CINA

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North Korea's satirical magazine (to delude the public) Rodong Shinmun(로동신문) published y'day the following f*cking BS(*):

An atmosphere of supporting and defending Songun politics is mounting among all the south Koreans.

More than 400 articles lauding the Songun politics have been posted on Internet homepages a day despite the oppression by the fascist authorities. This shows the hot wind of supporting Songun politics sweeping south Korea.

South Koreans are unanimous in asserting that "unification of systems" is impossible even though the authorities pour huge taxes collected from people in escalating confrontation with compatriots but reunification by federal formula is possible if the June 15 joint declaration and the October 4 declaration are implemented.

South Korean people greatly yearn for socialist system centered on the popular masses in the north.

It is quite natural that people, living in the hell-like society where the dignity and rights of the working people are trampled down, long for the man-centered socialist system and turn out in the movement for reunification through alliance with north for a new politics and life.

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news06/20111206-07ee.html

* Here you can read the complete shit in Korean... if you're not residing in S. Korea, where the f*cking NIS(buzzkill!!) is blocking every funny(resp. lame-o) BS, coming from the North.

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As today's "weekend reading" I would like to suggest...

...with its really fascinating traval reports from N. Korea:

http://monsoondiaries.com/category/destinations/north-korea

Please enjoy your weekend!!

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MUST READ! A. Lankov contributed the following interesting piece for today's Asia Times (HK):

The secret world of North Korea's new rich

When people in the West talk about North Korea, they usually imagine a country of hunger and floods, populated by starving children, subsistence farmers and goose-stepping female soldiers. These stereotypes - like nearly all stereotypes - are not completely unfounded, but misleading nonetheless.

North Korea is a poor place, no doubt, even though recent reports about looming famine seem to be part exaggeration and part deliberate stratagem, initiated by the regime to obtain aid from the international community. Nonetheless, 2011 Pyongyang has a booming restaurant scene and the traffic on its broad streets - once notoriously empty - is steadily increasing in volume.

Well-fed North Koreans are frequenting newly opened sushi bars and beer houses as well as a local hamburger joint. On the streets of the North Korean capital, one can see a lot of visibly undernourished people, but also a number of women clad in designer clothes.

One should not be surprised by these sights, which can be encountered not only in Pyongyang, but also in a number of major North Korean cities.

The past 20 years saw the slow-motion collapse of a hyper-centralized economy that was once a defining feature of North Korea's "nationalist Stalinism". Grassroots capitalism has replaced state socialism and this quiet transformation predictably brought in a remarkable income inequality.

North Korea's new rich made their fortunes amid the economic chaos and social disruption of the great famine of 1996-1999. This new bourgeoisie matured in the next decade as the North Korean economy started to partially recover from the disastrous 1990s.

As a North Korean female refugee said to this author a few days ago: "Until 2005, all but officials lived similar lives. But after 2005, everybody can see the difference between rich and poor." Perhaps the change is difficult to associate with just one year, but on balance she seems to be correct.

Who are they - the North Korean new rich? The upper crust of this social group consists of high-level officials. Some of them have gained their wealth through illegal means, but many have seen their business activities permitted and even actively encouraged by the government. Most of the money is made in foreign trade, with China being by the far the most significant partner.

Many North Korean companies, despite being technically owned by the state, are effectively private and are run by top officials and their relatives.

That said, these people are not that frequently seen on the streets of Pyongyang. They live in their own enclosed world, of which not much is known.

But if we go one or two steps down, we will encounter a very different type of North Korean entrepreneur - somebody who has made his or her (yes, surprising many of them are women) money more or less independent of the state.

Complete independence is not possible because every North Korean businessman has to pay officials just to make sure that they will not ask too many questions and turn a blind eye to activities that are still technically illegal. In many cases, North Korean entrepreneurs prefer to disguise their private operations under the cover of some state agency.

Take for example Pak. In his early 40s, he runs a truck company together with a few friends. The company has seven trucks and largely specializes in moving salt from salt ponds on the seacoast to major wholesale markets. The company employs a couple of dozen people, but officially it does not exist. On paper, all trucks are owned by state agencies and Pak's employees are also officially registered as workers of state enterprises.

