미션 바리오 아덴트로

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아래 기사를 간략히 번역한 것입니다.

핸즈오프베네수엘라

출처: http://www.handsoffvenezuela.org/urgent_coup_plots_in_bolivia_and_venezuela.htm
2008년 9월 12일 금요일

볼리비아에서는 지속적인 쿠데타 계획 진행 중.

어제 과두정치의 파시스트 갱들에 의해 8명의 농민들 피살.

산타 크루즈의 노동계급 거주 지역인 플랜3000에서는 이곳에 침투하여 공포를 확산시키려 하던 파시스트 갱들을 주민들이 몰아냄.

이런 사태들의 결과로 에보 모랄레스는 미대사를 추방함

목요일 저녁에는 베네수엘라에서 쿠데타 계획이 발각됨.

사람들은 즉각적으로 미라플로레스(대통령궁: 역자 주) 외에 운집하였으며, 차베스는 미대사를 추방한다고 선언. 이후 PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, 베네수엘라 통합 사회당: 역자 주)  활동가와 지도자들의 대중집회가 산 까를로스 성에서 개최. 도시의 주요 군사기지인 티우나 성 외곽에서 당일 행진을 진행하고 각 지역별 수도 곳곳에서 대중집회를 개최하기로 합의.

이정도면 충분하다(enough is enough: 고마해라, 마이 뭇다 아이가 와 어감 비슷)고 말할 때가 되었다. 베네수엘라와 볼리비아의 소수 독재자들은 민중 대다수의 민주적 의지를 존중할 의지가 없음을 또다시 보여주었다.

우리도 연대해야 한다. 세계 곳곳에서 긴급하게 회의를 열고 연대활동의 계획을 가져와야 한다. 미대사관 앞에서 집회를 열고 어떤 지속적인 행동을 해나갈 것인지 공적인 회의를 열어야 한다.

각국의 볼리비아와 베네수엘라 대사관은 이러한 활동을 보조해야 한다.

By Hands Off Venezuela   
http://www.handsoffvenezuela.org/urgent_coup_plots_in_bolivia_and_venezuela.htm
 Friday, 12 September 2008

The ongoing coup attempt in Bolivia continues, and yesterday 8 peasants were killed when they were ambushed by fascist gangs of the oligarchy. In the working class area of Plan 3000 in Santa Cruz, the people repelled the fascist gangs which had attempted to enter this area to spread fear.

 As a result of these provocations Evo Morales has expelled the US ambassador.

 In the evening of Thursday a coup plot was uncovered in Venezuela. The people immediately gathered outside Miraflores and Chavez addressed them announcing the expulsion of the US ambassador. A mass meeting of PSUV activists and leaders took place afterwards at the Fuerte San Carlos and it was agreed to call a march for today outside Fuerte Tiuna, the city's main military barracks and mass demonstrations in all the regional capitals on Saturday.

 It is time to say enough is enough. The oligarchy in Venezuela and Bolivia has shown once and again their lack of respect for the democratic will of the majority of the people.

 We need to organise solidarity. Urgent meetings should take place to plan actions of solidarity around the world. There should be rallies outside of the US embassies and public assemblies to discuss the situation and coordinate further action.

 The Venezuelan and Bolivian embassies around the world must contacted to help and participate in this mobilisation.

IT IS TIME FOR ACTION

DOWN WITH THE REACTIONARY COUPS IN BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA

DOWN WITH US IMPERIALISM

LONG LIVE THE BOLIVIAN AND BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION

FORWARD TO SOCIALISM

more information and details of actions as soon as we receive them

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이것은 지난 주 기사지만 관련해서...

베네수엘라가 원유 끊으면 살 수도 없는 나라가 왜 정신을 못 차리나 모르겠네...

거기에 비하면 베네수엘라나 쿠바인들은 마음이 너무 넓다 진짜.

대략의 내용은 미국에 광범위하게 진출해있는 베네수엘라 정유회사인 CITGO와 시민에너지 (NGO인 듯), 그리고 베네수엘라 대사가 휴스턴의 한 가정집에 모여서 한 파일럿 프로그램에 조인을 했다는 것. 빈민가에 전력소모가 적은 전구를 에너지 절약법을 알려주는 책자와 함께 무상으로 공급하는 것. 워크샾도 개최. 7천만 가구에 여름-가을에 걸쳐 14만개의 전구 공급. 전국 총 전구수의 1/3. 이 프로그램을 위해 CITGO는 연간 1조달러 이상 투자. 현재 베네수엘라에서 시행되고 있는 미시온 레볼루시온 에네르헤티카(Misión Revolución Energética)의 일환.

CITGO, Embassy of Venezuela and Citizens Energy Launch Energy Efficient Lighting Program in Houston

HOUSTON – CITGO Petroleum Corporation Chairman, President and CEO Alejandro Granado, Citizens Energy Chairman Joseph P. Kennedy II and Ambassador of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Bernardo Alvarez joined today at the home of Houston resident Delores Smith to promote a national pilot program providing low-income households with energy efficient and environmentally friendly compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs).

In Houston, the program will distribute an estimated 140,000 CFLs throughout the summer and early fall in 7,000 households -- approximately one third of the national total.

As with the low-income heating oil program inaugurated in 2005, this initiative is a partnership between Houston-based CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and the Boston-based nonprofit Citizen's Energy Corporation. Together, CITGO and Citizen's Energy will provide eligible Texas households in Houston and Corpus Christi as well as nine other cities nationwide with almost half a million CFLs. The initiative will also include education materials and workshops to help inform individuals about ways they can use energy more efficiently and in turn save on their electric bills.

Working with local community groups, the program will distribute light bulbs and energy conservation educational materials to approximately 23,000 households in the pilot cities. Qualified participants will participate in energy workshops sponsored by partner organizations. In total, the pilot program has the potential to save program participants nearly $15 million and reduce their energy use by 165 million kilowatt-hours.

"I am proud that CITGO invests over $100 million annually on social programs to improve the lives of those in need," Granado said. "The CITGO-Venezuela Energy Efficient Lighting Program will save money for recipients who struggle to make ends meet while also helping these communities learn more about energy efficiency and environmental conservation."

Simple energy-savings actions like those encouraged through this pilot program can make a big difference.  According to the federal government, if every American home replaced just one light bulb with a CFL, the U.S. would save enough energy to light more than 3 million homes for a year, more than $600 million annual energy costs, and prevent greenhouse gases equivalent to the emissions of more than 800,000 cars.

"The most cost effective and clean energy is the energy we don't use," Kennedy said. "We are proud to partner with CITGO Petroleum to help our most vulnerable households learn ways to use energy more efficiently, and in doing so, save energy, money and the environment."

The inspiration for the program came from a similar Venezuelan Government initiative called Misión Revolución Energética.

"This program is a counterpart to our efforts in Venezuela, where more than 60 million conventional light bulbs have been replaced by energy efficient ones through Misión Revolución Energética," Alvarez, said. "It is also proof of CITGO's commitment to social issues, which goes far beyond traditional corporate social responsibility, and of Venezuela's commitment to a new progressive model of development to confront the problems of poverty and environmental damage."

