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2개의 게시물을 찾았습니다.

  1. 2005/05/05
    Another Change in the N.K. Society
    no chr.!
  2. 2005/05/05
    DPRK: Changes in the Society
    no chr.!

Another Change in the N.K. Society

If this story is realy the truth, then sooner or later the

S. Korean government may get a huge problem^^!!!

Just let's see the future!!

 

Culture Shock


A flow of information from the outside world is changing the Hermit Kingdom.

By Christian Caryl and B. J. Lee
 
Source:

May 9 issue - On a warm spring day, a small boat is maneuvering down a narrow tributary of the Yalu River that marks the border between China and North Korea. The sightseers in the craft are in search of an unusual quarry. "Look, there they are," says the boat's Chinese owner. And sure enough, coming down the opposite bank are two young North Korean border guards in olive-drab uniforms, both bareheaded, one of them toting a Kalashnikov rifle. The prow touches the shore, and one of the passengers—a NEWSWEEK journalist—steps out briefly onto North Korean territory to shake hands with the two soldiers, who nod and offer greetings. The Northerners happily accept a gift of South Korean cigarettes and Chinese cash in return for allowing the brief foray into their country. But there's something else they'd like to have as well, they say: movies and TV shows from South Korea. Videotapes or DVDs? Either one, say the soldiers. "Comedies or action?" asks the visitor. "It doesn't matter," answers a soldier. "Just bring a lot."

 

Extraordinary as it may sound, such encounters are par for the course along China's 1,416-kilometer-long border with North Korea these days. The Hermit Kingdom, it's now clear, is no longer hermetic. (...)

 

North Korea, long one of the world's most isolated societies, has grown vulnerable to the flow of information from the outside world. North Koreans are watching Western movies on hidden video players and tuning in to Korean-language broadcasts from the South on illicit radios. In the border regions, mobile phones are ubiquitous, meaning that some defectors can keep in touch with their families back home. Much of this information is making clear to North Koreans that there is a vast prosperity gap between their society and the South's.

 

It's not known if the greater awareness yet poses a threat to North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Il. But it's certainly giving more North Koreans reason to nurse discontent with their government. That, in turn, is spurring more and more of them to seek their luck abroad by defecting, which can only intensify the pressure on the Great Leader. Last year a record 1,850 Northerners arrived in the South. "The West often regards North Korea as an immobile society, a black box," says Andrei Lankov, a Russian-born expert on North Korea at Kookmin University in Seoul. "But it's clear that North Korea is changing. North Korean Stalinism is dying."

 

The changes are real. Just take the story of Lee So Young (not her real name), a 33-year-old mother of one who defected from North Korea five years ago. She's one of an estimated 200,000 North Koreans living illegally in the border area. She's hiding in the Chinese city of Yanji as she awaits a chance to reach a new home in South Korea. In her account, it's money, not ideology, that does the talking inside North Korea these days. That's what helped her to cross the border seven times in five years. "The border guards are completely corrupt," she says. "Even South Koreans can go in if they want. All you have to do is give them some money." Lee's tiny Chinese-made phone cost her $6, and in February she smuggled another one across the border to her mother. It costs a mere $1.20 per month to keep her mother's phone active, and Lee is about to send in a fresh prepaid card just to be on the safe side. "The number of the old phone I gave her is known. So now she'll have a new number."

 

North Korea's information revolution is rooted in economics—and in particular, its fast-rising trade with China. Last year trade volume between the two nations reached $1.4 billion—a jump of 40 percent over 2003. "People sell and buy things," as Lee puts it. "Now it's allowed. If you sold something before, they'd confiscate it." In the summer of 2002, Kim's government enacted a set of cautious economic reforms that have triggered an explosion of mercantilism. Those have in turn created a new merchant class—consisting largely of government officials—and fomented corruption. They've also generated a modest wealth for some while leaving most people mired in poverty. One of the most visible sign of the changes: markets filled with goods from China and even South Korea, brought in by the prosperous new class of border-crossing businesspeople. Even for Northerners who can't afford them, the high-priced imports—including refrigerators, clothes and vegetables—are inspiring yearnings for a better life.