Pak bought used trucks in China, paying the Chinese owners with cash. He then took them to North Korea where he had the vehicles registered with various government agencies (army units are the best choice since military number plates give important advantages). Pak paid officials for their agreement to "adopt" the trucks. This is so common in the North that there is even an established rate of how much fake registration of a particular type of vehicle costs at which government agency.

Kim was a private owner of a gold mine. The gold mine was officially registered as a state enterprise. Technically, it was owned by a foreign trade company that in turn was managed by the financial department of the Party Central Committee. However, this was a legal fiction, pure and simple: Kim, once a mid-level police official, made some initial capital through bribes and smuggling, while his brother had made a minor fortune through selling counterfeit Western tobacco.

Then they used their money to grease the palms of bureaucrats, and they took over an old gold mine that had ceased operation in the 1980s. They restarted the small mine and hired workers, bought equipment and restarted operations. The gold dust was sold independently (and, strictly speaking, illegally) to Chinese traders.

The brothers agreed with the bureaucrats from the foreign trade company on how much money they should pay them roughly between 30-40% and the rest was used to run the business and enjoy life.

One step below we can see even humbler people like Ms Young, once an engineer at a state factory. In the mid-1990s, she began trading in second-hand Chinese dresses. By 2005 she was running a number of workshops that employed a few dozen women.

They made copies of Chinese garments using Chinese cloth, zippers and buttons. Some of the materials was smuggled across the border, while another part was purchased legally, mostly from a large market in the city of Raseon (a special economic zone which can be visited by Chinese merchants almost freely).

Interestingly, Ms Young technically remained an employee of a non-functioning state factory from which she was absent for months on end. She had to pay for the privilege of missing work and indoctrination sessions, deducting some $40 as her monthly "donation". This is an impressive sum if compared with her official salary of merely US$2.

The North Korean new rich might occasionally feel insecure. They might be afraid of the state, because pretty much everything they do is in breach of some article of the North Korean criminal code. A serious breach indeed - technically any of the above described persons could be sent to face an execution squad at the moment the authorities change their mind.

Indeed, such was the sorry fate of a significant number of first-generation North Korean businessmen, those who began to make money in the early 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the Juche (self-reliance)-style Stalinist economy. In 1994-1995, the execution of profiteers and embezzlers, occasionally conducted in public, was a part of a large campaign launched by the central government. The fear still lingers, but over the past 15 years such large-scale campaigns have never been conducted on a nationwide level. But for any business person, the risk is quite real.

However, it is difficult to say that they try to keep a low profile. On the contrary, nowadays one can see a lot of conspicuous consumption in North Korea, where the average official figure is misleading - virtually no North Korean family survives on the official wage alone.

The average monthly income is actually higher - thanks to the nearly universal involvement with the unofficial economy - and seems to be close to $15. Business people earn much more. People like Kim or Young usually make as much as a few thousand dollars a month, while smaller businesses (like a corner shop or tobacco workshop) bring in income measured in a few hundred dollars a month.

It is no surprise that the new rich enjoy consumption. Overseas travel is out of the question (it is permissible only for top business people related to the upper elite and/or the Kim Jong-il family), and domestic travel does not seem to be very popular. Nonetheless, the new rich frequent restaurants where a good meal will cost roughly as much as the average North Korean family makes in a couple of weeks.

They buy houses - technically the sale of real estate is illegal, but in the past two decades North Koreans have developed many techniques that allow the circumvention of these measures with ease. They buy all kinds of household appliances, flat-screen TVs, computers, large fridges, motor bikes. Even private cars have begun to appear, though in most cases successful businessmen prefer to register their used Toyotas and Hondas as the property of some state agency.

There are some peculiar problems that the North Korean new rich face. For example, even Pyongyang, let alone smaller cities, has a very unreliable supply of electricity. Large batteries and small power generators are of help, but only to a certain extent. Batteries are enough to run a TV or a DVD player, but power-hungry air-conditioners and fridges need a constant supply of electricity that is not readily available.