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오바마의 차베스 공격

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/renewing_us_leadership_in_the.html

부시행정부가 잘못된 판단에 근거해서 이라크전을 시작한 이후에, 아메리카 대륙에서 우리는 우리의 친구들을 방관하고 우리의 적에 대한 대항은 효과적이지 못했으며 민중의 삶에 중요한 도전들에 대해서 관심을 갖지 못했고, 대륙 내에서 우리의 이해관계를 발전시키는 데에 무능함을 보여왔다. 그렇다면, 우고 차베스와 같은 데마고그들이 이런 진공상태의 공간에 발을 내딛는 것이 당연하다. 예상가능하지만 위험한 반미(反美) 레토릭, 권위주의적 정부, 그리고 이해타산만을 따지만 외교정책은 과거에 이미 시행되었고 실패해온 이데올로기와 같은 거짓 약속을 할 뿐이다. 하지만 미국은 지금 다른 다라들로부터 너무나 소외되어 있기 때문에 이런 진부한 비젼이 당연하게 받아들여지고 심지어는 볼리비아에서 니카라구아에까지 진출한 것이다.

그리고 이 진공상태를 채우고 있는 것은 차베스와 그 동료들만이 아니다. 미국이 미대륙의 어려운 현실을 감당하지 못하고 있는 사이 유럽과 아시아에서 다른 나라들 - 특히 중국 - 이 나서고 있다. 이란은 베네수엘라에 더 가까와졌으며, 바로 몇일 전에 테헤란과 카라카스는 엄청난 석유이윤을 이용해서 공동은행을 창설했다. ... 베네수엘라에서 우고 차베스는 민주적으로 선출된 지도자이다. 하지만 우리는 또한 그가 민주적으로 정부를 운영하지 않는다는 것도 알고 있다. 그는 민중에 대해 말하지만, 그의 행동은 자신의 권력에 봉사할 뿐이다.

차베스의 답변:

http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2008/07/chavez_says_us_ties_would_be_n.php

[전략] 차베스는 오바마가 당선된다고 하더라도 미국과의 관계가 개선될 것이라고 너무 기대하지 말하고 그의 지지자들에게 말했다. 그와 공화당 후보인 존 맥케인 사이에는 거의 차이가 없기 때문이다.

"미대통령 후보 두 사람은 우리를 똑같이 공격한다, 그들은 제국의 이해를 방어하기 위해 우리를 공격한다." 차베스가 그의 사회당 모임에서 말했다.

"스스로를 속이지 말자, 미국은 제국이고 제국은 무너져야 한다. 그것이 유일한 해결책이다, 제국이 끝난다는 것."

오바마는 캠페인 초기에 차베스와 앉아서 논의할 준비가 되어 있다고 말했다. 하지만 최근 몇 주 간 베네수엘라의 좌파 지도자를 미국의 적이라 부르고 제재조치를 취해야 한다고 주장했다.

차베스 또한 이전에 부시 행정부가 끝나면 두 나라 사이에 더 온화한 관계가 맺어질 수 있을 것이라는 희망을 피력한 바 있다. 미국은 차베스가 라틴 아메리카에 나쁜 영향을 주고 있다고 생각하고 있으며 코카인 매매에 강하게 대처하지 못하고 콜롬비아의 맑시스트 게릴라와의 연관성이 있다면서 비난한 바 있다.

베네수엘라는 미국의 최대 원유공급국 중 하나임에도 2002년 워싱턴이 환영했던 2002년 반 차베스 쿠데타 이후 두 나라 사이의 관계가 악화되었다.

아래는 원문

Obama Attacks Chavez

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/05/renewing_us_leadership_in_the.html

OBAMA: "Since the Bush Administration launched a misguided war in Iraq, its policy in the Americas has been negligent toward our friends, ineffective with our adversaries, disinterested in the challenges that matter in peoples' lives, and incapable of advancing our interests in the region. No wonder, then, that demagogues like Hugo Chavez have stepped into this vacuum. His predictable yet perilous mix of anti-American rhetoric, authoritarian government, and checkbook diplomacy offers the same false promise as the tried and failed ideologies of the past. But the United States is so alienated from the rest of the Americas that this stale vision has gone unchallenged, and has even made inroads from Bolivia to Nicaragua.

And Chavez and his allies are not the only ones filling the vacuum. While the United States fails to address the changing realities in the Americas, others from Europe and Asia – notably China – have stepped up their own engagement. Iran has drawn closer to Venezuela, and just the other day Tehran and Caracas launched a joint bank with their windfall oil profits....In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez is a democratically elected leader. But we also know that he does not govern democratically. He talks of the people, but his actions just serve his own power."

Chavez responds:

Chavez says U.S. ties would be no warmer with Obama
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2008/07/chavez_says_us_ties_would_be_n.php

Reuters North American News Service
Jul6 16, 2008

CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said Wednesday his prickly relations with Washington would not improve even if Democrat candidate Barack Obama wins the U.S. presidential election in November. Chavez, a relentless critic of U.S. foreign policy and President Bush, advocates weakening the influence of the United States and calls the nation "the empire."

Chavez told his supporters not to raise their hopes that relations with the United States would improve if Obama is elected U.S. president, saying there was little difference between him and Republican candidate John McCain.

"The two candidates for the U.S. presidency attack us equally, they attack us defending the interests of the empire," Chavez said at a meeting of his socialist party.

"Let's not kid ourselves, it is the empire and the empire must fall. That's the only solution, that it comes to an end."

Obama said earlier in his campaign that he would be prepared to sit down to talk with Chavez. But in recent weeks he has called the leftist Venezuelan leader an enemy of the United States and urged sanctions against him.

Chavez also had previously expressed a hope that the end of the Bush administration would bring warmer ties between the two countries. The United States considers Chavez a negative influence in Latin America and has accused him of being soft on cocaine traffickers and of having ties to Marxist guerrillas in Colombia.

Although Venezuela is one of America's top crude oil suppliers, relations between the two countries have deteriorated since a brief 2002 coup against Chavez that Washington initially welcomed. (Reporting by Patricia Rondon)

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누구나 알고 있지만 (과장 좀 섞어서) 아무도 읽지 않은 두 권의 책이 있지요.

바로 국부론과 자본론 입니다.

우리나라에도 잘 알려진 데이빗 하비 교수가 블로그에 자신의 강의를 영상으로 연재 중인데,

영어는 좀 되는데 자본론을 읽을 기회는 없었다는 분이 있으시면, 혹은

자본론을 이용하여 영어 공부나 함 해보자 싶은 사람은 한번 참고해보시면 좋을 것 같네요.

첫번째 강의에 의하면, 교수가 1960년대 말 영국에서 미국으로 왔고,

당시는 시민권 운동의 격동기이다 보니 학생들과 함께 지금의 이 상황을 이해하고자 하는 노력으로

자본론을 읽기 시작했다고 합니다.