 

The city of Dandong, China, which has a population of 700,000, has become the window on the outside world for North Korea. There, North Korea's main rail line and highway enter Chinese territory via a majestic bridge spanning the Yalu. It's a key destination for anyone in the North with a scheme to make money. Fifty to sixty North Korean trucks cross the border every morning, then return in the evening loaded with officially approved imports ranging from food to heavy machinery. Many of the truckers have built a little side business in car parts. At the loading depot in Dandong, local merchants happily fill the drivers' orders for spare car parts, which are delivered individually to each truck before it departs. The parts are then sold in North Korea for a big profit. At a waterfront restaurant in Dandong, three men from the North Korean national railway dine out on a meal of sashimi, clams and beef, along with copious amounts of booze. Estimated tab: $100. How can they afford it? "We take things back and forth," crows a boozy conductor. His job—making the monthly round trip from Pyongyang to Moscow—offers limitless opportunities for bringing goods (officially sanctioned and not) back into the North from its capitalist neighbors.

 

At the Gome Electronics Store in downtown Dandong, salespeople count North Koreans among their most faithful customers. "They're always wearing their little pins," says Shi Hui, a Gome salesgirl, referring to the obligatory badges featuring portraits of North Korean founding father Kim Il Sung. "They always come with their interpreters." One very popular item: video CD players that sell for less than $30. Some of Shi's customers buy four or five at a time. "They say they're going to resell them in the North," she says. Home stereos, TVs, and, yes, the obligatory mobile phones are also selling strongly—and at the same surreally low prices, thanks to Chinese overproduction.

 

Much of the border area is inhabited by ethnic Koreans with strong ties to the South. As a result, South Korean soap operas and movies, popular throughout Asia, can be purchased on every corner and are easily smuggled into the North. "They take the discs but they throw away the boxes," says Wang Dan, a saleswoman in a Dandong music store that regularly sells South Korean videodiscs to Northern customers. The resulting inflow of outside culture is impossible to stem—and one result has been the irrevocable destruction of Northern propaganda stereotypes about the South, which was always depicted as a wasteland of poverty, shantytowns and unemployment. Choi Ji Won (not her real name), 43, repeatedly crossed into China to work before defecting for good 10 months ago. "Whenever I was here, I watched South Korean TV," she says. "Then when I went back to the North, I told my relatives about it. They realized it's a great place to live, and now they want to go, too." According to recent visitors to the North, Pyongyang university students have taken to dyeing their hair chestnut in accordance with the latest college fads in Seoul.

 

In the old days, any North Koreans lucky enough to get a foreign-made radio had to register it with the local police. Authorities then fixed the tuners to a single frequency that supplied only Pyongyang-approved broadcasts. Now, though, radios are everywhere, and officials can be bribed to leave tuners unaltered. When South Korean broadcaster KBS surveyed defectors living in the South two years ago, 67 percent said that they had listened to South Korean radio when they were living in the North. Internet use in the North is still limited to a precious few. But the growing number of Northerners lucky enough to travel to China can easily pop into cheap Internet cafes to peruse South Korean web sites.

 

Kim Jong Il's policy of a limited opening is risky but necessary. Trade with China doesn't just help his moribund economy, but also boosts his ties with a powerful partner who offers a desperately needed diplomatic counterweight to the United States and Japan. (China welcomes the trade with the North as a way of promoting economic growth in its three northeastern provinces, which have long lagged behind more vibrant southern China.) But the potential threat to Kim's leadership is huge. "North Korea wants to keep the booming trade with China from undermining its stability," says Park Young Ho, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul. "But it's a very tough job. Trade and stability are two different things."

Kim's minions lately have been battling to stem the tide. At the end of 2003 the ruling Korean Workers' Party published a series of edicts pledging to "fight vigorously against moves to spread unusual recorded objects and publications" and "to carry on the fight against smuggling activities." Penalties for harboring information about the South, in particular, can include long terms in prison. The security services have formed mobile squads to nab people viewing illegal videos. "They cut off the power so that the disc stays in the machine and can't be hidden," says defector Lee.