Surprisingly, many people in the countryside still buy fridges, even though the contraptions are unusable most of the time. I have frequently come across North Koreans who have boasted of the fridge they own, only to admit that they do not have electricity to switch it on.

To my perplexed question of why they spent so much money on such a useless device, my interlocutors would usually reply that a fridge was an important and even useful status symbol. An affluent household nowadays is expected to own a fridge, even if it is used as a bookshelf (as was the case with one of my North Korean acquaintances).

In some cases, fridges are on all the time - like the air-conditioners which are seldom bought for prestige purposes alone. At first glance, a small power generator appears to be the solution, but this is not really the case. Such generators are easy come by in the North, but they are not reliable, consume a lot of expensive fuel and - last, but not least - are very noisy. So, even though many rich North Korean families have such machines, these devices are usually only used on special occasions.

Surprisingly, more common is the seemingly exotic practice of electricity theft. A North Korean of wealthy means makes a deal with a local military commander or manager of the local power grid, then an illegal power cable connects the entrepreneur's house with a power grid sub-station or military base (military installations are usually supplied with electricity even when the common customers are switched off).

I know of a rich neighborhood in a relatively affluent borderland North Korean city where half a dozen households made an illegal deal with a manager of the power grid. Each family pays the equivalent of $7 and has round the clock access to an unlimited electricity supply. All these houses boast air-conditioners, a supreme luxury in the countryside.

What will happen to these people? What is their role in the future of North Korea? Ostensibly, there seem to be reasons to be optimistic. The rising merchant classes in Europe of the 17th and 18th centuries eventually destroyed feudal monarchies. So why shouldn't we expect a similar fate for the Kim regime, which has a surprising amount in common with the states of pre-modern Europe?

This indeed might happen: the growth of the private economy is slowly eroding the authority and control of the government and concurrently is bringing dangerous ideas to North Koreans. Business people themselves see the state and its officials as a swarm of parasites (frankly, this feeling seems to be mutual).

However, there is an interesting twist. If a North Korean revolution comes, it is likely to be followed by unification with (or rather absorption by) the South: the allure of the rich and free South is seemingly irresistible. However, if this were to happen, the future of North Korean nascent businesses would not be rosy. It is telling that in the countries of the former communist bloc, surprisingly few bosses of communist-era black market businesses managed to adjust to the new, "regular" capitalist environment.

In North Korea, their peers are likely to fare even worse, since they will have to compete with the capital and expertise of South Korean businesses.

Paradoxically, the long-term interests of the emerging North Korean business class might coincide with that of the Kim regime. Unlike normal people in the North, both groups - officials and entrepreneurs - have an interest in maintaining a separate North Korean state. Unification with the South is bound to spell disaster for both groups.

A person who is now running a couple of small shops might eventually, if North Korean capitalism continues uninterrupted growth, become an owner of a supermarket chain. If unification comes, he or she would be lucky to survive the competition with the South Korean retail giants and keep the few corner shops they had.

However, the alliance between the regime and the newly emerged North Korean entrepreneurial class does not seem likely: neither corrupt officials nor greedy black market operators are that far-sighted. This is probably very good news for the vast majority of North Koreans who are likely to benefit much from the collapse of the regime and possible unification with the South.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH10Dg02.html

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Monday's Guardian (UK) reported the following:

N. Korea cancels university classes for construction drive

Pyongyang calls for 10-month sacrifice for construction projects before centenary of founding leader's birth, says UK diplomat

North Korea has reportedly closed its universities to most students and told them to start building as it ramps up a construction campaign ahead of its planned re-emergence next year as a "great and prosperous nation".

The UK ambassador to Pyongyang, Peter Hughes, told the Guardian that the almost year-long academic sacrifice was deemed necessary to reach production targets for new housing ahead of the centenary of founding president Kim Il-sung's birth.

To mark the occasion, Hughes said the government pledged to build 100,000 accommodation units in the North Korean capital, which has a chronic housing shortage.

"I think they have built maybe 10% of that ... Any country would be stretched to hit that accommodation target in two or three years," he said. "As far as we can tell they are going all out to achieve as much as they can before then."

