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17개의 게시물을 찾았습니다.
our years ago, Alan Greenspan urged Congress to cut taxes, asserting that the federal government was in imminent danger of paying off too much debt.
On Wednesday the Fed chairman warned Congress of the opposite fiscal danger: he asserted that there would be large budget deficits for the foreseeable future, leading to an unsustainable rise in federal debt. But he counseled against reversing the tax cuts, calling instead for cuts in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid.
Does anyone still take Mr. Greenspan's pose as a nonpartisan font of wisdom seriously?
When Mr. Greenspan made his contorted argument for tax cuts back in 2001, his reputation made it hard for many observers to admit the obvious: he was mainly looking for some way to do the Bush administration a political favor. But there's no reason to be taken in by his equally weak, contorted argument against reversing those cuts today.
To put Mr. Greenspan's game of fiscal three-card monte in perspective, remember that the push for Social Security privatization is only part of the right's strategy for dismantling the New Deal and the Great Society. The other big piece of that strategy is the use of tax cuts to "starve the beast."
Until the 1970's conservatives tended to be open about their disdain for Social Security and Medicare. But honesty was bad politics, because voters value those programs.
So conservative intellectuals proposed a bait-and-switch strategy: First, advocate tax cuts, using whatever tactics you think may work - supply-side economics, inflated budget projections, whatever. Then use the resulting deficits to argue for slashing government spending.
And that's the story of the last four years. In 2001, President Bush and Mr. Greenspan justified tax cuts with sunny predictions that the budget would remain comfortably in surplus. But Mr. Bush's advisers knew that the tax cuts would probably cause budget problems, and welcomed the prospect.
In fact, Mr. Bush celebrated the budget's initial slide into deficit. In the summer of 2001 he called plunging federal revenue "incredibly positive news" because it would "put a straitjacket" on federal spending.
To keep that straitjacket on, however, those who sold tax cuts with the assurance that they were easily affordable must convince the public that the cuts can't be reversed now that those assurances have proved false. And Mr. Greenspan has once again tried to come to the president's aid, insisting this week that we should deal with deficits "primarily, if not wholly," by slashing Social Security and Medicare because tax increases would "pose significant risks to economic growth."
Really? America prospered for half a century under a level of federal taxes higher than the one we face today. According to the administration's own estimates, Mr. Bush's second term will see the lowest tax take as a percentage of G.D.P. since the Truman administration. And don't forget that President Clinton's 1993 tax increase ushered in an economic boom. Why, exactly, are tax increases out of the question?
O.K., enough about Mr. Greenspan. The real news is the growing evidence that the political theory behind the Bush tax cuts was as wrong as the economic theory.
According to starve-the-beast doctrine, right-wing politicians can use the big deficits generated by tax cuts as an excuse to slash social insurance programs. Mr. Bush's advisers thought that it would prove especially easy to sell benefit cuts in the context of Social Security privatization because the president could pretend that a plan that sharply cut benefits would actually be good for workers.
But the theory isn't working. As soon as voters heard that privatization would involve benefit cuts, support for Social Security "reform" plunged. Another sign of the theory's falsity: across the nation, Republican governors, finding that voters really want adequate public services, are talking about tax increases.
The best bet now is that Mr. Bush will manage to make the poor suffer, but fail to make a dent in the great middle-class entitlement programs.
And the consequence of the failure of the starve-the-beast theory is a looming fiscal crisis - Mr. Greenspan isn't wrong about that. The middle class won't give up programs that are essential to its financial security; the right won't give up tax cuts that it sold on false pretenses. The only question now is when foreign investors, who have financed our deficits so far, will decide to pull the plug.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com
부시의 외교정책이 후퇴를 할 것이고, 군부-니오콘은 약화될 것이고, 이라크에서 선거로 새정부(알 하킴이 수상이 될 것?)가 세워진다고 해도 민족주의적 성향을 보일 것이고, 부시는 북한 이란 등에 대해서도 암묵적으로 무능을 인정했고, 쿠바 러시아 중국 등과 대립각을 세울 수도 없을 것이고, 이런 상황에서 영리하고 원칙에 충실하지 않는 부시는 불리한 게임을 하려 하지 않을 것이다, 그래서 미국헤게모니의 약화의 공백을 여러 준비되지 않은 세력들의 불안정한 경쟁이 채울 것이다, 부시가 2001년 집권했을 때 미국은 이미 헤게모니가 약화하고 있었고 부시정부는 이를 더욱 악화시켰는데 부시 2기는 이 어리석은 정책의 부정적인 결과를 감수해야 할 것이라는 취지의 글이네요.
