
This is a remark made by a high-ranking official of the Lee Myung-bak administration during an interview with the New York Times on March, 1. “While South Korea is dropping leaflets in North Korea alerting its population to the uprisings in the Middle East, senior South Korean officials acknowledged in interviews last week that should North Korea face a similar uprising, it could use the threat to unleash its arsenal _ which includes six to a dozen nuclear weapons by most estimates _ in an effort to keep neighboring countries from encouraging the government’s ouster” said the official on the condition of anonymity.
This analysis carries a significant implication about current and future situation of the Korean peninsula. Those who have been hawkish toward the North around the Lee Myung-bak administration seem to hope that “butterfly effect of Libya” spreads over North Korea, regarding “North Korea’s sudden change” such as, they classify, death of Kim Jong-il or a large-scale civil uprising as a great opportunity for “Absorbing Unification” (Unification through absorbing North Korea). In the same vein lies the reason why even military authorities and some members of the Grand National Party (the ruling party of the South) all are eager to distribute the leaflets. Moreover, Joint South Korea and the U.S. Military Exercise which began last 28th February is also focusing on making provision for this sudden change of the North.
As emerges this preparation for sudden change of the North in Seoul and Washington, an opposition of Pyongyang is also escalating. It reacted against the discourse by mentioning “a deluge of fire of Seoul” and “a nuclear disaster”. In particular, there increases the possibility that Pyongyang will cling to its nuclear as it faces the turmoil in Libya and Seoul and Washington’s preparation for North Korea’s sudden change. This is because the North Korean authorities, witnessing Qaddafi’s exposure to external military intervention especially by the U.S. and the U.K. after Qaddafi gave up nuclear weapons and missiles, will be convinced of its faith that “they need one decisive blow”.
A Libyan Model and North Korea
December, 2003, the Qaddafi’s administration, with arbitration of the U.K., signed up an agreement with the U.S. Under the terms of the agreement, Qaddafi contributed himself to abandoning weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the U.S also has lifted economic sanctions and normalized relation with Libya. Believing that so called “Iraq Effect” (an effect that one must meet the U.S.’ attack if it does not voluntarily abandon WMD) brought Libya’s abandonment of WMD, the Bush administration was so encouraged by the agreement and insisted that North Korea and Iran need to follow the “Libyan Model”. However, North Korea and Iran, who were pointed as an axis of evil by Bush, interpreted this as a U.S.’ gesture for “regime change” and rather accelerated development of nuclear capabilities.
Now, the United States, who once referred to the Qaddafi’s administration as the epitome of non-proliferation, struggles to dethrone Qaddafi by all means available. Following economic sanctions such as freezing assets of family of Qaddafi’s, the U.S. is even considering military intervention including No-flight zone and forward deployment of Navy and Air force. While doing so, it sighed with relief given that it successfully had a deal to remove WMD with Qaddafi in 2003. Affirming that there is no question Qaddafi would have used whatever he felt necessary to stay in power including WMD had it failed to remove them, the U.S. believes that the worst nightmare possible had been prevented through the 2003 agreement.
At this point, we can figure out why the U.S. is so enthusiastic in hindering its adversary countries from possessing nuclear weapons and missiles. When the U.S. feels necessity of military intervention, the prime strategic consideration is whether or not the countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. On the other hand, it also explains why Pyongyang and Tehran, who are being first targeted even by the Obama administration, keep attempting to possess them.
Reinforcing this analysis, New York Times reported that “the message of the Libyan experience to other countries under pressure to give up their arsenals may not be the one Washington intends” and also reported that “Iran and North Korea, who have often been urged by the West to follow Libya’s example, may conclude that Colonel Qaddafi made a fatal error.” The “fatal error” in this context refers to Qaddafi’s abandonment of WMD.