Building work for such prestigious state events is normally carried out by the military, but construction teams are at full stretch on monuments, residential blocks and other projects.

North Korea has also recommenced work on the 105-storey Ryugong skyscraper, which was started in 1987 and was then halted during the years of starvation and economic hardship. Foreign engineers have been called in for consultation and the authorities have promised to finish the building by 2012.

There has been no mention of the mobilisation in the domestic media. Japan's Kyodo news agency has reported that all universities, except for graduating seniors and foreign students, had to cancel classes until next year.

University World News said universities would be closed for up to 10 months from 27 June while students were dispatched to farms, factories and construction sites.

The last time this is known to have happened for such a length of time was during the famines of the late 1990s. The food situation in the country remains precarious. Earlier this year, the UN launched an appeal for humanitarian aid.

Hughes said the universities remained open, but many students were being shifted to outside tasks.

"They are already out there building things. It's difficult to know exactly what," he said. "This has happened before, but for maybe a month or two. The only unusual thing is that they are out for 10 months."

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/04/north-korea-closes-universities-reports

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As today's "weekend reading" I would like to suggest the following story, published in yesterday's Asia Times(HK)!

Narco-capitalism grips North Korea
By Andrei Lankov

In early March, the United States State Department made a statement that attracted surprisingly little attention worldwide, estimating that government-sponsored narcotic production in North Korea seemed to have decreased considerably. At the same time, the statement made clear that the private production of drugs was on the rise.

This fits with what the present author has heard recently - often from sources inside North Korea; it seems that North Korea's drug industry is changing, and this change might have important consequences for the outside world.

The story of North Korea's involvement with the international narcotics trade began 35 years ago. In 1976, Norwegian police intercepted a large shipment of hashish in the luggage of North Korean diplomats. The same year, another group of North Korean officials was found in possession of the same drug by Egyptian customs; they had 400 kilograms of hashish in their luggage.

In both cases, diplomatic passports saved them from any formal investigation. Next year, North Korean diplomats were caught trying to smuggle drugs into Venezuela and India. In India, quite friendly to North Korea in those days, the 15 kgs of hashish was transported by the ambassador's secretary. After that, such seizures became regular occurrences, usually once every year or two, and usually involving North Korean diplomats.

North Korea's narcotics program has always appeared strange to outside observers - "strange" even if judged by the standards of Pyongyang, whose leaders do not care much about legal niceties and international reputation, and perceive international politics as a cut-throat, zero-sum game. On balance, state-sponsored drug production has done much more harm than good to Pyongyang.

Available estimates agree that the North Korean government didn't earn much from pedaling illicit drugs. It is even possible that these risky operations were largely waged to sustain North Korean missions overseas - from the mid-1970s such missions were required to pay for their own expenses.

At the same time, the existence of this program inflicted serious damage on Pyongyang's international standing, which was at rock-bottom anyway. Despite all denials of official involvement, the program could not really be hidden because seizures of narcotics carried by North Korean diplomats and officials happened far too often and sometimes in countries that were relatively sympathetic to the North.

So, if analysts at the State Department are to be believed, North Korea seems to have come to its senses and stopped or, more likely, significantly reduced its narcotics production. Indeed, this program seems to belong to the strange and slightly bizarre world of the foreign policy of North Korea in the 1970s. After all, those were the times when North Korean agents were busy kidnapping Japanese teenagers to become living tools for the training of agents (and when US$200 million was spent propagating the juche(self-reliance) ideology in the Third World).

However, this doesn't mean the world should heave a collective sigh of relief and write off North Korea as a potential source of dangerous narcotics. If anything, the situation has become worse over the past five to six years. But this time, the North Korean regime seems to have little or no responsibility for the new boom in drug production.

The change in the North Korean drug industry essentially mirrors the wider changes that in the past two decades have occurred in the North Korean economy and society at large. The state-run economy essentially collapsed whilst private business took over - usually unrecognized by the state, technically illegal in most cases, completely absent from official statistics, but powerful nonetheless. This happened in all industries, and drugs production was not an exception.