 

There is an even more ominous trend: According to defectors interviewed by NEWSWEEK, Pyongyang is using public executions to discourage defections. Brokers involved in moving people across the border are often the targets. Two covertly recorded videotapes recently smuggled out of the North show three people being shot (in two separate incidents) in the city of Hoeryong on March 1 and March 2. Lee says the authorities stage the executions in marketplaces and force residents to watch. "You have to go. If you don't, they say you don't agree with the government's decision.

 

It's possible that Kim will succeed in tamping down the forces of discontent bound to be generated by knowledge of the outside world. But the odds are against it. "North Korea reminds me of the USSR in the 1970s," says analyst Lankov. "Officials are paying lip service to the ideology but what they actually do is very different." Like most experts on the North, he's reluctant to issue a expiration date for the North Korean regime. But, he adds, "the genie is out of the bottle—and Kim will have a hard time putting it back in." The dictator surely knows that himself.

 

With Hideko Takayama in Tokyo

진보블로그 공감 버튼트위터로 리트윗하기페이스북에 공유하기딜리셔스에 북마크

DPRK: Changes in the Society

North Korea: Market forces have female faces
By Andrei Lankov (source: Asia Times)

SEOUL - A defector from the North, a typical tough Korean auntie with trademark permed hair, smiled when asked about "men's  role" in North Korean families: "Well, in 1997-98 men became useless. They went to their jobs, but there was nothing to be done there, so they came back. Meanwhile their wives went to distant places to trade and kept families going."

Indeed, the sudden increase in the economic strength and status of women is one of manifold changes that have taken place North Korea over the past 10 or 15 years. The old Stalinist society is dead. It has died a slow but natural death over the past decade and, in spite of Pyongyang's frequent and loud protestation to the contrary, capitalism has been reborn in North Korea. The old socialist state-managed economy of steel mills and coal mines hardly functions at all, and the ongoing economic activity is largely private in nature.

But the new North Korean capitalism of dirty marketplaces, charcoal trucks and badly dressed vendors with huge sacks of merchandise on their backs demonstrates one surprising feature: it has a distinctly female face. Women are over-represented among the leaders of the growing post-Stalinist economy - a least on the lower level, among the market traders and small-time entrepreneurs.

This partially reflects a growth pattern of North Korean neo-capitalism. Unlike the restoration of capitalism in the former Soviet Union or China, the "post-socialist capitalism" of North Korea is not an affair planned and encouraged by people from the top tiers of the late communist hierarchy. Rather, it is capitalism from below, which grows in spite of government's attempts to reverse the process and turn the clock back.

Until around 1990, the markets and private trade of all kinds played a very moderate role in North Korean society. Most people were content with what they were officially allocated through the elaborate public distribution system, and did not want to look for more opportunities. The government also did its best to suppress the capitalist spirit. The rations were not too generous, but still sufficient for survival.

And then things began to fall apart. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics brought a sudden end to the flow of the Soviet aid (which was, incidentally, happily accepted but never publicly admitted by the North Korean side). This triggered an implosion of the North Korean economy. In the early 1990s people discovered that the rations were not enough for survival, and thus something had to be done. In a matter of years acute shortages of food developed into a large-scale famine, and in 1994-96 the public distribution system ceased to function in most parts of the country.

But men still felt bound to their jobs by their obligations and rations (distributed through workplaces). Actually, rations were not forthcoming, but this did not matter. Being used to the stability of the previous decades, the North Koreans saw the situation as merely a temporary crisis that soon would be overcome somehow. No doubt, they reasoned, one day everything will go back to the "normal" (that is, Stalinist) state of affairs. So men believed that it would be wise to keep their jobs in order to resume their careers after eventual normalization of the situation. The ubiquitous "organizational life" also played its role: a North Korean adult is required to attend endless indoctrination sessions and meetings, and these requirements are more demanding for males than for females.