Policy toward North Korea should not lose prime goal
As most North Korea experts pointed, there is very little likelihood that a large-scale civil uprising will occur in the North as did in the Middle East. Thus, being focused are sudden political changes such as death of Kim Jong-il and social unrest caused by consecutive power succession through three generations. However, a civil uprising for democratization and instability of regime are totally different. For international society, humanitarian interventions are relatively easy in the case of Libya where massive citizens rise for democracy under the threat of massacre by Qaddafi regime. However, should external military forces intervene due to potential political unrest caused by such a thing as death of Kim Jong-il, it is clearly violation of international law and able to trigger another disaster like a total war.
What is the most worrisome situation on the Korean peninsula is a meet of the two sides; first, conservative camps of South Korea and the U.S. which seem to regard democracy wave in the Middle East as an opportunity to overthrow “Dictator Kim Jong-il regime” and second, “Nuclear Deification” of North Korean leaderships wishing to dispel the suspicion and to prevent external military intervention by reinforcing “nuclear deterrent.” When these two movements converges, forming vicious circle, chances are there will be decadence of South Korean democracy and increased probability of the second Korean War, not a democratization of the North or Absorbing Unification.
In short, what is significant at this point is to clear up the principal goals in North Korean policies which have been missing since the Lee Myung-Bak administration. Prevention of Korean War is the priority of the priorities. Thus, not only deterrence of Pyongyang’s provocation but also restraint of behaviors provoking Pyongyang are now necessity. Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula also became more important. In order to achieve this denuclearization, required is not a unilateral nuclear abandonment of the North, but corresponding measures such as lifting economic sanctions and building peace system. In addition, what is also needed for stabilization of the peninsula is a special effort for restoration of the relationship of the two Koreas.
It is obvious that these principal goals in policies toward North Korea are incompatible with the current effort to trigger sudden change of the North. Therefore, the Lee Myung-bak administration’s idle and incompetent North Korean policies assuming that “the North will collapse someday” and doing nothing other than promoting the collapse need to be changed urgently.
While since last Sat. the so-called "int'l community" is busy with "Tomahawking" Libya, Pyongyang (as usual) must always butt in:
A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA Tuesday as regards the U.S. military attack on Libya:
The U.S. launched a military attack on Libya in collusion with some Western countries on March 19.
It openly interfered in the internal affairs of Libya, sparking off a civil war, and then cooked up a deceptive resolution by abusing the authority of the UN Security Council. It finally perpetrated indiscriminate armed intervention in the country, going beyond the limits of the resolution.
The DPRK strongly denounces this as a wanton violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent state and a hideous crime against humanity in gross breach of the dignity of the Libyan people and their right to existence.
Such war action can never be justified and should be halted at once.
The world is witnessing almost everyday the miserable death of a great many peaceable citizens and unspeakable disasters caused by two wars launched by the U.S. in the new century.
Not content with this, the U.S. sparked a fresh war disaster in order to bring about a regime change in the country incurring its displeasure under the spurious signboard of "protecting civilians" and put the natural resources of Libya under its control.
The U.S. does not hesitate to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and launch armed invasion by abusing the UN name in disregard of the sovereignty of independent states. Such high-handed and arbitrary practices of the U.S. have become a root cause of harassing world peace and stability at present.
The present Libyan crisis teaches the international community a serious lesson.
It was fully exposed before the world that "Libya's nuclear dismantlement" much touted by the U.S. in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former with such sweet words as "guarantee of security" and "improvement of relations" to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force.
It proved once again the truth of history that peace can be preserved only when one builds up one's own strength as long as high-handed and arbitrary practices go on in the world.
The DPRK was quite just when it took the path of Songun and the military capacity for self-defence built up in this course serves as a very valuable deterrent for averting a war and defending peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Since the start of the year, North Korea has been mounting a kind of peace offensive. But despite Pyongyang's (ongoing) "charm offensive", A. Lankov (one of the most prestigious experts on N. Korea) is very pessimistic about a coming inter-Korean "peace process" in 2011, as you can learn from his following article (published in Asia Times, 1.11):
Push could soon turn to shove
2010 was a hard and dangerous year in Korea. Alas, 2011 might become even worse.