The author interacts with North Koreans quite frequently and most of my contacts are people from the northernmost part of the country, from areas adjacent to the Chinese border. They are unanimous: around 2005 to 2006, these areas experienced a sudden and dramatic upsurge in drug usage, hitherto almost unknown to the common public.

It's true that some opium productive capacity existed in the northeastern parts of Korea since the early 1900s. This is also the region where secret state-run plantations were rumored to be located in the 1980s or early 1990s. However, in the North Korea of the Kim Il-sung era, surveillance was tight and exceptionally efficient, so drug problems were for all practical purposes non-existent within the country. The drugs were produced for export and medical purposes only.

Things began to change around 2005; by that time North Korea had undergone what is usually described as "grassroots capitalism" or "marketization from below". The old state-run economy had come to a complete standstill, so most North Koreans started to make a living through all sorts of private economic activities - from cultivating private fields and working at private workshops to smuggling.

Official corruption became endemic, so officials became more than willing to turn a blind eye to all sorts of illegal activities as long as they received their cut. Arguably, North Korea nowadays might be described as the most corrupt country of East Asia: every interaction with authorities requires payment, and if the payment is sufficient, almost everything is possible.

This social and economic situation has made the large-scale private production of drugs possible. The new North Korean drug scene is dominated by "Ice" (crystal meth), a synthetic substance produced in numerous small workshops. It is frequently mentioned by defectors, while references to other drugs are quite rare.

Most of my North Korean interlocutors, some former Korean People's Army officers, believe that methamphetamines were initially produced officially, but not so much as a drug in the strict sense, rather as a stimulant for elite military units. This seems to be plausible - after all, it was used as such during World War II by both the Axis and the Allies.

However, after around 2005 private production of Ice began and soon became large-scale. There are rumors about occasional state involvement with illicit production of drugs for export, but even if those rumors are true, the state-sponsored labs clearly produce only a small fraction of the total. Most of the labs are private nowadays.

Raw materials are often imported from China, and China has also become a major market for North Korean drug manufacturers. Since law-enforcement in North Korea is so lax (at least when no political issues are involved), it is easier and safer to run a drug workshop there, on the southern banks of the Tumen River.

The Ice-producing labs are difficult to hide since the production is smelly. Usually, such labs operate at some distance from living quarters, somewhere in the mountains or at a non-operational factory. (Admittedly, such factories are not in short supply in post-crisis North Korea).

In many cases, there are joint operations of Chinese and North Korean criminal groups: the Chinese provide the necessary supplies while the North Koreans use their territory as a safe haven to process drugs that are later shipped to China.

However, some narcotics remain in North Korea, where drug usage has increased dramatically. My interviewees say that at least in the cities of the borderlands a significant proportion of younger people have had some experience with Ice. A schoolteacher from a borderland city of Musan recently told me that in 2008-09 most of the students in their final years of high school tried Ice.

But the problem is not limited to the borderlands. A few months ago, a colleague of mine whilst visiting a prestigious college in Pyongyang spotted a poster that warned Pyongyang students about the dangers of drug use. Merely a few years ago, such a poster would be both unthinkable and unnecessary.

It seems this development has begun to worry the Chinese. In the past few years, Chinese media occasionally write about crackdowns on drug dealers in China's northeast, often explicitly mentioning their Korean connection. Last summer, Chinese media reported that a fleet of high-speed boats, operated by the Chinese police, had begun to patrol the rivers on the border with North Korea. The task of this squad is specifically to fight drug smuggling.

The "new" North Korean drug problem is relatively local and small in scale, although it might have sufficiently grave consequences for North Korea itself, as well as for some adjacent areas of China and Russia. It also might be seen as an indication of a new type of problem that North Korea might create.

In the past, most troubles related to North Korea were caused by the North Korean government that demonstrated an inclination to flout international laws and conventions (sometimes this inclination was strengthened by remarkable adventurism). Nowadays, problems are increasingly caused by the inability of this government to control what is happening in the country - at least outside of Pyongyang and some major cities. In the long run, the lawlessness of uncontrolled private profiteers might prove more dangerous than the Machiavellian adventurism of dictators.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MC18Dg02.html

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As today's "weekend reading" I would like to suggest the following two pieces, published in yesterday's Asia Times(HK)!