그때부터 시작해서 1년에 한 두번씩은 꼭 읽었다고 하니,

지금까지 거의 40년 동안 빠짐없이 강의를 해오신 것이지요.

강추입니다.

http://davidharvey.org/

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"He had faults, like other men; but it was for his virtues that he was hated and successfully calumniated."

-- Bertrand Russell, on the American revolutionary Thomas Paine.

The defeat of the Venezuelan government's proposed constitutional reforms last Sunday will probably not change very much in Venezuela. Most of what was in the reforms can be enacted through the legislature. This is especially true for the progressive reforms: social security pensions for informal sector workers, free university education, the prohibition of discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation. The negative elements, such as expanding the government's powers in a state of emergency, probably wouldn't have changed much if they had passed. The Chavez government has never declared a state of emergency, and did not invoke any special powers even when most democratic governments in the world would have done so, e.g. during the oil strike of 2002-2003, which crippled the economy and almost toppled the government for the second time in a year; or after the April 2002 military coup. (It is also worth noting that even if they had passed, the amendments wouldn't have given the Venezuelan government the authority to commit the worst infringements on civil liberties that the Bush administration has made in its "war on terror.")

Chavez's proposal to scrap term limits was defeated, but he has more than five years to try again if he wants. But even if this is his last term, the changes underway in Venezuela will not likely be reversed when he steps down.

Most importantly, the character of the political battles in Venezuela has not changed. The popular presentation of this contest as between pro-Chavez and anti-Chavez forces is misleading. It is a struggle of left versus right, with the two sides divided and polarized along the lines of class, democracy, national sovereignty, and race.   

For these reasons, in the past eight years there has been very little progressive or even liberal political opposition to the Chavez government in Venezuela - just as there were no progressive or liberal organizations in the United States that supported President George W. Bush for re-election in 2004. Venezuela is politically polarized - much more so than the United States.

The referendum shifted these political dividing lines only very slightly, and very likely temporarily. Some within the pro-government coalition opposed the reforms; and it appears that the amendments failed mainly because a great many of Chavez's supporters didn't vote. But there is no indication that these people have shifted to the opposition camp, and polls show that Chavez and the government remain highly popular. And the opposition to the government is still a right-wing opposition, despite the addition of a mostly-well-off student movement that is more ideologically mixed - including the student opposition leader Stalin Gonzalez, who recently defended his namesake in the Wall Street Journal.

With regard to democracy, there has always been a clear difference between the two sides. Chavez's immediate acceptance of a razor-thin margin of defeat - 50.7 percent against - before all the votes were even counted should cut through all the media hype about a "strongman" and a "dictator." Chavez congratulated his opponents on their victory. As in previous elections, he had publicly committed to accepting the results before the vote, and had called on the opposition to do the same.

On the other side,  the opposition tried several oil and business strikes, and a military coup in April 2002, to win what they could not gain at the ballot box. The first act of the short-lived coup government was to abolish the constitution and dissolve the Supreme Court and the elected National Assembly. The coup was reversed due to massive pro-democracy street demonstrations, but eight months later the opposition once again tried to topple the government with a devastating, management-led oil shutdown. Unlike in the United States, where we have three sets of labor laws that would have put the leaders of such a strike in jail, the Chavez government allowed the strike to run its course, with the economy crippled in the process.

Only after all extra-legal means failed to dislodge the government did the Venezuelan opposition resort to the ballot box, exercising their constitutional right to a recall referendum on the presidency in August 2004. They lost by a margin of 59-41, and promptly refused to accept the result. Although vote-rigging was nearly impossible under the dual electronic-plus-paper-ballot voting system and the result was certified by the Carter Center and the OAS, the opposition - which has its own media and invents its own reality - to this day holds to conspiracy theories(1) that the referendum was stolen by a fantastic electronic fraud. In December 2005, seeing that it would lose congressional elections, the opposition boycotted, despite the OAS and European Union observers' condemnation of the boycott.

The opposition did finally accept their defeat in the December 2006 presidential elections, which Chavez won with 63 percent of the vote and the highest turnout ever. And now that they have finally won at the ballot box, there is a possibility of an opposition emerging that is more willing to play by the democratic rules of the game. The student movement seems to have more elements that favor democratic means of challenging the government, and may have played a role in convincing others in the opposition to vote in the referendum. But they have not transformed the opposition into a democratic movement.

With regard to class, polls sponsored by the opposition and the government show that poor and working people are overwhelmingly pro-Chavez, and the upper classes against him. There are obvious reasons for this class divide: the Chavez government has provided health care to the vast majority of poor Venezuelans, subsidized food, and increased access to education. Real (inflation-adjusted) social spending per person has increased by 314 percent over the eight years of the Chavez administration. The proportion of households in poverty has dropped by 38 percent - and this is measuring only cash income, not other benefits such as health care and education.(2) Interestingly, the upper classes have also done pretty well, but appear to oppose Chavez for mostly ideological reasons, including his commitment to "21st century socialism." The Chavez administration has also provided the poor with more of a voice in government than they have ever had previously.

 

On the questions of national sovereignty and empire, the lines are also clearly divided in Venezuela. Leading opposition groups, including some who were involved in the coup, have received U.S. funding and other support. Washington's involvement in the coup is well-documented and much deeper(3)  than the vast understatements and euphemisms used by the major US and international media describe the US role. The Washington Post reported this week that the Bush Administration has been funding unnamed student groups, presumably opposition, up to and including this year.

The Bush Administration has remained committed to this day to regime change in Venezuela, through destabilization and de-legitimation, although there are differences within the State Department. Its tacit support for the completely unjustified opposition boycott of the December 2005 congressional elections is a good example of this strategy: giving up about 30 percent of the Venezuelan congress just for the propaganda advantage of having the media report on "a congress completely dominated by Chavez." While the media focuses on Chavez' rhetoric, such as his notorious UN speech in which he referred to President Bush as the devil, his confrontation with Washington has been inevitable and not of his choosing.

Latin American racism, especially outside of that directed against indigenous groups, is different than in the United States because "race" is less well-defined; but institutional racism is no less prevalent, as the noticeable difference in skin color between the white elite and the poorer classes throughout the region makes very clear. In Venezuela, this difference of complexion is also quite visible between the anti-Chavez and pro-Chavez demonstrations. Perhaps more importantly, those who are aware of and against racism - including indigenous and anti-racist groups - are overwhelmingly pro-Chavez, partly because of his government's actions on behalf of indigenous rights, including land reform and land titling, and constitutional rights. (4) Needless to say, the opposition to Chavez - who is proud of his African and indigenous heritage - also contains overtly racist elements.