At first glance, this statement might appear excessively pessimistic. After all, in the last weeks the tensions on the Korean Peninsula were decreasing, North Korea suggested negotiations, and South Korea also said that talks might be a good idea.
However, the appearances are misleading. If one has a better look at the recent crisis, as well as at the current mood in Seoul and Pyongyang, there is little ground for optimism. It seems that both
North Korean strategic calculations and South Korean assumptions about ways to handle its uneasy neighbor will bring the crisis back - and with a vengeance.
What we have seen throughout the last year was another exercise in the habitual North Korean brinkmanship – yet another attempt to apply tactics which have been used many times and usually with great success.
When North Korean strategists want to squeeze some aid or political concessions from other side, they follow a simple but efficient routine. First, Pyongyang manufactures a crisis, and does everything to drive tensions high. The missiles are launched, islands are shelled or nukes are tested, while the usual verbal bellicosity of the North Korean media reaches almost comical heights. Sooner or later both the "target audience" and international community begin to feel uneasy, and when this point is reached Pyongyang suggests negotiations. Its neighbors and adversaries alike feel relief and start talks, which usually end with Pyongyang getting what it wants - in exchange for restoring the status quo.
In the past, this tactic has worked well (for example, this is how in 2007 North Koreans managed to push the George W Bush administration to switch to a soft line and resume aid). However, this time things are different. So far, North Korea is not getting what it wants.
But what does the North want to achieve with this seemingly dangerous (but actually very calculated) military/political theater? As usually is the case with Pyongyang's foreign policy, it is about money. In 2008 South Korea and United States dramatically reduced the amount of unilateral and unconditional aid to the North.
It had to turn to China instead. China obliged, and it seems that the North Korean economy - while still very poor by current East Asian standards - is in better shape than at any time since the early 1990s (albeit this modest recovery seems to be, first and foremost, brought about by domestic transformation rather than by Chinese aid). However, this made North Korean leaders excessively dependent on China, whom they do not like and whom they do not trust (this seems to be a mutual feeling).
So, they want the US and South Korean aid back. First, it will increase the size of the entire aid pie, controlled and distributed by the regime. Second, it will provide Pyongyang with ample opportunities to distance itself from dangerous China, and acquire a number of sponsors whose contradictions can be used to North Korea's advantage. The North Korean diplomats are very good at this game, which they learned in the 1960s when they exploited the Sino-Soviet schism with remarkable success.
The North decided that this was a time to exercise pressure on both Seoul and Washington (actually, this is what it has been doing since 2008). It is not often noticed that North Korea actually conducts two separate, if related, blackmail programs - one aimed at the US and another aimed at South Korea. The ways of exercising pressure should be different, because the concerns of these two countries are dissimilar.
In the case of South Korea, the North decided to take advantage of Seoul's dependence on the international markets. Foreign investors and trade partners of South Korean firms are not going to be amused by the newspaper headlines which talk a war "which is going to erupt on the Korean Peninsula".
These tensions are likely to have a negative impact on the South Korean economy, making the South Korean voter worse off. On top of that, the average South Korean voter does not usually care too much about North Korea, but still expects its government to be capable at handling the North, in order to avoid major confrontations. Therefore, the North Korean leadership expects that sooner or later South Korean voters will penalize an excessively stubborn government by supporting the opposition.
To the US, the North's selling point is its ability to proliferate. Since for the Americans the major (almost only) reason they care about North Korea is its potential for nuclear and missile proliferation, the North Korean regime demonstrated to Washington that even without aid and in spite of the international sanctions, North Korean engineers and scientists managed to make considerable progress in areas of military significance.
In mid-November, just before the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, a group of American nuclear scientists led by Dr Siegfried Hecker from Stanford, was shown a state-of-the-art uranium-enrichment facility whose scale and sophistication exceeded what the US experts believed to be possible. This is a major step towards a full-scale military uranium program, which is, incidentally, more difficult to control than the old plutonium program.