Women enjoyed more freedom. By the standard of the communist countries, North Korea has always had an unusually high percentage of housewives among its married women (for example, in the northern border city of Sinuiju, up to 70% of married women were estimated to be housewives in the 1980s). While in most other communist countries women were encouraged to continue work after marriage, in North Korea the government did not really mind when married women quit their jobs to become full-time housewives.

Thus when the economic crisis began, women were first to take up market activities of all kinds. This came very naturally. In some cases they began by selling those household items they could do without, or by selling homemade food. Eventually, this developed into larger businesses. While men continued to go to their plants (which by the mid-1990s had usually ceased to operate) women plunged into market activity. In North Korea such trade involved long journeys in open trucks, and nights spent on concrete floors or under the open skies; they often bribed predatory local officials. And, of course, women had the ability to move heavy material, since the vendor's back tends to be her major method of transportation.

This tendency was especially pronounced among low- and middle- income families. The elite received rations even through the famine years of 1996-99, so the women of North Korea's top 5% usually continued with their old lifestyle. Nonetheless, some of them began to use their ability to get goods cheaply. Quite often, the wives of high-level cadres were and still are involved in resale of merchandise that is first purchased from their husbands' factories at cheap official prices. It is remarkable that in the case of North Korea such activities are carried out not so much by the cadres themselves, but by their wives. Cadres had to be careful, since it was not clear what was the official approach to the new situation of nascent capitalism. Thus it was assumed that women would be safer in such undertakings since they did not, and still do not, quite belong to the official social hierarchy.

But for the cadres' wives, these market operations were a way to move from being affluent to being rich. The lesser folks had to do something just to stay alive.

Perhaps, had the state given its formal approval to nascent capitalism (as did the still formally "communist" state of China), the men would be far more active. But Pyongyang officialdom still seems to be uncertain what to do with the crumbling system, and it is afraid to give to unconditional approval to capitalism. Thus men are left behind and capitalism is left to women.

This led to a change in the gender roles inside families. On paper, communism appeared very feminist, but real life in the communist states was an altogether different matter, and among the communist countries North Korea was remarkable for the strength of its patriarchal stereotypes. Men, especially in the more conservative northeastern part of the country, seldom did anything at home, with all household chores being exclusively the female domain. But in the new situation, when men did not have much to do while their wives struggled to keep the family fed and clothed, many men changed their attitude that housework was something beneath their dignity (at least this is what recent research among the defectors seem to suggest). As one female defector put it, "When men went to outside jobs and earned something, they used to be very boastful. But now they cannot do it and they become sort of useless, like a streetlight in the middle of the day. So a man now tries to help his wife in her work as best as he can" to keep the family going.

Recently, when it is increasingly clear that the "old times" are not going to return, some men are bold enough to risk breaking their ties with official employment. But they often go to market not as businessmen in their own right but rather as aides to their wives who have amassed great experience over the past decade. Being newcomers, males are relegated to subordinate positions - at least temporarily. Or alternatively, they are involved in more dangerous and stressful kinds of activity, such as smuggling goods across the badly protected border with China. As one woman defector said: "Men usually do smuggling. Men are better in big things, you know".

Economic difficulties and change in money-earning patterns as well as new lifestyle and related opportunities in some cases led to family breakdowns. In South Korea the economic crisis of 1998 resulted in a mushrooming divorce rate. In the North, the nearly simultaneous Great Famine had the same impact, even if in many cases the divorce was not officially recognized.

Of course, we are talking about a great disaster here, and a large part of the estimated 600,000-900,000 people who perished in those years were women. Of the survivors, not all women became winners, bold entrepreneurs or successful managers: some were dragged into prostitution, which has made a powerful comeback recently, and many more had to survive on whatever meager food was available. But still, it seems that years of crisis changed the social roles in North Korean families. For many women, the social disaster became the time when they showed their strength, will and intelligence not just to survive, but also to succeed.


진보블로그 공감 버튼트위터로 리트윗하기페이스북에 공유하기딜리셔스에 북마크

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