Indigenous supporters outside Venezuela include President Evo Morales of Bolivia, a close friend and ally of Chavez. Other progressive Latin American presidents also have close relationships with Chavez and see him as a very important ally: Nestor Kirchner of Argentina, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and although the international media is always trying to deny it, President Lula da Silva of Brazil. Lula heads a divided government, but he has consistently defended Chavez.(5)  All of these leaders understand the historic nature of what is happening in Latin America - the majority of a region once known as 'the United States' backyard" now has governments that are more independent of the United States than Europe is. Chavez has played a huge role in this process, most importantly through the Venezuelan government's billions of dollars of lending and grants to governments - made without policy conditions. Until a few years ago, Washington's main avenue of influence in Latin America was through control over credit, which was exercised through a creditors' cartel headed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The collapse of this cartel in recent years is the most important change in the international financial system in more than three decades, and one that has drastically reduced U.S. influence. Venezuela's provision of an alternative source of credit has helped other democratic governments to try and deliver on their electoral promises without the threat of economic strangulation from abroad that, just a few years ago, may have doomed them to a short life. It is thus helping to promote democracy in the region.

What about the charges that Venezuela under Chavez has been moving toward "an authoritarian state'? The denial of a broadcast license renewal to a TV station that participated in a military coup and several other attempts to topple the government, and that would not get a license in any other democratic country, is hardly inappropriate (6); it was also defended by other democratic presidents in the region, including those of Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Venezuela's media is still dominated by the opposition, and remains the most anti-government media in the hemisphere. Then there is the controversial "enabling law,"  which gives Chavez fairly broad temporary authority to make certain legislation by executive order, subject to revocation by the congress or referendum. But as the US State Department's top official for Latin America, Thomas Shannon, commented when the Venezuelan congress passed the law in January, "It's something valid under the constitution. As with any tool of democracy, it depends how it is used." And Chavez has hardly used the enabling legislation at all - only to extract more concessions from foreign oil companies.

One can go through the list, but the point is that one does not have to agree with every decision of the Venezuelan government to see that there is little or nothing to back up the absurd image of "authoritarian rule" that the Chavez-haters have created. Unfortunately they have gotten help from politicized groups such as "Reporters Without Borders," which receives funding from the "National Endowment for Democracy" (which has funded groups involved in the overthrow of elected governments, including Venezuela [2002] and Haiti [2004]); the Committee to Protect Journalists, which is funded by big media owners; and other organizations who are generally more autonomous but whose independence seems to weaken under pressure with regard to Venezuela. Bottom line: no reputable human rights organization has claimed, nor would they, that civil liberties or human rights have deteriorated under the Chavez government - or that it compares unfavorably on these issues with the region.

A historic transformation in underway in Latin America. After more than a quarter century of neoliberal economic reform, and the worst long-term economic growth failure in more than a century, a revolt at the ballot box has elected leaders who are looking for democratic alternatives that will restore economic growth and development, and reduce poverty and inequality.(7) The U.S. government is opposing these efforts; a key element of its overall strategy is to demonize Chavez and de-legitimize the democratic government of Venezuela. The U.S. and international media have enthusiastically embraced this agenda, with journalism that makes Judy Miller's worst articles in the run-up to the Iraq war look fair and balanced by comparison.

A more truthful and accurate reporting and analysis of these events is sorely need.

---

Footnotes:

1.See Mark Weisbrot, David Rosnick and Todd Tucker, "Black Swans, Conspiracy Theories, and the Quixotic Search for Fraud," Center for Economic and Policy Research, September 2004.  [http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela_2004_09.pdf]

2.See Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval, "The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez Years," Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2007. [http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela_2007_07.pdf] Poverty figures here updated for first half 2007.

3. See Mark Weisbrot, "Venezuela's Election Provides Opportunity for Washington to Change its Course" Aniston Sunday Star, December 10, 2006.  [http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=649&Itemid=45]

4.  See e.g., Michael Fox, "Indigenous March in Support of Chavez in Venezuela," Venezuelanalysis.com, June 11, 2006. [http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno=1985]

5. See Gosman, Eleonara, "Lula: "Nadie Hará que Discute con Chávez, es mi Amigo," Clarín, July 7, 2007; and Mark Weisbrot, "President Bush's Trip to Latin America is All About Denial," Center for Economic and Policy Research, March, 2007

6. See Robert McChesney and Mark Weisbrot, "Venezuela and the Media: Fact and Fiction [http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1200]; Mark Weisbrot, "Eyes Wide Shut: The Media Looks at Venezuela [http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1269&Itemid=45]

7. See Mark Weisbrot, "Latin America: The End of an Era,"  International Journal of Health Services, Volume 37, Number 3 / 2007, also available at [http://www.cepr.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=374&Itemid=8]

---

Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. (www.cepr.net).

본문

피델 카스트로가 투표 전날 베네수엘라 국민들에게 보낸 서신입니다.

투표 전 지지집회에서 차베스가 낭독하기도 했었지요.

역시 번역하다가 시간이 너무 걸려서 일단 영문으로 올립니다.

Reflections on Venezuela: A People Under Fire

December 1st 2007

Venezuela, whose people are heirs to Bolivar's ideas which transcend his era, is today facing a world tyranny a thousand times more powerful than that of Spain's colonial strength added to that of the recently born United States which, through Monroe, proclaimed their right to the natural wealth of the continent and to the sweat of its people.

Marti denounced the brutal system and called it a monster, in whose entrails he had lived. His internationalist spirit shone as never before when, in a letter left unfinished due to his death in combat, he publicly revealed the objective of his restless struggle: "…I am now every day risking my life for my country, and for my duty -since I understand it and have the courage to do it- to timely prevent, with the independence of Cuba, that the United States expand over the Antilles and that they fall, with this additional force, over our lands in America…"

It was not in vain that he stated in plain verse: "With the poor of this earth, my fate I wish to cast". Later, he proclaimed categorically: "Humanity is homeland". The Apostle of our independence wrote one day: "Let Venezuela call on me to serve her: I am her son".

The most sophisticated media developed by technology, employed to kill human beings and to subjugate or exterminate peoples; the massive sowing of conditioned reflexes of the mind; consumerism and all available resources; these are being used today against the Venezuelans, with the intent of ripping the ideas of Bolivar and Marti to shreds.

The empire has created conditions conducive to violence and internecine conflicts. On Chavez's recent visit last November 21, I seriously discussed with him the risks of assassination as he is constantly out in the open in convertible vehicles. I said this because of my experience as a combatant trained in the use of an automatic weapon and a telescopic sight. Likewise, after the triumph, I became the target of assassination plots directly or indirectly ordered by almost every United States administration since 1959.

The irresponsible government of the empire does not stop for a minute to think that the assassination of Venezuela's leader or a civil war in that country would blow up the globalized world economy, due to its huge reserves of hydrocarbons. Such circumstances are without precedent in the history of mankind.

Cuba developed close ties with the Bolivarian government of Venezuela during the hardest days resulting from the demise of the USSR and the tightening of the United States economic blockade. The exchange of goods and services grew from practically zero level to more than 7 billion dollars annually, with great economic and social benefits for both our peoples. Today that is where we receive the fundamental supplies of fuel needed for our country's consumption, something that would be very difficult to obtain from other sources due to the shortage of light crude oil, the insufficient refining capacity, the United States' power and the wars its has unleashed to seize the world oil and gas reserves.