미국과 부시의 후퇴를 너무 쉽게 예측하고 있는 것은 아닌가 하는 생각이 드네요. 헤게모니 후퇴를 막기 위한 미국이나 부시정부의 강공과 온갖 무리수가 동원될 수도 있지 않을까요? 힘센놈들은 무리수인줄 알면서도 무리수를 쓰기도 하잖아요. 거함은 쉽게 가라않지 않을 거란 이야기죠. 암튼 참고하십시요.
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Comment No. 152, January 1, 2005
"Bush and the World: The Second Term"
George W. Bush has been reelected for a second term of four years. It is rather certain what policy he will pursue on the U.S. domestic scene, since he has announced it clearly. He will push for further tax cuts. He will seek to privatize as much of the social security system as he can. He will appoint only judges who will reflect his conservative values, both on economic and social matters. He will seek to dismantle as much environmental legislation as possible. He will seek to strengthen the authority of the government in all police investigations and prosecutions. In short, he will pursue a classic rightwing agenda.
What remains much more obscure is what he intends to do in foreign policy, and this for one very simple reason. On the one hand, during his first term his administration committed itself strongly to a particular foreign policy - that of unilateral pre-emptive action whenever and wherever it felt like. On the other hand, this foreign policy has not been very successful, not only in the eyes of its critics at home and elsewhere in the world, but even in the eyes of many of its faithful supporters. There is turmoil in the ranks of the Bush partisans, which can be observed in the recent flurry of demands by certain major conservative figures for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld combined with the immediate support Rumsfeld received from others, including the president himself. Rumsfeld simply exemplifies these policies.
What can we expect now? There are actually two questions here. Will the second Bush administration pursue the identical foreign policy as the first? And, to the extent that it changes, how will the rest of the world react?
The most immediate question is Iraq. The number one political priority of the U.S., as we enter 2005, is holding Iraqi elections in the end of January. But why is this so important? In the first place, it is important to the U.S. in order to show that these elections can be held at all, despite the attacks of the insurgents. Secondly, it is important because the U.S. fears that, if they weren't held, they would be blamed by the Ayatollah al-Sistani, who might then shift his position from one of prudent distance from the U.S. to one of active hostility. Thirdly, it is important because the U.S. hopes to be able to shift the political/military battle in Iraq from one in which it is Iraqi insurgents versus the U.S. to one in which it is Iraqi insurgents versus a legitimate elected Iraqi government. But fourthly, it is important because it is seen as the essential prerequisite to a reduction of the number of the U.S. troops in Iraq. Of course, there are others who also anxiously want these elections - the interim Iraqi government and the mainstream Shia parties in particular.
So, elections will almost certainly be held - amidst continuing and probably escalating violence and amidst a high rate of abstentionism, especially in Sunni areas. But what will happen then? We shall probably see a new government with Ayatollah Sayed al-Hakim, the leader of the main Shia party (SCIRI), as Prime Minister. Depending on how the elections actually go and the behavior of al-Hakim, this government may or may not start with some minimal acceptance as a national government. The insurgency will almost surely continue, however, charging that the new government is a U.S. puppet. And the new Iraqi government will sooner or later have to choose between continuing to pursue the overtly pro-American policy of Iyad Allawi and adopting a nationalist line more consonant with the demands of the Iraqi people. One does not have to be a Middle East expert to suspect that sooner or later the new Iraqi government will opt to be more nationalist, in order first of all to be more legitimate.