Now, after a few months of tension building, the North Koreans decided to test the ground and check whether the adversaries (and potential donors) are ready to give in. Frankly, Pyongyang's decision seems to be surprising, since the answer is obvious: neither Washington nor Seoul is ready to make concessions.
Why didn't the old tactics succeed this time? In short, because the attitudes in both Washington and Seoul changed in recent years.
Talking about the US side, the main reason why Washington was in past willing to give concessions and unilateral aid, was the once widespread (albeit unfounded and na๏ve) belief that this was a way to facilitate the denuclearization of North Korea. It was assumed that Pyongyang could be persuaded/bribed/pressed into surrendering its nuclear program. This belief evaporated in 2008, after the second nuclear test.
American policymakers have finally realized that North Korea is not going to surrender its nukes under any circumstances. North Korean leaders are ready to talk about arms control, not about disarmament. In other words, North Korean leaders hope to get paid (generously) for freezing their nuclear program while still keeping the existent nuclear devices. The US is not ready to discuss this yet.
With South Korea, the situation is more complicated. The Lee Myung-bak government was in favor of a hard line from the very beginning. After the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling, the South Korean public, usually cautious when it comes to matters of peace and war, switched to support of the hard line.
In a poll in late November, some 80% of participants said they were in favor of a massive military retaliation in the case of the next North Korean attack (and a considerable minority even said that they did not mind a war). This unusual bellicosity of the public, reinforced by the even harder position of the military, puts additional pressure on the government.
Paradoxically, the events (or rather non-events) of early December contributed towards Seoul's shift to a hard line. Then, soon after the Yeonpyeong shelling of November 23, the South Korean military staged large drills in the disputed waters near the North Korean coast. Before the exercises, the North Koreans threatened a mighty counterstrike, but when Seoul decided to go ahead on December 20, nothing happened.
North Korea's decision not to execute its threats was seen as a sign of weakness. A triumphant South Korean official said in a private conversation: "They are with their tail between their legs now. This is what we should have done from the very beginning."
Therefore, the dominant view in Seoul now is that if North Korean leaders know that their new strikes will be met with a mighty response, Pyongyang will not dare to stage another attack. So, Seoul politicians believe that harshness is the best option, since North Korean leaders will surely duck a fight.
This seems to be an illusion - and, perhaps, a dangerous one. Like it or not, there is no valid reason why Pyongyang strategists should be afraid of a Southern counterstrike. It is true that North Korea does not want a full-scale war, but due to the peculiarities of its political system North Korea can sustain a minor military confrontation far more easily than its southern counterpart - or, to be more precise, in the case of such a confrontation the domestic consequences for the North Korean government will be far less serious.
Needless to say, even if a South Korean counterstrike kills many hundreds of North Korean soldiers or sailors, the leaders will not feel too sorry of them (and children of the leaders do not serve in the North Korean military). The loss of a few pieces of rusty military equipment of 1960s vintage will not upset them too much, either.
It is sometimes stated that an efficient counterstrike will at least lead to a loss of face for the North Korean leadership, and that fear of such humiliation could serve as a deterrent against future attacks. Unfortunately this seems to be wishful thinking as well. The North Korean government is in full control of the media, so such a defeat will remain unknown to almost everyone outside the military elite.
If this is the case, why did the North avoid a fight in December, after so many threats and bellicose statements? Because there is no reason why it should agree to fight at the time and place chosen by its adversaries, when these adversaries were ready to strike back. It makes much more sense to wait for a while and then deliver a sudden and powerful strike when the North Korean political leadership decides that the time is ripe.
It seems that we are not going to wait for long. Recent events leave little doubt that the North Korean charm offensive will be ignored by Seoul (and, perhaps, by Washington as well, even though signals are slightly mixed). The first sign of this position became visible on January 6 when the US and South Korea rejected North Korea's call for unconditional talks with South Korea as "insincere" and repeated their usual set of demands, which are, alas, clearly unacceptable for the North Koreans.