Add to the high energy prices, the prices of foods destined by imperial policy to be transformed into fuel for the gas-guzzling cars of the United States and other industrial nations.

A victory of the Yes vote on December 2 would not be enough. The weeks and months following that date may very well prove to be extremely tough for many countries, Cuba for one; although before that the empire's adventures could lead the planet into an atomic war, as their own leaders have confessed.

Our compatriots can rest assured that I have had time to think and to meditate at length on these problems.

Fidel Castro Ruz

November 29, 2007

본문

번역하겠다고 잡고 있으면 또 못할 것 같아서,

일단 참고하시라고 올립니다.

Socialist Voice
Marxist Perspectives for the 21st Century
      

Number 154, September 7, 2007
Web Edition: www.socialistvoice.ca
     
After Referendum Defeat,
Chávez Pledges to Continue the Struggle
A Report from Caracas

By John Riddell and Suzanne Weiss

John Riddell and Suzanne Weiss traveled to Venezuela at the end of November, as participants in a tour organized by the Australia-Venezuela Solidarity Network.

Responding to what he termed a "photo finish" defeat in Venezuela's December 2 constitutional referendum, President Hugo Chávez pledged to continue the struggle for the measures that were presented to voters.

Announcing the results on national TV, he accepted "the decision made by the people" and thanked all voters, both those who voted "yes" and those in the "no" camp. But he called for his movement to stay on course. "I do not withdraw a single comma from the proposal," he added. "The proposal is still on the table."

Chávez also recalled the words he used after the failure of the Bolivarian movement's initial bid for power: "As I said on February 4, 1992, we could not do it – for now.'" On that occasion, the Venezuelan masses seized on the words "for now" (por ahora) as a commitment to fight on until victory was won.

Chávez closed by saying that a major proposal in the constitutional reform project, the expansion of social security to include workers in the informal economy and housewives, does not require a constitutional amendment and would be carried out as soon as possible.

The right-wing victory in the vote was paper-thin: 51% to 49%. The "no" camp increased its vote only marginally (about 2%) from the opposition's score in last year's presidential elections. The big change was the abstention of more than a third (38%) of those who voted for Chávez last year. Unconvinced of the reform proposals but unwilling to associate themselves with the opposition, they chose this time to stay at home.

Profile of the Reform

Chavez announced plans to reform Venezuela's 1999 constitution shortly after his reelection in December 2006, as a way to open the road for the country's advance to socialism. On August 15, 2007, he proposed amendments to 33 articles of the constitution. This triggered an extensive public debate in all parts of the country.

Following this discussion, on November 2, the National Assembly adopted a package that included not just Chavez's amendments, but others affecting another 36 articles. The referendum followed automatically 30 days later.

The reform's main provisions can be grouped under six headings:

Popular power: Creation of a new level of government consisting of communal and other councils that would receive at least 5% of the national budget and would take decisions not through elected representatives but through assemblies of all members.

Non-capitalist economic development: Provisions for new forms of collective, social, and public property alongside private ownership; subjection of the central bank to government direction; stronger measures for land reform and against capitalist speculation.

Deepening social inclusion: A variety of measures to counter discrimination, democratize higher education, and move towards a 36-hour work week.

New territorial divisions: New presidential powers to channel resources to designated regions with special needs.

A stronger presidency. Removal of the two-term limit on a president's time in office; provision for suspension of freedom of information during a state of emergency (a response to the capitalist media's role in organizing the unsuccessful 2002 military coup); and other measures.

Socialism as the goal. The amendments proclaimed a socialist society as Venezuela's goal, without specifying what that would mean in practice.

(For a fuller outline, see Greg Wilpert's discussion in Venezuelanalysis.)

The view from the streets

When we arrived in Caracas, 12 days before the vote, the streets in downtown and working-class areas were lined with banners, posters, and graffiti calling for a "yes" vote ("Sí con Chávez"). The "no" campaign conceded the streets, relying instead on its vise-grip on the media—the strongest instrument of political control.

We saw little evidence of public discussion. Efforts were being made to circulate the text of the reforms, which filled several dozen pages of legalistic prose. But at first, we saw these distributions only close by the National Assembly. Not until the last few days did we see "red points"—with tables, banners, and music—carrying out the distributions across the city. In the last week, a "dual-column" version was also distributed. We spent time pouring over it, trying to grasp the changes, but it was slow going.

Only in the final few days before the vote did we see flyers that attempted to summarize the changes. Just back from a lengthy trip abroad, Chávez spoke stirringly during the final week in defense of the reform.

Nonetheless, on the whole, we did not see any concerted effort to explain why the changes were necessary.

A loaded debate

Most of criticisms we heard from "no" supporters were based on obvious distortions of the reform, including claims that the changes would abolish private property, end free bargaining for employment contracts, make Chávez president for life, abolish elections, and end free speech.

Other charges were even more fanciful: the government was arming criminal gangs and promoting incursions of Colombian paramilitaries, planning to take children from their parents, and preparing to convert Venezuela into a "totalitarian" state like Cuba or North Korea.

Such accusations were usually delivered in a scattergun style that made reasoned response difficult.

The whole debate was loaded against the Chávez supporters — to vote "yes," you had to support a wide range of proposals which were individually and collectively difficult to understand. But to vote "no" or abstain, you only needed to object to a single proposal, or just feel uneasy or uncertain. The capitalist media made certain that everyone heard plenty of reasons for unease and uncertainty.

The `yes' campaign

During our two-week stay, we talked to many hundreds of "yes" supporters. In the two mass demonstrations we attended, we carried a banner reading, in Spanish, "Canadians in support of the Bolivarian revolution." Marchers crowded round to greet us, talk to us, and express their internationalist convictions.

Given the complexity of the issues, it was striking how well and thoroughly these "yes" supporters understood the reform. Whenever we asked, "Which change is the most important?" we got specific and thoughtful responses, often quoting the constitutional paragraph number, and often taking up complex topics remote from the speaker's immediate experience.

Partisans of the "yes" often overestimated our knowledge of the changes. On a voting lineup in the "23 de Enero" district of western Caracas, a "yes" supporter, asked which change was the most important, replied, "Well, I'd say article 115, but also articles…" and he reeled off a series of article numbers, far too quickly for us to jot down.

We took part in a pro-reform student demonstration of more than 60,000 – the largest such action so far – and a campaign windup that mobilized some 750,000 in downtown Caracas. Both actions were far larger than anything the "no" forces managed. At both events the mood was confident, joyous, and militant.

And as Chávez points out, the vote of 4.3 million for reforms that endorsed a course toward socialism is a historic achievement.

The impact of our discussions with "yes" supporters was overwhelming and is hard to convey to those who have not witnessed revolution. Here we have a revolutionary vanguard of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions—experienced in struggle, wise, passionate, and determined—that has several times rallied a decisive majority to beat down attacks of the imperialist foe.