The pressure on the U.S. to withdraw its troops will then be coming from three sides: from the insurgents, from the new Iraqi government, and from public opinion at home. Within the U.S., all the polls indicate that more and more people feel that the price the U.S. is paying in soldiers killed and wounded and in the costs of war are simply too high. The U.S. is at the beginning of an isolationalist reaction. And since isolationism has always had a strong hold within the Republican party, we shall begin to see the president's own supporters pushing for troop withdrawal.
There is no doubt that there are others within the Bush administration such as the militarists and the neo-cons - the two are not identical, by any means - who will fight this tendency bitterly. But this camp is much weaker than it was in 2003. So we may get a big swing in U.S. foreign policy. What we will not get is the modulated middle position of "multilateralism" dear to the heart of Colin Powell and to the first President Bush's advisors like Brent Scowcroft, and dear as well to the leaders of the more conservative wing of the Democratic Party (such as Senators Biden and Lieberman).
What happens vis-a-vis Iraq will presage all the rest of the Bush foreign policy. It is already the case that Bush has pulled back on North Korea and Iran to a position of tacit recognition of impotence. The Bush team is huffing and puffing, but they know there is very little they can do. They would be happy to see renewed negotiations between Israel and Palestine, which Blair is trying his best to push, but the U.S. will merely go along with such developments rather than be their prime promoter. These renewed negotiations are in any case not likely to go very far. And, in that case, the laid-back position of the Bush administration will protect it from too much internal U.S. damage.
Looking around the world, where can Bush act now? In Cuba? He'd like to, no doubt. But today we have state officials in Alabama (the heart of Bush country) saying that if they don't sell chickens to Cuba, Brazil will, and adding that the government's restrictions on trade with Cuba are an unjustified sop to the Cuban exiles in Florida. There is no sign of any serious support within the U.S. for a Cuban adventure. In Russia? We have just seen how, even though the Ukrainian elections have caused a very bad press for Putin in the United States, nonetheless Bush went out of his way to indicate that the U.S. will continue to work with Putin. In China? The economic interests of the United States preclude anything hostile, despite the uneasiness the Bush administration has with China's increased political role in Asia. In Europe? Even Rumsfeld's "new Europe" is beginning slowly to desert the U.S. In short, Bush does not have many options available to him. And since Bush is a canny and very unprincipled politician, he will not want to play in a game in which the odds are so heavily against him.
And how will the world react to a de facto pulling inward -both militarily and economically - of the U.S.? One can expect that, after an initial period of caution, everyone will try to take advantage of this new display of U.S. geopolitical weakness. The problem is that, once the U.S. presence in the world is reduced, it is like removing an elephant from the living room. No one is quite sure how to fill the space. And it is probably the case that no one has a fully prepared set of policies for such a situation. So there will be much unsure jostling among all the other geopolitical players. The U.S. was already a declining hegemonic power when Bush came to power in 2001. In seeking to restore the U.S. world position in his first four years of power, Bush actually made the situation much worse for the U.S. The U.S. (and Bush) will reap the harvest of his folly in the second term.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
'해체주의' 철학자 데리다가 모종의 암으로 세상을 떠났다는군요.
이름은 많이 들어봤지만 데리다 관련 글은 거의 읽은 게 없습니다. 알튀세와 관련한 조사('맑스주의 역사'), 다 읽었나 싶을 정도로 기억이 없는 어떤 인터뷰(이론지)가 고작이군요. 그리고 그 뒤엔 그의 글이 매우 어렵다는 얘기를 듣고 읽을 엄두조차 내지 않았지만 최근 한겨레신문 기사에선가 인터뷰에선가 결혼제도와 관련해서 그가 얘기했다는 '시민결합'이 무척 신선했습니다. 그리고 신자유주의가 기승을 부리던 90년대 중후반이던가요? 맑스를 이야기하면서 모종의 '인터내셔널'을 주장한 것으로도 알려졌지요.