The North Korean leaders will probably do what they did before in similar situations: they will stage a provocation or two in order to increase pressure on the stubborn Americans and South Koreans, in hope that sooner or later they will give in. After all, contrary to what Seoul wants to believe, the associated political risks for the North Korean elite are small and rewards in case of eventual success are significant.
This coming round of military/diplomatic might be more dangerous than usual, largely because of Seoul's newly acquired belief in the power of counterstrikes. Now it seems likely that in case of another North Korean strike the South will retaliate mightily. This counterstrike is likely to trigger a counter-counterstrike, and there is even a probability (albeit very minor) that such an exchange will escalate into a real war or at least some intense fighting.
Far more likely, though, is that the situation will remain under control. In this case, the excessive reaction by the South Koreans is likely to amplify the message their North Korean adversaries want to deliver.
North Korean strategists want to damage the South Korean economy as well as create domestic tension, which will eventually turn the South Korean public against the current South Korean government and its North Korean policy. However, if such an exchange of fire happens we can be certain that the international media will not be merely writing about a "war that is about to start in Korea" but rather will declare that a "war started in Korea". The impact of such reports on the world markets and, eventually, on the South Korean economy is easy to predict.
The South Korean government should not be misled by the current bellicose mood of the voters. This mood is not likely survive a major confrontation, and once the situation becomes really tough, the same people who now cry for revenge are likely to start blaming the government for its inability to maintain a stable and secure situation on the peninsula.
Alas, not much can be done now. The North is likely to follow the usual line of a professional (and usually successful) blackmailer: since pressure has not worked, even greater pressure should be applied. The South, confident in the power of deterrence, is likely to over-react, thus further aggravating the situation and increasing the scale of the next crisis.
Well, it seems that the year 2011 will not be especially tranquil in Korea. And the subsequent few years might be even worse.
At least the "war of words" between S. and N. Korea is continuing...
And y'day it was - once again - MB's turn to give proof that he's a "trigger-happy agitator", according to the following Yonhap(via K. Herald) news report:
Lee says S. Korea not afraid of war with North Korea
President Lee Myung-bak said Monday that South Koreans should not fear war with North Korea although his government is eager to keep peace on the peninsula.
“If (we) are afraid of war, we can never prevent war,” Lee said in his biweekly radio address, the last of this year.
His remarks represent Seoul’s firm stance to deal resolutely with the communist neighbor’s provocations down the road.
The conservative Lee administration came under harsh public criticism for being too feeble and passive in handling the North’s deadly artillery attack on the Yellow Sea border island of Yeonpyeong last month. It was the North’s second major unprovoked attack on South Korea this year following the torpedoing of a naval ship in March that killed 46 sailors.
“North Korea committed the provocations without reluctance, misjudging our patience and desire for peace,” Lee said. “We have clearly realized the fact that only strong counteractions to military provocations are able to deter war and safeguard peace.”
He said the South had tolerated the North’s belligerence in hopes of maintaining peace on the peninsula, but he stressed that his military should cope with any future attacks without mercy.
Lee also reiterated calls for the South Korean people to boost unity in dealing with the North, a longstanding source of ideological rifts.
“There can’t be ‘you’ and ‘me’ separately when it comes to national security with our life and the country’s fate at stake,”
Lee said, adding the North’s goal is to split public opinion here.
“If our people become one and show united power, North Korea can’t dare to challenge us,” he said. “We learned valuable lessons from the Yeonpyeong incident.”
Concluding his speech, the president said South Korea aspires to reunify with the North peacefully.
Holy shit!!! Synchronized to the "Christmas season" Pyongyang threatens with...
Yesterday's Guardian (UK) about the current situation on the Korean Peninsula:
Tensions on the Korean Pensinsula were at their most dangerous level since the 1950-53 war today when North Korea threatened to use nuclear weapons in a "holy war" (*) against its neighbour after South Korean tanks, jets and artillery carried out one of the largest live-fire drills in history close to the border...