Defections from the Bolivarian camp

Yet again and again, "yes" activists told us that support for the reform in their milieus was noticeably less than support for Chávez in the presidential elections last year. This uncertainty in the progressive camp was reinforced by a series of much publicized defections, including the Podemos party (which scored 8% in last year's vote) and former defense minister and army chief Raúl Baduel. Many Bolivarian activists told us that the reform faced possible defeat.

In this context, it seemed to us that the revolutionary forces urgently needed to organize an intensive dialogue with those in Bolivarian rank-and-file who were uncertain about the reform. We expected to see efforts to canvass working-class areas similar to what took place earlier this year, when five million signed up to support the project of a new unified socialist party (the PSUV). But we saw no such initiative.

A PSUV meeting we attended in the Catia district of Caracas, a week before the vote, concerned itself with the organizing of scrutineers at polling places – a crucial and complex task – rather than with organizing discussions with voters in its region and getting out the "yes" vote. For the newly formed party branch we visited, just getting the scrutineers in place and provided with logistical backup was a major challenge. The party shows great promise, but did not play a strong visible role in the campaign. (See "The Battle for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela," by Kiraz Janicke.)

Hammer of counterrevolution

The opposition campaign proceeded along two parallel tracks. On one hand, "no" spokespersons – with Baduel and Podemos in the lead – cloaked themselves in the mantle of the 1999 constitution, an early Bolivarian achievement, claiming they merely wanted to defend the movement's original goals (although in fact, the opposition at that time had bitterly opposed that progressive document).

At the same time, the opposition readied its "Plan B." Opposition groups engaged in repeated violent provocations against "yes" supporters, including three wanton killings of Chávez supporters. Elements of the right-wing student movement that is strong in the country's traditional upper-class universities were prominent in the disorders. There was talk of insurrection if "yes" forces won.

Opposition leaders did little to disavow and prevent such actions. During the campaign they did not pledge to accept a "yes" victory. All this reinforced fears about voting.

In the aftermath of the vote, some opposition leaders made conciliatory gestures, clearly seeking to build a bridge to more conservative forces within the government. Yet the entire course of the opposition since Chávez's election in 1999 has aimed not just at halting the Bolivarian process but at forcibly destroying the revolution root and branch and fully restoring U.S. domination and oligarchic rule. In view of Venezuela's oil wealth and world political influence, the opposition's masters in Washington can settle for nothing less.

If the opposition can preserve its control of Venezuela's most powerful social institutions, starting with the private economy and the media, it has good reason to hope that over time they can divide, grind down, and crush the revolution.

This fact was a central motivation for the constitutional reform proposals. The Bolivarian movement's socialist course is not a change from its original goals, which included national sovereignty, a break from neo-liberalism, endogenous development, popular democracy, equality, and the well-being of the working masses. Rather, as Chávez has stated, these goals can be achieved only through a fundamental re-organization of society along socialist lines.

However, many supporters of the Bolivarian cause preferred to stand pat on the social achievements of their movement, rather than risking an uncertain advance toward socialism. The dynamics of elections under capitalism, which isolate working people from each other while maximizing the impact of hostile media, reinforce such conservative impulses.

Yet the revolutionary process has as yet been able only to slightly alleviate the grinding poverty of the Venezuelan masses. Society has only begun to recover from the devastation of neo-liberalism. A still-dominant capitalist class conspires to heighten instability, while seizing on it to discredit the government.

The revolution cannot stand pat. It must advance – or ultimately lose all.

That choice will be made not in parliament but in the arena of mass social struggles, where the multi-millioned Bolivarian vanguard, if successfully deployed, has decisive political weight.

The referendum's outcome is a serious setback. But the resolute response of President Chávez, plus the vigor and determination of the Bolivarian ranks, provide good reason to believe that the revolution will resume its forward march.

SOCIALIST VOICE
Editors: Roger Annis, John Riddell
Managing Editor: Ian Angus
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본문

어제 이 곳에서 베네수엘라 영사님과 최근 베네수엘라에서 돌아온 몇몇 사람들, 그리고 학자들을 포함해서 조촐한 토론회가 있었습니다. 더 큰 토론회가 있기 전에 사전 논의 격으로 진행된 것인데요, 그 곳에서 논의된 내용을 적어봅니다.

논의 내용을 구체적으로 언급하기 이전에, 이야기해두어야 할 것이 있습니다. 연임제 폐지에 대해서들 말이 많은데, 연임제한 없는 나라 굉장히 많습니다. EU 대부분의 나라에서 연임에 제한이 없구요, 캐나다도 마찬가지입니다. 무슨 유신헌법처럼 평생 선거도 안 하고 대통령 해먹겠다는 것도 아닌데, 참 이곳 북미 뿐만 아니라 지구 반대편 한국에서조차 연임제 폐지 가지고만 이야기들을 하고 있네요. 복지 서비스 확충이나 노동시간 단축, 특히 참여 민주주의의 확장 이런 중요한 지점에 대해서는 아무런 논의가 없구요. 오히려 이런 정책들을 공부해보는 것이, 그리고 이런 정책들이 어떻게 민중적 지지를 형성해 내는 지 그런 것을 연구해는 것이 더욱 도움이 될텐데 말입니다. 한국에서 베네수엘라 자주관리운동 (현재 50000개 정도의 사업장에서 노동자 자주관리가 이루어지고 있어요) 이런 것들에 대해서는 사실 잘 모르고 있잖아요. 사실 연임제한이 없는 나라가 그렇게 많다는 것 저도 그 토론회에서야 알게 됐습니다. 미리 알았더라면 사람들이 독재니 어쩌니 할 때마다 이야기하기가 쉬웠을텐데 말이예요. 미언론의 세계 장악, 참 문제입니다. 농담이 아니예요!

이번 패배(?) 이후, 베네수엘라 내적으로는 좀 재미있는 현상이 일어나고 있어요. 선거 전 제가 들은 것은 60% 정도로 헌법개정안이 통과될 것이라는 말이었는데, 실지로 대부분 이렇게들 생각을 한 것 같아요. 워낙 반대파들이 굳세게 단합을 하고 미국에서 돈을 엄청나게 전략적으로 쏟아부은 것과 다른 요인들에 힘입어 이런 결과가 나오긴 했는데, 이것 참 이기고 나니까 반대파들에게는 오히려 자승자박이 된 것이죠. 몇 가지로 정리해보면요,

1) 투표결과에 대한 빠른 승복 -> 베네수엘라는 민주공화국이다, 즉 차베스는 독재자가 아니다.
2) 개정헌법에 극렬히 반대함으로써 오히려 반대파들이 20021999년 개정된 기존 볼리바리안 헌법의 정당성을 역설하는 꼴이 되었다.
3) 반대파들의 투표 후의 시나리오에 차질이 생겼다.

3)은, 워낙 다들 헌법 개정이 될 것이라고 생각을 하고 있었기 때문인데요, 원래 시나리오는 통과가 되면 부정선거라고 하면서 여기저기서 대규모 집회-시위 벌이고 대대적인 불안정국 형성한다 이런 것이었단 말이죠. 49%와 51%가 바꼈다고 했을 때, 그래서 2% 차이로 헌법이 통과되었다고 했을 때 얼마나 불안한 상황이 연출되었을 지는 불을 보듯 뻔한 것이었지요. 그런데 통과가 안 되고 말았다는 것이죠. 반대파들로는서는 참 선거결과에 책임을 질 수 밖에 없는 상황. 이렇게도 저렇게도 할 수 없는 상황이 되어 버린 것이죠.