아래 '자크 데리다, 난해한 이론가(이는 진태원씨에 의하면 특별한 분야의 철학을 하는 사람들이라는 의미를 갖는다고 들었습니다)'라는 뉴욕타임즈 기사는 좀 선정적이고 비우호적으로 쓰여진 것 같습니다. 폴 드만, 하이데거 등 데리다와 이론적으로 관련된 인사들의 과거 나치 전력들, 두둑한 강연료를 받으며 많은 청중을 몰고 다니기, '해체주의'의 불가해성, 결혼 등등.
그 중 하나. 데리다는 아들이 셋인데 그 중 하나가 나중에 죠스팽과 결혼한 실비안 아가신스키(?)와의 사이에서 낳은 아들이라네요.
데리다 특집이 봇물을 이룰 것 같은데 쉽게 씌여진 글이라면 한 번 읽어봐야겠네요.
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Jacques Derrida, Abstruse Theorist, Dies at 74
By JONATHAN KANDELL
Published: October 10, 2004Jacques Derrida, the Algerian-born, French intellectual who became one of the most celebrated and notoriously difficult philosophers of the late 20th century, died Friday at a Paris hospital, the French president's office announced. He was 74.
The cause of death was pancreatic cancer, according to French television, The Associated Press reported.
Mr. Derrida was known as the father of deconstruction, the method of inquiry that asserted that all writing was full of confusion and contradiction, and that the author's intent could not overcome the inherent contradictions of language itself, robbing texts - whether literature, history or philosophy - of truthfulness, absolute meaning and permanence. The concept was eventually applied to the whole gamut of arts and social sciences, including linguistics, anthropology, political science, even architecture.
While he had a huge following - larger in the United States than in Europe - he was the target of as much anger as admiration. For many Americans, in particular, he was the personification of a French school of thinking they felt was undermining many of the traditional standards of classical education, and one they often associated with divisive political causes.
Literary critics broke texts into isolated passages and phrases to find hidden meanings. Advocates of feminism, gay rights, and third-world causes embraced the method as an instrument to reveal the prejudices and inconsistencies of Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Freud and other "dead white male" icons of Western culture. Architects and designers could claim to take a "deconstructionist" approach to buildings by abandoning traditional symmetry and creating zigzaggy, sometimes disquieting spaces. The filmmaker Woody Allen titled one of his movies "Deconstructing Harry," to suggest that his protagonist could best be understood by breaking down and analyzing his neurotic contradictions.
A Code Word for Discourse
Toward the end of the 20th century, deconstruction became a code word of intellectual discourse, much as existentialism and structuralism - two other fashionable, slippery philosophies that also emerged from France after World War II - had been before it. Mr. Derrida and his followers were unwilling - some say unable - to define deconstruction with any precision, so it has remained misunderstood, or interpreted in endlessly contradictory ways.
Typical of Mr. Derrida's murky explanations of his philosophy was a 1993 paper he presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, in New York, which began: "Needless to say, one more time, deconstruction, if there is such a thing, takes place as the experience of the impossible."
Mr. Derrida was a prolific writer, but his 40-plus books on various aspects of deconstruction were no more easily accessible. Even some of their titles - "Of Grammatology," "The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond," and "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce" - could be off-putting to the uninitiated.
"Many otherwise unmalicious people have in fact been guilty of wishing for deconstruction's demise - if only to relieve themselves of the burden of trying to understand it," Mitchell Stephens, a journalism professor at New York University, wrote in a 1994 article in The New York Times Magazine.
Mr. Derrida's credibility was also damaged by a 1987 scandal involving Paul de Man, a Yale University professor who was the most acclaimed exponent of deconstruction in the United States. Four years after Mr. de Man's death, it was revealed that he had contributed numerous pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic articles to a newspaper in Belgium, where he was born, while it was under German occupation during World War II. In defending his dead colleague, Mr. Derrida, a Jew, was understood by some people to be condoning Mr. de Man's anti-Semitism.
A Devoted Following
Nonetheless, during the 1970's and 1980's, Mr. Derrida's writings and lectures gained him a huge following in major American universities - in the end, he proved far more influential in the United States than in France. For young, ambitious professors, his teachings became a springboard to tenure in faculties dominated by senior colleagues and older, shopworn philosophies. For many students, deconstruction was a right of passage into the world of rebellious intellect.