☞ Why the Kim regime will falter (by A. Lankov)
☞ Why the Kim regime will never die (by Kim Myeong-cheol)

Here some "highlights" from Kim Myeong-cheol's lousy job:

"What the West has yet to appreciate is that North Korea under Kim Jong-il is so resilient that it will last hundreds of years and enjoy a millennium prosperity, as indisputably shown in his first-class statesmanlike stewardship of North Korea's emergence into two elite clubs - that of space and nuclear powers - nullifying the United States-initiated sanctions..."

"The North Koreans see a heaven-sent peerless national hero and great patriot in the father image Kim Jong-il and identify him with the proud Korean nation, its future and destiny..."

"The most striking thing about North Korea is that its whole population of 24 million people make up an awesome corps of highly motivated and well-disciplined candidate suicide bombers, dedicated to their supreme leader-cum father figure Kim Jong-il in a highly nationalistic society with traditional values..."

PS: Today's Hankyoreh published the following article (somehow related to A. Lankov's piece): ☞ NGO reports escalating food crisis in N.Korea
 

Have a nice weekend (if you're not located in Libya or Japan)!!

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The revolutions/popular uprisings for human rights and civil liberties/democracy are taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya... And soon in North Korea (the "Paradise of the Working Class", led by the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il, the "Sun of the 21st Century"^^)???

Yesterday morning the German (bourgeois) magazine Der Spiegel headlined: "The unrest is spreading into North Korea" (few hours later the word "allegedly" was added!!)

One day earlier AsiaNews reported: "First public protests against the Kims’ regime"

Well, here're just some related aricles:
☞ Scent of freedom in North Korea (Asia Times, 2.25)
☞ Are Egypt-inspired upheavals possible in N. Korea? (Yonhap, 2.25)
☞ Hundreds of N. Koreans against the police, dead and wounded (AsiaNews, 2.24)
☞ A DPRK for the Middle East! (DailyNK, 2.24)


 

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Well, usually there're not many funny stories about/from North Korea, but the following is definitely one of them (even if it's possibly only a rumor...)!

Headline in today's (German) Spiegel (magazine):

Sabotage Against Kim Jong-un's "Birthday Train"

Reuters reported the following:

Train carrying gifts for N.Korea heir derailed

A train packed with birthday gifts for North Korea's leader-in-waiting Kim Jong-un derailed this month in a possible act of sabotage, a Seoul-based radio station which broadcasts across the border reported on Monday.

Open Radio for North Korea, a non-profit station which often cites sources in the reclusive, impoverished North, said the train laden with gifts including televisions and watches came off the rails on Dec. 11 near North Korea's border with China.

"The security service has been in an emergency situation because a train departing Sinuiju and headed for Pyongyang derailed on Dec. 11," the radio station quoted a source in the security service in North Phyongan province as saying.

The city of Sinuiju is a North Korean trading gateway.

"The tracks and rail beds are so old it is possible there was decay in the wood or nails that secured the tracks could have been dislodged but the extent of damage to the tracks and the timing of the incident points to a chance that someone intentionally damaged the tracks," the source said.

"It's highly likely that it was someone who is opposed to succession to Kim Jong-un," the source said, according to the radio station...

http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-53794420101227

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"X-mass Season" in N. Korea, the "Paradise of the Working Class"

KCNA 'reported' the following about events, incl. a booze-up(*), happened Dec. 24, aka the "Christmas Eve":
  
Dancing parties of youth and students took place here and in various provinces, cities and county seats of the country on Friday. They were to celebrate the 19th anniversary of General Secretary Kim Jong Il as supreme commander of the Korean People's Army and the 93rd birth anniversary of anti-Japanese war hero Kim Jong Suk.

As song "Please Receive Our Salute" reverberated far and wide, youth and students presented merry dances, extending profound thanks to Kim Jong Il who has developed the KPA into invincible revolutionary armed forces of Mt. Paektu and brought about a great change in building a rich and powerful country.