어쨋든, Maria Paez Victor이라는 사회학자의 이야기를에 저의 의견을 섞어서 옮겨보겠습니다. 임승수씨께서 이야기하신 것처럼 투표율 하락이 매우 중요한데요, 그러니까 작년에 차베스에게 투표했던 사람 중 3백만 명이 이번에는 기권을 했다는 것이예요. 여덟가지 정도로 정리가 되는데요,

1) 승리주의(?)라고 번역하면 될른지 모르겠는데, 그러니까 볼리바리안들 내부에서 좀 안일한 기운이 있었다는 거죠.

2) 매우 복잡한 개정안인데 (법률이니까 어찌 보면 당연하지요) 이에 대해 충분한 안내나 설명같은 것이 진행되지 않았다. 이게 선거와는 다른 건데, 선거에서는 민생문제에 대해 이야기할 수 있지만, 헌법개정국민투표에서는 개정안 글자 하나하나를 가지고 논쟁이 일어나게 되니까요. 그렇지만 민중들에게 중요한 것은 부패나 범죄나 의식주, 뭐 그런 것이죠.

3) 개정헌법의 핵심이 대통령의 권한 강화에 있는 것은 사실인데요, 연임제한 폐지도 폐지지만 핵심은 '경제적 권력'을 강화하는 데 있었다는 점이예요. 이 부분은 제 설명인데, 베네수엘라를 한국과 같이 이해하면 안 되는 것이, 한국과는 경제구조, 그래서 계급구조 자체가 완전히 다른 나라예요. 부르주아계급이 석유자원에 기생되어 있기 때문에 한국 부르주아들처럼 교육받은 노동자원이 그렇게 중요하지 않아요. 그래서 산업도 발전되지 못하고 빈곤율-실업율이 그렇게 높은 것이지요. PDVSA가 그렇게 중요한 이유가 세금도 거의 없기 때문이거든요. 거꾸로 생각하면 차베스가 석유로 들어오는 수입에 의존할 수 밖에 없는 이유가 있다는 거죠. 그래서 경제적 부분에 있어서 대통령과 정부의 권력을 강화하는 것이 사실은 이번 헌법 개정의 핵심이었던 것이예요.

그런데 참세상 독자분이라면 '경제개혁'하면 바로 떠오르시겠지요, 그래요, 그래서 그렇게 목숨걸고 반대한 것이었어요.

4) 그래서 이번에 반대파들이 완전 단결투쟁한 것이지요. 이들은 (1) 차베스가 평생 대통령하려고 한다 (2) 빨갱이들에게 사유재산 다 뺏긴다 이것 두 가지만 가지고 계속 캠페인을 했던 것이구요. 사실 개헌을 통해서 얻을 것이 더 많은 중간층들은 다시 한번 자신의 이익에 배반하는 투표를 했던 것이죠. 이것이야 계속 반복되는 테마입니다만...

5) 그리고 같은 이유에서, 미국에서도 가능한 자원을 총동원한 것이었어요. 대학생들의 반대집회를 위해서 5십만달러, 그러니까 5억원 정도가 지원이 되었구요, 광고로 3백만달러, 즉 30억 정도 지원되었구요, 다양한 경제 제재가 이루어졌지요. 그러니까 또 헷갈리는 중간층들 불안해하고, 열렬하지 않은 지지자들은 에이 차라리 모른 채 하자 싶고.

6) 이런 상황에서 사회복지의 확충이나 노동시간 단축과 같은 내용은 전혀 논의가 안 되고, 그래서 투표에 영향을 못 미치고...

7) 사실 이것이 가장 큰 문제인데, 후견적인 (paternalistic) 관료라는 지점이죠. 장기적으로 봤을 때 참여민주주의의 확장이라는 것이 어떤 형태이냐면 이전 건강위원회 (comites de salud)에서 발전된 지역위원회(consejos communales)가 의회(parlamento)를 대신해나가는 뭐 그런 것들인데, 꼭 이런 구체적인 것 이외에도 참여 민주주의의 확장이라는 것 자체가 그 정의상 기득권의 권력을 줄여나가게 될 수 밖에 없다는 점이예요. 그렇다보니 관료들 자체가 이런 내용의 헌법 통과를 그렇게 반기지 않는다는 것. 사보타지하지는 않더라도 막 적극적으로 선전하고 그렇게 하지를 않았다는 것이예요. 그런데다가 볼리바리안이라고 해도 그 중에는 순수한 사람, 이곳에 권력이 있으니까 들어온 사람, 프락션(?)들어온 사람, 이렇게 다양하고, 의도를 가진 사람들이 갈 수록 많아질 수 밖에 없다 보면 혁명의 미래에 약간의 먹구름이...;;;

8) 마지막으로 현재 진행되고 있는 당건설 사업이 아직까지 완전하지 못하다는 점. 그래서 아직은 강력하게 어떤 선전사업을 행할 만한 능력이 안 되었다고 해요.

(원래 이렇게 길게 쓸 생각이 아니었는데 글이 길어지네요.)

이런 맥락에서 사실 중요한 것은 차베스가 독재자가 되려고 한다, 이런 식이 아니라 헌법의 내용을 좀 구체적으로 살펴보고 그런 것들에 대해 논의를 진행하는 것이겠지요. 예를 들어 좌파 내에서 많이 나오고 있는 비판은 "사회주의적 경제 (economia socialista)"라는 말이 헌법에서 많이 쓰이고 있는데 이것이 충분히 제대로 정의되지 않았다, 이런 것이랍니다.

몇 가지 전망에 대해 이야기해보겠습니다.

1) 차베스는 집권 세력 내에서 가장 진보적인 쪽이예요. 이것이 상당히 재미있는데, 보통 권력을 쥔 사람이 좀더 우경화되는 쪽이 많잖아요. 국가관료는 매우 완강히 저항을 하고 있구요, (예를 들어 일차 의료 개혁인 바리오 아덴트로의 경우에도 원래 보건복지부 외부에서 건설되었지요) 세력 내에서도 "이 정도면 됐지" 하는 사람들이 많습니다. 그런 측면에서 일정하게 '민중주의적인 외형을 띄는' 권력이 형성되는데, 즉, 차베스는 민중들에게 직접 호소함으로써 권력 내부와 관료를 좀더 좌측으로 견인하려 하는 것이죠. 이에 대한 개혁세력들의 전략은 따라서 "Chavismo sin Chavez" 즉 차베스 없는 차베스주의입니다. 차베스를 제거함으로써 베네수엘라의 혁명적 전망을 거세하고 안정적인 자본주의사회로 안착시키려고 하는 것이지요. 저도 개인숭배 등에 대해서는 매우매우 심한 알러지를 갖고 있는 사람입니다만 좋든 싫든 간에 볼리바리안 혁명이라는 찐빵의 앙꼬는 차베스가 맞습니다.