While LMB claimed y'day "Counterattacks neccessary for peace" (But of course! What else?^^), on the same day North Korea's armed forces minister, Kim Yong-chun, also lifted the pitch of the sabre-rattling: "To counter the enemy's intentional drive to push the situation to the brink of war, our revolutionary forces are making preparations to begin a holy war at any moment necessary based on nuclear deterrent"...
Dec.22/23: KIJ and LMB on 'PEACE MISSION'(^^), resp. preparing the next showdown:
* N. Korea should apply for admission in the 'Global Jihad Network' (aka AL-QAIDA)!!!
Anyway, please enjoy a nice weekend/peaceful "Christmas"(^^)
Well, there was no counter-attack from the North Korean military (thankfully!!) to Monday's resumption of the S. Korean artillery exercises on Yeonpyeong...
KPA's chief of staff explained: "This was nothing but a childish play with fire of cowards... The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK did not feel any need to retaliate against every despicable military provocation like one taking revenge after facing a blow." (^^)
So the crisis of a large-scale armed clash between South Korea and North Korea appears to have been avoided for the time being...
But, dear audience, please stay tuned!(*)
☞ The day the guns were silent (Asia Times, 12.21)
☞ N. Korea doesn’t respond militarily... (Hankyoreh, 12.21)
☞ KPA Supreme Command: World Should Know Who Is Provoker (KCNA, 12.20)
* Because it might well be that the coming "holiday season" is/will be a f*cking great opportunity to initiate large-scale armed clash, resp. to declare war!! Yesterday's K. Times: "S. Korea ready for surprise attack ahead of Christmas"...
S.K. armed forces were put on the highest alert around Aegibong, a mountain peak located just three kilometers from the DMZ, as S.K. Christian maniacs, supported by the gov't and backed my the military, held a ceremony last night to turn on Christmas lights:
Looks like a superb target for N.K.'s short-range artillery...(^^)
Related "news report":
☞ S. Korea lights up Christmas tree on border with N. Korea (Yonhap, 12.21)
PS: It seems that the S. Korean armed forces - like their "colleagues" in the North - are already geared up for the "final battle", i.e. the forcibly reunification...
Written on the S. Korean soldiers' headbands: “Tongil”(통일) means “unification” and
“Myeolgong”(멸공) means “eradicate the communists.” The (f*cking stupid) message
being, “Let’s unify Korea by eradicating the communists!”
Actually we get used to headlines in the int'l media like "N. Korea threatens the South with War", "North Korea threatens with nuclear war", "Korean peninsula on 'brink of war', Pyongyang says" or statements from N.K. like "Seoul will be the next target. It will be a sea of fire", "The army and our people are ready for both an escalated war and an all-out war" etc...
Well, we get used... And who gives a shit?
But in yesterday's Asia Times Kim Myeong-chol("Pyongyang's unofficial spokesman") defined N.K.'s latest war threatening more precisely:
Acting for supreme leader Kim Jong-il, the Young General (i.e. Kim Jong-eun) is only one click away from issuing a long-awaited order to the Korean People's Army's (KPA) shiny and sleek, quick-response global strike force. This would see the torching of the bulwark of the US empire, the skyscrapers of New York City and other centers of metropolitan America.
Crack front-line units of the KPA are ready round the clock to bomb Seoul, turning it into a towering inferno before moving in on the ground to complete their mission.
Japan's cooperation with the US would invite retaliatory nuclear missile attacks on their nuclear power plants, with the result that Tokyo and other major cities of the Japanese archipelago are rendered unhabitable...
It will only take Kim Jong-eun a couple of minutes to turn Seoul into a sea of fire, five minutes to torch Tokyo, and 15-20 minutes to evaporate New York and Washington in a "day-after" scenario...
The moment of truth will come sooner than originally expected, vindicating the validity of the military-first policy mapped out by Kim Jong-il and demonstrating how wise the Korean people are in selecting Young General Kim Jong-eun as heir to the supreme leader.
Kim's complete "article"(MUST READ!!) you can check out here:
☞ When North Korea’s threats become reality (A. Times, 12.14)
☞ One nuclear backpack makes Seoul sea of fire... (K. Times, 12.15)