Jacques Derrida was born on July 15, 1930, in El-Biar, Algeria. His father was a salesman. At age 12, he was expelled from his French school when the rector, adhering to the Vichy government's racial laws, ordered a drastic cut in Jewish enrollment. Even as a teenager, Mr. Derrida (the name is pronounced day-ree-DAH) was a voracious reader whose eclectic interests embraced the philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Camus, and the poet Paul Valéry.
But he could be an indifferent student. He failed his baccalaureate in his first attempt. He twice failed his entrance exam to the École Normal Supérieure, the traditional cradle of French intellectuals, where he was finally admitted in 1952. There he failed the oral portion of his final exams on his first attempt. After graduation in 1956, he studied briefly at Harvard University. For most of the next 30 years, he taught philosophy and logic at both the University of Paris and the École Normal Supérieure. Yet he did not defend his doctoral dissertation until 1980, when he was 50 years old.
By the early 1960's, Mr. Derrida had made a name for himself as a rising young intellectual in Paris by publishing articles on language and philosophy in leading academic journals. He was especially influenced by the German philosophers, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Both were strong critics of traditional metaphysics, a branch of philosophy which explored the basis and perception of reality.
As a lecturer, Mr. Derrida cultivated charisma and mystery. For many years, he declined to be photographed for publication. He cut a dashing, handsome figure at the lectern, with his thick thatch of prematurely white hair, tanned complexion, and well-tailored suits. He peppered his lectures with puns, rhymes and enigmatic pronouncements, like, "Thinking is what we already know that we have not yet begun," or, "Oh my friends, there is no friend..."
Many readers found his prose turgid and baffling, even as aficionados found it illuminating. A single sentence could run for three pages, and a footnote even longer. Sometimes his books were written in "deconstructed" style. For example, "Glas" (1974) offers commentaries on the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the French novelist Jean Genet in parallel columns of the book's pages; in between, there is an occasional third column of commentary about the two men's ideas.
"The trouble with reading Mr. Derrida is that there is too much perspiration for too little inspiration," editorialized The Economist in 1992, when Cambridge University awarded the philosopher an honorary degree after a bruising argument among his supporters and critics on the faculty. Elsewhere in Europe, Mr. Derrida's deconstruction philosophy gained earlier and easier acceptance.
Shaking Up a Discipline
Mr. Derrida appeared on the American intellectual landscape at a 1966 conference on the French intellectual movement known as structuralism at Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore. Its high priest was French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who studied societies through their linguistic structure.
Mr. Derrida shocked his American audience by announcing that structuralism was already passé in France, and that Mr. Lévi-Strauss's ideas were too rigid. Instead, Mr. Derrida offered deconstruction as the new, triumphant philosophy.
His presentation fired up young professors who were in search of a new intellectual movement to call their own. In a Los Angeles Times Magazine article in 1991, Mr. Stephens, the journalism professor, wrote: "He gave literature professors a special gift: a chance to confront - not as mere second-rate philosophers, not as mere interpreters of novelists, but as full-fledged explorers in their own right - the most profound paradoxes of Western thought."
"If they really read, if they stared intently enough at the metaphors," he went on, "literature professors, from the comfort of their own easy chairs, could reveal the hollowness of the basic assumptions that lie behind all our writings."
Other critics found it disturbing that obscure academics could presume to denigrate a Sophocles, Voltaire or Tolstoy by seeking out cultural biases and inexact language in their masterpieces. "Literature, the deconstructionists frequently proved, had been written by entirely the wrong people for entirely the wrong reasons," wrote Malcolm Bradbury, a British novelist and professor, in a 1991 article for The New York Times Book Review.
Mr. Derrida's influence was especially strong in the Yale University literature department, where one of his close friends, a Belgian-born professor, Paul de Man, emerged as a leading champion of deconstruction in literary analysis. Mr. de Man had claimed to be a refugee from war-torn Europe, and even left the impression among colleagues that he had joined the Belgian resistance.