2) 이것이 차베스 1인이 아니라 일정하게 제도적인 틀을 갖춘 형태가 되기 위해서는 당건설이 핵심입니다. 그 과정에서 Podemos같은 민주화세력(우리나라 평민당이랑 비슷한 역사적 위치에 있는 것 같아요)은 저쪽으로 넘어가기도 했구요. 이 당이 얼마나 성공적으로 건설되는가, 즉, 내부의 적(스탈린적인 경향 등)과 외부의 적(수도없이 많아서;;)을 어떻게 싸워이기고 민주적인 당으로 형성되어가는가가 사실 향후 베네수엘라 혁명의 전망에 있어서는 핵심입니다.

3) Paramilitary 문제가 심각한데요, 특히 콜롬비아 접경지역, 해안선, 그리고 수도인 카라카스 등에서 심각합니다. 이들이 정부기관 등에 프락션을 하기도 하구요, 여기저기 많이 들어가 활동을 하는데, 아무도 파악이 안 되구요, 그리고 사람을 그냥 막 죽입니다. 니카라구아 산디니스타 혁명의 예를 보면 알겠지만, 그러면 민중들이 지치게 되죠. 하룻밤 자고 일어나니 내 아들이 죽었는데 이유는 우리나라 대통령이 자꾸 개혁을 하려고 해서 그렇다는 거죠. 인생이라는 것이 워낙 살기 힘든 것인데, 이런 일까지 생기면 아주 열렬한 사회주의자가 아닌 이상은 이제 좀 그만하지 싶은 생각이 들 수 밖에 없을 겁니다. 지금이야 고유가지만 (그런 일 없을 것 같긴 해도 예를 들자면) 유가도 내리고 경제제제가 막 들어오면 몇 십년만 참자, 이렇게 이야기하기 힘들게 되겠죠. 콜롬비아의 군사력이 베네수엘라 10배 정도인데, 사실 처쳐들어올 가능성에 대한 이야기도 많이 되어 왔구요.

두서없는 글 이만 마치겠습니다. 국내에서의 논의에 도움이 되길 바랍니다.

본문

Venezuela’s RCTV: Sine Die and Good Riddance

http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=2050

Monday, May 28, 2007

Venezuela Analysis

By: Stephen Lendman

Venezuelan TV station Radio Caracas Television's (known as RCTV) VHF Channel 2's operating license expired May 27, and it went off the air because the Chavez government, with ample justification, chose not to renew it.  RCTV was the nation's oldest private broadcaster, operating since 1954.  It's also had a tainted record of airing Venezuela's most hard right yellow journalism, consistently showing a lack of ethics, integrity or professional standards in how it operated as required by the law it arrogantly flaunted.

Starting May 28, a new public TV station (TVES)  replaces it bringing Venezuelans a diverse range of new programming TV channel Vive president, Blanca Eckhout, says will "promot(e) the participation and involvement of all Venezuelans in the task of communication (as an alternative to) the media concentration of the radio-electric spectrum that remains in the hands of a (dominant corporate) minority sector" representing elitist business interests, not the people.

Along with the other four major corporate-owned dominant television channels (controlling 90% of the nation's TV market), RCTV played a leading role instigating and supporting the aborted April, 2002 two-day coup against President Chavez mass public opposition on the streets helped overturn restoring Chavez to office and likely saving his life.  Later in the year, these stations conspired again as active participants in the economically devastating 2002-03 main trade union confederation (CTV) - chamber of commerce (Fedecameras) lockout and industry-wide oil strike including willful sabotage against state oil company PDVSA costing it an estimated $14 billion in lost revenue and damage.

This writer explained the dominant corporate media's active role in these events in an extended January, 2007 article titled "Venezuela's RCTV Acts of Sedition."  It presented conclusive evidence RCTV and the other four corporate-run TV stations violated Venezuela's Law of Social Responsibility for Radio and Television (LSR).  That law guarantees freedom of expression without censorship but prohibits, as it should, transmission of messages illegally promoting, apologizing for, or inciting disobedience to the law that includes enlisting public support for the overthrow of a democratically elected president and his government. 

In spite of their lawlessness, the Chavez government treated all five broadcasters gently opting not to prosecute them, but merely refusing to renew one of RCTV's operating licenses (its VHF one) when it expired May 27 (its cable and satellite operations are unaffected) - a mere slap on the wrist for a media enterprise's active role in trying to overthrow the democratically elected Venezuelan president and his government.  The article explained if an individual or organization of any kind incited public hostility, violence and anti-government rebellion under Section 2384 of the US code, Title 18, they would be subject to fine and/or imprisonment for up to 20 years for the crime of sedition. 

They might also be subject to prosecution for treason  under Article 3, Section 3 of the US Constitution stating: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort" such as instigating an insurrection or rebellion and/or sabotage to a national defense utility that could include state oil company PDVSA's facilities vital to the operation and economic viability of the country and welfare of its people.  It would be for US courts to decide if conspiring to overthrow a democratically government conformed to this definition, but it's hard imagining it would not at least convict offenders of sedition.

Opposition Response to the Chavez Government Action

So far, the dominant Venezuelan media's response to RCTV's shutdown has been relatively muted, but it remains to be seen for how long.  However, for media outside the country, it's a different story with BBC one example of misreporting in its usual style of deference to power interests at home and abroad.  May 28 on the World Service, it reported RCTV's license wasn't renewed because "it supported opposition candidates" in a gross perversion of the facts, but that's how BBC operates. 

BBC online was more nuanced and measured, but nonetheless off the mark in key comments like reporting "Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in Caracas Sunday, some to celebrate, others to protest" RCTV's shuttering.  Unexplained was that Chavez supporters way outnumbered opponents who nearly always are part of rightist/corporate-led staged for the media events in contrast to spontaneous pro-government crowds assembling in huge numbers at times, especially whenever Chavez addresses them publicly.

BBC also exaggerated "skirmishes"

BBC also exaggerated "skirmishes"on the streets with "Police us(ing) tear gas and water cannons to disperse (crowds) and driving through the streets on motorbikes, officers fired plastic bullets in the air."  It also underplayed pro-government supportive responses while blaring opposition ones like "Chavez thinks he owns the country.  Well, he doesn't."  Another was "No to the closure.  Freedom."  And still another was "Everyone has the right to watch what they want. He can't take away this channel."  BBC played it up commenting "As the afternoon drew on, the protests got louder."  The atmosphere became nasty.  Shots were fired in the air and people ran for cover.  It was not clear who was firing" when it's nearly always clear as it's been in the past - anti-Chavistas sent to the streets to stir up trouble and blame it on Chavez.

BBC's commentary ended saying "The arguments highlight, once again, how deeply divided Venezuela is."  Unmentioned was that division is about 70 - 80% pro-Chavez, around 20% opposed (the more privileged "sifrino" class), and a small percentage pro and con between them.

Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.