CINA

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And on all the other days(aeh~ better said evenings) during the week(at the same time) candle light rallies to support the stuggle of the irregular construction workers in Pohang are taking place there:

매일 저녁 7시 30분 촛불문화제로 모입시다

포항지역건설노동자들의 파업이 두달째 전개되고 있습니다.

하중근 열사 사망 사건에 대해 경찰과 검찰은 파렴치한
작태로 자신들의 잘못 보다는 불법시위, 폭력시위라는 낙인찍기에
혈안이 되어 있습니다.

포스코는 여전히 기만적인 협상자세를 보이고 있고
언론은 포항시 관제대모를 포항시민들의 여론인양
건설노동자들의 파업 파괴공작을 일삼고 있습니다.

이제 투쟁의 중심은 포항에서 서울로 올라와야 합니다.

수도 서울에서 '하중근열사 진상규명, 책임자 처벌과 포항지역건설노동자
파업투쟁' 승리를 위한 치열한 사투가 전개되어야 합니다.

오늘부터 포항지역건설노조에서 약 40여분의 조합원들이 올라와서
광화문 열린마당을 거점으로 매일 집회와 시위, 선전전을 전개할 예정입니다.

또한 매일 저녁 7시 30분 광화문 동아일보앞에서
'열사정신계승, 파업투쟁 승리 촛불문화제'가 있습니다.

각 단위에서는 촛불문화제에 적극적인 참여를 조직하여 주십시오.

열마디 말보다 한번의 연대, 실천이 중요한 시기입니다.
투쟁의 현장에서 만납시다.. 투쟁!



'하중근 열사정신계승, 파업투쟁 승리를 위한 촛불문화제'

일시: 평일 오후 7시 30분
(주말 개최여부는 추후 판단.)
장소: 동아일보사 앞

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VICTORY!! ...but for whom??

While Hezbullah is claiming victory over IDF and predicting the "beginning of the end of the Zionist entity(a.k.a. Israel)" and the "entire Arab/Muslim world is praising Hezbullah's victory"(CNN Int'l), in Israel the discussion about the last Lebanon war and its results is still continuing.. and escalating.

Today the Israeli bourgeois daily Yedioth Ahronot published following contribution by R. Ben-Yishai:

Hizbullah was better

Hizbullah fighters fought more effectively than IDF soldiers

The balance sheet of the second Lebanon War certainly does not point to an IDF victory. Even in points, it's closer to a loss than to an achievement, when taking into account the home front's extended suffering.

Indeed, in light of the relative UN good Security Council resolution we received, and possible positive future developments in Lebanon itself, we were not defeated. However, what happened to us is very similar to the defeat suffered by the American military in Vietnam and Iraq, and to the one suffered by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya.

I covered some of those wars. I saw from up close how guerilla fighters overcame the most powerful, modern armies in the world because they knew how to fully utilize their intimate familiarity with the war zone and the local population's support.

Yet this isn't the only reason. The guerillas won also because they received unlimited material, planning, and moral support from a patron country or countries.

Another reason: Guerilla fighters consistently avoided a head-on clash with overwhelming air and ground forces and were not embarrassed to run away and hide when needed.

Finally, the guerilla fighters were more highly motivated than their opponents and willing to sacrifice their lives.

Israeli arrogance

Regular armies stood helpless in the face of guerillas because they failed to formulate an effective combat tactic that would neutralize the "hit and run" advantages of the Vietcong and Mujahideen, and because military units on the ground lacked real-team tactical intelligence that would allow them to take advantage of their superior fire power.

The final straw that led to the militaries' defeat was the heavy losses they suffered without being able to reach a phase where the end of fighting could be seen on the horizon. This is almost precisely what happened to us in Lebanon.

There's plenty of arrogance in the common perception around here that the failure in meeting the ground offensive's objectives was entirely the result of the failures of the political echelon and senior commanders to properly utilize the army.

This argument underestimates the enemy's capabilities and advantages and assumes that had we taken determined decisions and the logistical operation had worked smoothly, we would have won.

This is not the case, however. In my estimate, the ceasefire prevented an even greater ground offensive fiasco. Even if it's unpleasant, we must admit the fact that the IDF did not achieve victory not so much because of the failed conduct of its leaders, but rather, because Hizbullah was more effective and determined.

Hizbullah's intelligence better

The Shiite organization developed and implemented a combat method that takes maximal advantage of its natural advantages as a popular militia that operates within its natural habitat. Hizbullah also designed its future battlefield through an intimate understanding of IDF vulnerabilities.

The group prepared in a manner that allowed small cells to take cover and than appear at the time of their choosing equipped with anti-tank missiles, which enabled them to hit tanks and homes used by IDF infantrymen as cover.

More significant even was the tactical intelligence information gathered by Hizbullah members before, and particularly through, the fighting.

Their information was of better quality than that possessed by the IDF simply because Hizbullah's information gathering was undertaken through the use of eyes and binoculars on the ground in proximity to our forces, and not through pilotless drones and other sophisticated means, which failed to identify, in real-time, rocket launchers and small Hizbullah cells moving from one bunker to the next.

Hizbullah made sure each cell of fighters was able to gather intelligence independently, both for the purpose of accurate rocket attacks (by watching Israeli television reports) as well as for the purpose of fighting IDF troops inside villages (by using observers.)

IDF troops, on the other hand, walked around the villages as if they were blind, because the tactical information gathered before the war was not shared. Moreover, while in the villages, intelligence forces did not gather information methodically.

Frustration can lead to reform

We should also acknowledge the following reality: Hizbullah commanders and fighters were willing to sacrifice their lives in order to complete missions, while IDF commanders and cabinet ministers were virtually panicking every time they received casualty reports and attempted to prevent human losses as if this was the military objective.

A large part of the contradictory, changing orders relayed to troops resulted from this syndrome. At the end, because of the desire to avoid casualties, we suffered even more losses.

We must be merciless in admitting that Hizbullah succeed because it fought more effectively than the IDF in a mountainous area and through a total willingness for sacrifice. When facing those factors, the IDF has no proper combat tactic, just like the Americans and Russians, which would allow it to successfully respond to a super-guerilla featuring the characteristics and equipment of a modern army.

However, failures are also an opportunity. Deep frustration gives rise to an authentic, powerful demand for fundamental reforms. There's no point in fixing minor flaws here and there.

What we need is the total enlistment of the State of Israel , both in terms of finances and thought process, so that the IDF quickly develops and implements operation combat methods, unique combat means, and effective tactical intelligence that ensures different results in the next round.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3294340,00.html

To be continued soon..

BTW: This discussions are taking place not in the basements of Israeli "dissidents"  or deep in the political underground... It takes place in the open public, even in the f.. bourgeois media. Please keep this in mind(more about it, I'll write later)!!