But in 1987, four years after Mr. de Man's death, research revealed that he had written over 170 articles in the early 1940's for Le Soir, a Nazi newspaper in Belgium. Some of these articles were openly anti-Semitic, including one that echoed Nazi calls for "a final solution" and seemed to defend the notion of concentration camps.
"A solution to the Jewish problem that aimed at the creation of a Jewish colony isolated from Europe would entail no deplorable consequences for the literary life of the West," wrote Mr. de Man.
The revelations became a major scandal at Yale and other campuses where the late Mr. de Man had been lionized as an intellectual hero. Some former colleagues asserted that the scandal was being used to discredit deconstruction by people who were always hostile to the movement. But Mr. Derrida gave fodder to critics by defending Mr. de Man, and even using literary deconstruction techniques in an attempt to demonstrate that the Belgian scholar's newspaper articles were not really anti-Semitic.
"Borrowing Derrida's logic one could deconstruct Mein Kampf to reveal that [Adolf Hitler] was in conflict with anti-Semitism," scoffed Peter Lennon, in a 1992 article for The Guardian. According to another critic, Mark Lilla, in a 1998 article in The New York Review of Books, Mr. Derrida's contortionist defense of his old friend left "the impression that deconstruction means you never have to say you're sorry."
Almost as devastating for deconstruction and Mr. Derrida was the revelation, also in 1987, that Heidegger, one of his intellectual muses, was a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1945. Once again, Mr. Derrida was accused by critics of being irresolute, this time for failing to condemn Heidegger's fascist ideas.
By the late 1980's, Mr. Derrida's intellectual star was on the wane on both sides of the Atlantic. But he continued to commute between France and the United States, where he was paid hefty fees to lecture a few weeks every year at several East Coast universities and the University of California at Irvine.
Lifting a Mysterious Aura
In his early years of intellectual fame, Mr. Derrida was criticized by European leftists for a lack of political commitment - indeed, for espousing a philosophy that attacked the very concept of absolute political certainties. But in the 1980's, he became active in a number of political causes, opposing apartheid, defending Czech dissidents and supporting the rights of North African immigrants in France.
Mr. Derrida also became far more accessible to the media. He sat still for photos and gave interviews that stripped away his formerly mysterious aura to reveal the mundane details of his personal life.
A former Yale student, Amy Ziering Kofman, focused on him in a 2002 documentary, "Derrida," that some reviewers found charming. "With his unruly white hair and hawklike face, Derrida is a compelling presence even when he is merely pondering a question," wrote Kenneth Turan in The Los Angeles Times. "Even his off-the-cuff comments are intriguing, because everything gets serious consideration. And when he is wary, he's never difficult for its own sake but because his philosophical positions make him that way."
Rather than hang around the Left Bank cafés traditionally inhabited by French intellectuals, Mr. Derrida preferred the quiet of Ris-Orangis, a suburb south of Paris, where he lived in a small house with his wife, Marguerite Aucouturier, a psychoanalyst. The couple had two sons, Pierre and Jean. He also had a son, Daniel, with Sylviane Agacinski, a philosophy teacher who later married the French political leader Lionel Jospin.
As a young man, Mr. Derrida confessed, he hoped to become a professional soccer player. And he admitted to being an inveterate viewer of television, watching everything from news to soap operas. "I am critical of what I'm watching," said Mr. Derrida with mock pride. "I deconstruct all the time."
Late in his career, Mr. Derrida was asked, as he had been so often, what deconstruction was. "Why don't you ask a physicist or a mathematician about difficulty?" he replied, frostily, to Dinitia Smith, a Times reporter, in a 1998. "Deconstruction requires work. If deconstruction is so obscure, why are the audiences in my lectures in the thousands? They feel they understand enough to understand more."
Asked later in the same interview to at least define deconstruction, Mr. Derrida said: "It is impossible to respond. I can only do something which will leave me unsatisfied."
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어딜가나 자영농과 자영업자를 노동자의 처지로 만들어버리는 것이 자유무역이라는 이름으로 행해지고 있는 것 같습니다. 너무 마음이 아프네요.부가 정보