They also presented graceful dances to the tune of songs "The Tuman River Full of Memories" and "Triumphant War Song in Forest," looking back with deep emotion on Kim Jong Suk's noble revolutionary career and undying feats.

Dancing parties held in various parts of the country successfully represented the will of the youth and students to devotedly defend Kim Jong Il and give steady continuity to the tradition of Juche.

http://175.45.179.68/eng/i_news.php?lang=eng&year=2010&kk=8036

* For more please read the following KCNA 'news reports':

☞ Banquet Given by Central Military Commission of WPK and NDC of DPRK
☞ Kim Jong Il Enjoys Art Performance

But in reality millions of 'ordinary' N. Koreans (the inhabitants of the "Paradise of the Working Class"!!^^) are struggling only for survival, as the following example describes the current situation in the 'DPR'K:

The residents of Hamheung city in South Hamgyong Province are complaining about not being able to sleep because of the bone-chilling cold temperature as cold weather continues as falling temperatures plummet below freezing point.

Although officials and the wealthy can stock up plenty of coal and firewood at home, the ordinary citizens can only obtain them as needed.

They try to get firewood when they are unable to obtain coal and collect leaves and twigs when firewood is not available. On the days when none of those are available they cannot even dream of heating, so they use fuel only for cooking rice only for a minute.

The children who are not mature enough to understand the situation whine about being cold, and old people groan in pain instead of complaining verbally.

It is so cold that frost and water droplets can be seen along the inner walls of the house, and white steam out of your breath is visible even inside a room as you wake in the morning and talk. People sleep with their clothes on because of the cold temperature.

For that reason many people keep the same clothes on throughout the day and night. They keep the outdoor clothing while living in the house during the day and then go to bed wearing the same clothes because the temperature inside and outside is not that much different.

People would be able to stand the cold weather if they can fill their stomach a little bit, but the days of cold and hunger are continuing because there is not enough food...

Source: NK Today ("Good Friends/좋은벗들")

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KCNA reported last night(KST) that the WPK Conference had come to an end after one full day, saying, “The WPK Delegates’ Conference has been successfully completed, with Kim Young Nam giving the closing address.”

A few hours later KCNA released the results of the Delegates’ Conference to the world:

Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party are as follows:

Kim Jong Il, Kim Young Nam, Choi Young Rim, Cho Myung Rok, Lee Young Ho, Kim Young Chun, Jeon Byung Ho, Kim Kuk Tae, Kim Ki Nam, Choi Tae Bok, Yang Hyeong Seop, Kang Sok Ju, Byeon Young Rip, Lee Yong Mu, Ju Sang Seong, Hong Seok Hyeong, Kim Kyung Hee

Candidates Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party are as follows:

Kim Yang Gun, Kim Young Il, Park Do Chun, Choi Ryong Hae, Jang Sung Taek, Ju Gyu Chang, Lee Tae Nam, Kim Rak Hee, Tae Jong Su, Kim Pyong Hae, Woo Dong Cheuk, Kim Jeong Gak, Park Jung Sun, Kim Chang Seop, Mun Kyeong Deok

Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party are as follows:

Kim Jong Il, Kim Young Nam, Choi Young Rim, Cho Myung Rok, Lee Young Ho

Kim Ki Nam, Jang Sung Taek, Kim Young Il, Kim Pyong Hae, Lee Young Su, Ju Gyu Chang, Hong Seok Hyeong, Kim Kyung Hee, Choi Hee Jeong, Oh Il Jeong, Kim Yang Gun, Kim Jeong Im, Chae Hee Jeong, Tae Jong Su have been appointed directors of the Central Committee of the Party

Kim Ki Ryong has been appointed Editor-in-Chief of Rodong Shinmun, the publication of the Central Committee of the Party.

The members of the WPK Secretariat

The following is the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party

General Secretary of the Chosun Workers’ Party: Kim Jong Il

Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party: Kim Ki Nam, Choi Tae Bok, Choi Ryong Hae, Mun Kyeong Deok, Park Do Chun, Kim Young Il, Kim Yang Gun, Kim Pyong Hae, Tae Jong Su, Hong Seok Hyeong.”

The Central Military Commission is as follows:

Chairman: Kim Jong Il
Vice Chairman: Kim Jong Eun, Lee Young Ho

Members: Kim Young Chun, Kim Jeong Gak, Kim Myeong Kuk, Kim Kyung Ok, Kim Won Hong, Jeong Myeong Do, Lee Byeong Cheol, Choi Bu Il, Kim Young Cheol, Yun Jeong Rin, Ju Gyu Chang, Choi Sang Ryeo, Choi Kyeong Seong, Woo Dong Cheuk, Choi Ryong Hae, Jang Sung Taek

Members of the Central Committee of the Party are as follows:

Kim Jong Il, Kang Neung Su, Kang Dong Yun, Kang Sok Ju, Kang Pyo Young, Kang Yang Mo, Ko Byeong Hyeon, Kim Kuk Tae, Kim Kyung Hee, Kim Kyung Ok, Kim Ki Nam, Kim Ki Ryong, Kim Rak Hee, Kim Myeong Kun, Kim Byeong Ryul, Kim Byeong Ho, Kim Seong Deok, Kim Song Cheol, Kim Jeong Gak, Kim Jeong Suk, Kim Jong Eun, Kim Jeong Im, Kim Chang Seop, Kim Cheol Man, Kim Chun Sam, Kim Tae Bong, Kim Pyong Hae, Kim Hyeong Ryong, Kim Hyeong Shik, Kim Hee Taek, Jun Yang Gun, Kim Young Nam, Kim Young Chun, Kim Young Il, Kim Young Cheol, Kim Yong Jin, Kim In Shik, Kim Won Hong, Kwak Beom Ki, Ryang Man Kil, Ryeo Chun Seok, Roh Du Cheol, Roh Bae Kwon, Ryu Young Seop, Lee Ryong Nam, Lee Man Gun, Lee Myeong Su, Lee Mu Young, Lee Byeong Sam, Lee Byeong Cheol, Lee Bong Deok, Lee Bong Juk, Lee Tae Nam, Lee Hyeong Gun, Lee Hee Heon, Lee Young Kil, Lee Young Su, Lee Young Ho, Lee Yong Mu, Lee Yong Hwang, Lee Yong Cheol, Lee Eul Seol, Rim Kyeong Man, Mun Kyeong Deok, Park Gwang Cheol, Park Don Chun, Park Myeong Cheol, Park Su Kil, Park Seung Won, Park Jeong Sun, Park Jong Geun, Park Jae Kyeong, Park Tae Deok, Park Ui Chun, Byeon Young Rip, Byeon In Sun, Baek Seh Bong, Seong Ja Rip, Jang Byeong Gyu, Jang Sung Taek, Jang Cheol, Jeon Kil Su, Jeon Ryong Kuk, Jeon Byung Ho, Jeon Jin Su, Jeon Chang Bok, Jeon Ha Cheol, Jeon Hee Jeong, Jeong Myeong Do, Jeong Ho Gyun, Jeong In Kuk, Cho Kyung Cheol, Cho Myung Rok, Cho Byeong Ju, Ju Gyu Chang, Ju Sang Seong, Ju Young Shik, Cha Seung Su, Chae Hee Jeong, Choi Kyeong Sung, Choi Ryong Hae, Choi Bu Il, Choi Sang Ryeo, Choi Tae Bok, Choi Hee Jeong, Choi Young Deok, Choi Young Rim, Tae Jong Su, Han Gwang Bok, Hand Dong Geun, Hyun Cheol Hae, Hyun Young Cheol, Hong Seok Hyeong, Hong In Byeom, An Jeong Su, Yang Dong Hun, Yang Hyeong Seop, Oh Keuk Ryul, Oh Guem Cheol, Oh Su Yong, Oh Il Jeong, Woo Dong Cheuk, Yun Dong Hyeon, Yun Jeong Rin.”

For more "detailed(^^)info": Since today KCNA has a special section with collected "news reports" about the ☞ WPK Conference!